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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to answer the following question: How and to what extent does identity 
and Self-Other perception influence the foreign policy of the EU and Russia toward the 
establishment of a sovereign and viable Palestinian State?   
The thesis scrutinises the assumption that identity and Self-perception as well as 
perception of ‘otherness’ play a vital role in defining foreign policy-making, with policy 
toward the Middle East being no exception. The investigation focuses on how the EU’s 
and Russia’s desire to reinforce their ‘global actorness’ on the international stage informs 
their involvement in the Middle East peace process. This assumption brings into the 
analysis the dynamic of constructivism in the shaping of foreign policy. Through a 
constructivist approach, the thesis attempts to explore how Self-Other perception informs 
foreign policy-making, specifically by the EU and Russia, in relation to Palestinian 
statehood. Thus the thesis problematises existing views about the role of established IR 
schools in understanding foreign policy-making (namely, in terms of peace-making). The 
study seeks to deepen our understanding of the role of identity and Self-Other perception 
in EU and Russian foreign policy-making by going beyond conventional understanding of 
foreign policy-making that are fixated on ‘power’, with special reference to the question of 
Palestinian statehood.  
In this vein, I advance the argument that, contrary to the old assumptions of schools such 
as realism and liberalism, there is a role played by identity and ideas that needs to be 
assessed in the context of EU and Russian peace-making in the Middle East. The thesis 
tests these assumptions using a qualitative methodology to investigate the making of 
foreign policy by the EU and Russia. Discourse analysis is the main method employed to 
interpret the role of identity and Self-Other perceptions. This is done through a study of 
discourse made up of official documents and statements as well as interviews with 
diplomats with current and past involvement in the formulation of EU and Russian foreign 
policy.  
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DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
MEPP       the Middle East Peace Process  
UN         United Nations  
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RUSSIA      the Russian Federation  
UNSC       United Nation Security Council 
UNGA      United Nation General Assembly  
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PLO      Palestinian Liberalization Organization  
IHEC      Independent High Electoral Commission 
ENP                    European Neighbourhood Policy 
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HR-CFSP     Higher Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
policy  
CFSP      the Common Foreign and Security policy 
EPC      European Political Co-operation  
CIS      Commonwealth of Independent states 
NGOs       Non-Governmental Organizations  
IOPS       the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society  
EEAS       the European External Action Service 
CEE       Central and Eastern Europe  
WMD       Weapon of Mass Destruction 
ISESCO      the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  
UAE       United Arab Emirates   
GCC       the Gulf Cooperation Council  
Duma      the Russian legislative lower house  
EUPOL COPPS the European Union mission for the Palestinian territories’ 
EU BAM Rafah European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah 
Crossing Point  
TIM      Temporary International Mechanism  
NUG       Palestinian National Unity Government  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Learning does not mean to fill a barrel, but to ignite a flame. 
(Heraclitus, sixth century BC) 
 
In the making of foreign policy in the Middle East, no issue has drawn as many political 
initiatives and as much academic attention as the Palestinian issue. Although the 
Palestinian problem emerged around 100 years ago, the land of Palestine, as a result of its 
geographic, religious, and symbolic relevance, has been at the heart of international 
politics between global powers for hundreds of years. The political discourse of the 
conflict has focused on many issues, including the religious, the historical, the ethnic, and 
the cultural. The discourse of the conflict is not solely a Palestinian-Israeli matter. Within 
the context of the conflict, regional and international dimensions have a strong presence. 
Certainly, the Middle East, by its geographical proximity   and political, economic, 
religious and cultural ties, occupies a high position in the foreign policy-making agenda of 
global actors, and especially those of the region’s close neighbours the EU and Russia. 
That is, the EU and Russia could not keep themselves out of the process of the evolution of 
the political settlement of the Middle East. In the last decade, the establishment of the 
Palestinian state has become a permanent priority in world politics and has widely 
dominated foreign policy-making towards the Middle East peace process (MEPP). The 
fact is that the Palestinians have yearned for an independent viable state of their own for 
generations. Thus, the more than century-long continuous conflict over historical Palestine, 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, continues with no end in sight.  
 
Two decades after the Oslo Accords that represented an attempt to pave the way for a 
peace settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and more than a decade after the 
creation of the Quartet as a collective will of global actors in making peace in the Middle 
East, the current Palestinian UN bid for statehood highlights the failure of global actors to 
realise Palestinian statehood. This failure has drawn a bold line under peace efforts made 
by these global actors toward the Middle East Peace Process.  In fact, a peace settlement in 
the Middle East has been influenced by multifaceted contexts that deeply inform this 
process. Despite wide-spread international support for a Palestinian state, especially by the 
nearby region’s global powers- the EU and Russia, a lasting and comprehensive peace 
settlement seems to be far out of reach. When the time came to declare a Palestinian state, 
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any genuine effort faded due to the failure to put any pressure on Israel to realise this 
objective.  
 
Thus, this failure stands as one of the most remarkable issues in foreign policy-making by 
global actors towards the region. Inquiring into the reasons for the failure to reach a peace 
settlement once more is as topical as ever.  In fact, the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy-
making has been contradictory with divergent perceptions of the peace process and its 
parties.  At the core of this investigation are three assumptions. First, the construction of 
the international identities of the EU and Russia highly informs their policies towards an 
active and effective involvement in the MEPP which reflects underlying internal 
developments at contextual levels. Second, this involvement is defined by their perception 
of the Middle East within multifaceted contexts, reflecting certain content changes and 
shifts in international identity construction, as well as the consideration and 
institutionalisation of this international identity as external expectations and aspirations of 
global actorness.  Third, the perception of the conflict as chronic and intractable has 
become a characteristic on which peace-making is played out, as well as the perception of 
Israelis in contrast to the Palestinians deeply defines their activeness and effectiveness in 
Palestinian state-building.   
 
My approach to EU and Russian involvement in the MEPP is derived from the 
constructivist scholarship in foreign policy-making which recognises the existence of an 
ideational structure in informing this involvement. The international identities of the EU 
and Russia are an important part of these ideational structures in their foreign policy-
making towards the MEPP. This thesis understands the international identities of the EU 
and Russia as constructs which are reflected in internal developments and expectations 
about the ‘Self’. Where the EU and Russian involvement in the MEPP is high and active, it 
cannot be reduced to rational action and must be understood as part of a foreign policy that 
shapes and is shaped by ideational structures about the Self, and their place and mission in 
the world.   Thus, the thesis assumes that the international identities of the EU and Russia 
are constructed within different contextual levels, not ‘natural’ as realism assumes, and 
that it is relational, dynamic and established in relation to a series of internal and external 
developments.  
The seven chapters that make up this thesis offer a deep analysis and investigation of the 
role of identity and Self-Other perception in the EU and Russian foreign policy-making 
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towards Palestinian statehood. These chapters present a framework for a better 
understanding and analysis of the impact of identity and Self-Other perception on peace-
making in the Middle East.  The failure to establish a Palestinian state after two bids at the 
United Nations is an empirical illustration of this approach.  The EU’s and Russia’s 
foreign policy is not about peace per se, rather it is about preserving a mechanism to 
facilitate easy access to Middle East politics and bilateral relations.  
1.1 The Importance of the Study 
The question of identity and Self-Other perception in defining the foreign policy-making 
of the EU and Russia towards the Middle East conflict is rarely discussed. My own 
research has confirmed that there are very few scholarly publications on this topic. This 
makes the current inquiry imperative and compelling. Moreover, the EU and Russia as 
global actors involved in in the Middle East peace process are seldom discussed in relation 
to identity and Self-Other perception. Thus, the importance of this study is embedded in 
the understanding that identity matters in interpreting the behaviour of big power players 
in designing foreign policy in regions where conflict remains unresolved, such as in the 
Middle East, where the Israeli-Palestinian issue dominates international relations inside 
and outside the region.  
I argue that the constructivist approach is useful for analysing the role played by identity 
and Self-Other perception in shaping foreign policy vis-à-vis this conflict. This study 
advances arguments based on constructivist assumptions not used in the more established 
IR schools, such as realism. The significance of this study also lies in the opportunity that 
a look through a constructivist lens offers to deepen our understanding of conflict in the 
Middle East. From this angle, the study addresses the shortfall of studies using identity and 
Self-Other perception in interpreting the nature of conflict in the Middle East. This 
shortage is notable in most academic studies discussing Middle East political phenomena.  
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
In following the Palestinian–Israeli conflict it is clear that Palestinian statehood is not 
purely a Palestinian–Israeli matter. For many decades, and especially since the Madrid 
Conference in 1991, the question of the Palestinian state has been at the centre of 
international relations concerning the Middle East. Indeed, the question of the 
establishment of a Palestinian state is extremely dominated by global power politics. Thus, 
the foreign policy of the EU and Russia is enormously relevant to the question of 
10 
 
Palestinian statehood. The main objective of this study is therefore to problematise the 
foreign policy-making of the EU and Russia as it concerns the Palestinian state. I intend to 
investigate the matter from a constructivist perspective rather than a realist and liberal one.  
 
This study takes as its starting point two observations. First, from a neo-realist perspective, 
as Nizar Messari argues, if the state were not to exist, the security of its citizens would not 
be guaranteed. Hence, states seek power to guarantee their citizens’ security.1 Thus, the 
establishment of the Palestinian state, as Mushtaq H. Khan argues, is perceived as a threat 
to Israel.
2
 However, the security of Israel is guaranteed by most global powers. Many EU 
leaders like Sarkozy, Merkel, and Berlusconi, assert their commitments to guarantee Israeli 
security. Furthermore, the PLO leadership accepted a de-militarised state within the 1967 
borders.
3
 Hence, the assumption that the Palestinian state would be defined by a security 
agenda is not reasonable.  
 
Second, from a liberal perspective, the formation of a Palestinian state is vital to the 
promotion of stability and prosperity in the Middle East. In this regard, Hillel Frisch and 
Menachem Hofnung argue that the massive international financial aid from donor states 
and major international financial institutions to the Palestinian authority is intended to 
support and encourage peace efforts to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. That is, the 
liberal perspective on the Palestinian state is based on political and economic assumptions 
that promoting democracy, civil society, and economic growth is conducive to achieving a 
peace settlement.4 In April 2011, the UN said that the Palestinian Authority was ready to 
run an independent state.
5
 This matter was also discussed in the context of the idea of a 
greater Middle East.
6
 In 2002, the Arab League summit formally endorsed the initiative of 
                                                 
1
 N. Messari, 'The State and Dilemmas of Security: The Middle East and the Balkans', Security Dialogue, 
33/4 (2002), 415-27.p. 415-16. 
2
 See John A Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998).p. 3-6 
3
 The Palestinian leadership especially Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, and even Hamas leaders Sheikh 
Ahmad Yasein, Khalid Meshal or Ismail Hanya, expressed their acceptance of establishing a Palestinian state 
within the 1967 borders (the West Bank and Gaza Strip). 
4
 H. Frisch and M. Hofnung, 'State Formation and International Aid: The Emergence of the Palestinian 
Authority', World Development, 25/8 (1997), 1243-55.p. 1243-44. 
5
 Aljazeera, 'UN Says Palestinians Able to Govern Own State', (12/04/2011 edn.; Doha: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/04/2011412152947529736.html, 2011). 
6
  For more information see Rand Corporation. Rand Palestinian State Study Team, Building a Successful 
Palestinian State (Rand, 2005). 
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a two-state solution as a desired end for peace and prosperity in the Middle East. 
Practically, and in theory, the road to the establishment of a Palestinian state, from the 
liberal perspective, is paved and ready to exist. Thus, the second observation is that the 
liberal perspective does not explain the question of why the Palestinian state has not been 
established.  
 
Thus, the objective of this thesis is twofold. The first purpose is to focus on the central 
puzzle, which is: How the discourse of Palestinian statehood by the EU and Russia can be 
understood? This is specifically in order to understand why the EU and Russia support the 
establishment of a Palestinian state in their general discourse, but do not support it in 
action. The puzzle I attempt to examine and explore in this thesis is at the centre of EU and 
Russian foreign policy-making towards the Middle East peace process (MEPP). In 
principle, and directly, establishing a Palestinian state is a strategic priority for both the 
EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict. Indirectly, the EU and 
Russia do not seem to be ready to take serious steps and pressure Israel to comply with 
regard to the UNSCRs and stop its aggressive policies against the Palestinians which they 
might perceive in different contexts, through the different prisms of EU and Russian 
identities. It aims to understand and analyse the set of internal developments and the 
ideational bases of identity which shape Self-perception in the case of both EU and 
Russian foreign policy-making, in parallel. This is partly in order to gain a greater 
understanding of the social elements behind the ineffectiveness of international efforts to 
support the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is also motivated by the need within the 
field of international relations for greater emphasis on interpreting and seeking to 
understand the role of key social elements such as identity and Self-Other perception in 
influencing peace-making processes in the Middle East.  
 
The second objective is to argue that conventional assumptions – based on theories of 
power, security and interdependence – have failed to explain adequately why the 
Palestinian state has not been established. That is, the thesis does not accept realist and 
liberal assumptions that foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict is always 
informed by the security agenda (realist paradigm), or is simply shaped by the quest for 
interdependence (liberal paradigm). And so, the study frames its analysis of EU and 
Russian foreign policy discourse within a constructivist approach.  
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1.3 Problematic and Key Questions 
Over decades, Palestinians have struggled for a viable and independent state. The 
establishment of a Palestinian state has largely been defined by the foreign policy of the 
major global actors. It is under these auspices that the Middle East peace process has been 
defined. On 23 September 2011, Mr. Mahmoud Abbas, the chairman of the Palestinian 
Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, submitted the Palestinian 
application for full UN membership to H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. Mr. Abbas summed up this matter in his speech at the United Nations: 
 
‘I come before you today from the Holy Land … to speak on behalf of the 
Palestinian people in the homeland and in the Diaspora, to say, after 63 years of 
suffering of an ongoing Nakba: Enough. It is time for the Palestinian people to 
gain their freedom and independence. The time has come to end the suffering 
and the plight of millions of Palestine refugees in the homeland and the 
Diaspora, to end their displacement and to realize their rights, some of them 
forced to take refuge more than once in different places of the world’. 
Mahmoud Abbas, 2011
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Despite a long history of diplomatic initiatives, from 1917 when Palestine fell under 
British rule, an independent and viable Palestinian state still seems unachievable. After the 
formation of the League of Nations, Palestine was placed under a British mandate.
8
 In 
1923, Palestine was recognized by the League of Nations as an ‘A’ mandate. Technically it 
was to be administered like a trust by Britain until ready for self-government’9, but the 
Palestinian right to self-government was ignored.
10
 This led to the extension of the 
                                                 
7
 Mahmoud Abbas, speech in the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly, 2011 
8
 Y. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 
(Oxford University Press, USA, 1998). 
9
 Bunton, M.,' Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, 1917-1936', (Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 
2007), p1.  
10
  The fate of Palestinians cannot be understood isolated from the political developments at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. After the Ottoman defeat in the first World war, the question of Palestine has always 
been associated with big political questions in the international scene. The victorious powers, particularly 
Britain and France, redrew the political map of the Arab Middle East. The new political map of the Arab 
Middle East was endorsed by the newly established League of Nations. The League of Nations designed a 
mandate system. According to this system, Palestine was annexed to the British political and military sphere.  
The mandate meant that the Palestinians would gain an independent state. But before independence, 
Palestinians needed the British to prepare them for self-government. The crucial matter of the British 
mandate on Palestine was the commitment to create the Jewish national homeland in Palestine. The British 
promise for the Jews which was known as the “Balfour Declaration” was added to the British mandate on 
Palestine. British policy in Palestine worked to pave the way for creating a homeland for the Jews. The 
British authorities adopted political, economic and demographic policies, aiming to facilitate the creation of a 
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conflict, which was both political and military. The conflict developed into a number of 
wars, including the 1948 war (Nakba), the 1956 war,  the Six Days War in 1967, the 
October War in 1973, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and two intifadahs – 
the first in 1987 and the second (Al-Aqsa Intifadah) in 2000. Efforts to resolve the conflict 
have produced a number of peace initiatives and UN resolutions, such as General 
Assembly Resolutions 181 and 194 and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
 11
     
 
In the course of Palestinian history, statehood has been the primary objective. Indeed, it is 
a major motif in Palestinian political leaders’ political discourse and military activism. 
Most Palestinian leaders, such as Haj Amin Al-Husayni, Ahmed Al-Shugari, Yasser 
Arafat, Ahmed Yassin, Ismail Haniya, Khalid Mishal, George Habash, Naïf Hwatmah, and  
Mahmoud Abbas have agreed on the Palestinian right to statehood.
 12
 On this long route, 
                                                                                                                                                    
homeland for the Jews.  For more information see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The 
Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993.p. 3-6.  
11
 The Arab-Israeli conflict started when the British established a mandate over Palestine in 1917. During 
that time, substantial waves of Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine. The rise of nationalism in Europe 
which led to the first and second World Wars resulted in a large wave of Jewish immigrants outside Europe. 
Palestine under the British Mandate became a key destination for Jewish immigrants. The increased number 
of Zionist Jews arriving in Palestine led to clashes with the Palestinians. Minor clashes between Palestinians 
and Jews were rapidly taking a new course, one of armed conflict. Later, this conflict led to war.  
Accordingly, in 1948 the Jewish Zionists in Palestine announced what they called the independent state of 
Israel. The Zionist declaration led to the breakout of violence which led to the 1948 war between the Arabs 
and Israelis. The new state of Israel was established on 78% of the historic lands of Palestine. The rest of 
Palestine was divided between two political rules; the West Bank which was subject to Jordanian Rule and 
the Gaza Strip which was under Egyptian rule. In 1967, a new war erupted; Israel occupied the West Bank 
and Golan Heights in Syria and the Gaza Strip and Sinai in Egypt. In 1973, a war of liberation erupted on 
two fronts: Sinai and the Golan Heights. Israel withdrew from Sinai according to the Camp David agreement 
that was signed in 1979, but still occupies the Syrian Golan Heights. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon aiming 
to destroy the PLO presence there.  In 1987, a popular uprising (Intifadah) erupted against the Israeli 
occupation. The Intifadah gained wide international support and popularity. It placed international pressure 
on Israel which led to the signature of the declaration of principles (known as the Oslo Accords) between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians. The  Oslo Accords paved the way for direct negotiations between the 
Palestinians and Israelis to reach an independent state. In 2000, the Palestinian deputation and Israeli 
delegation failed to reach an agreement on the issues of Palestinian statehood. This failure to establish a 
Palestinian state led to the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifadah. For more information see J. Hilal, 
Where Now for Palestine?: The Demise of the Two State Solution (Zed Books, 2007). And I. Pappe, A 
History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
12
 At the beginning of the British mandate in Palestine, the Palestinians sought to organize themselves. They 
established a number of national institutions which represented their ambitions for an independent 
Palestinian statehood. Two institutions were particularly important during this period: the Arab Executive of 
Palestinian Arab Congress, established in 1922 and the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) headed by Amin al- 
Husayni. In 1948, the AHC formed the first government which was then called the All Palestine Government 
(APG). This government was based in the Gaza Strip. It was led by Ahmad Hilmi eAbd-al-Baqi. The APG 
issued passports to local inhabitants. It sent an official delegation to the UN. This government faced 
Jordanian opposition. King Abdullah of Jordan was not in favour of this institution. It was dissolved in 1949.  
After the creation of Israel in 1948, two thirds of Palestinians found themselves refugees in the surrounding 
Arab countries. Palestinian refugees carried the dream of statehood with them in the exile. They reorganised 
themselves in many Palestinian factions with different ideational backgrounds. In 1964, the Palestinian 
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there have been many Palestinian Peace initiatives.  Yasser Arafat addressed the UN 
General Assembly in 1974 and assured the world of the Palestinians’ commitment to 
peace, famously declaring: “Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand”.13 In 1988, the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) adopted the Palestinian peace programme and 
declared an independent Palestinian state.
14
 This gesture, however, and its symbolism, was 
no more than an emotional act used to justify the PLO’s recognition of UNSC Resolutions 
242 and 338.
15
  
 
In 1993, the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles (known as the Oslo Accords) as a 
first practical step towards Palestinian statehood.
16
 The declaration set an interim period of 
five years as a framework for reaching an agreement on final matters in the lead-up to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state.
17
 Under the Clinton administration, a Camp David 
                                                                                                                                                    
Liberation Organization (the PLO) was established by Ahmed Al-Shugari. The PLO was supported by the 
Arab League. In 1974, the Arab League recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinians. Most Palestinian factions joined the PLO and adopted the Palestinian national objectives. One 
important objective was the attainment of statehood. Having a state for themselves is central to the 
Palestinians. Palestinian leaders from all factions and from all political backgrounds could not overlook this 
central question.  For more information see Sayigh, Y. (1998). Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The 
Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, Oxford University Press, USA.. P 7-22. 
13
 S. Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine (Olive Branch Press, 1991).p. 198. 
14
 The Palestinian National Council (PNC) which met in Algeria on 12-15 November 1988 endorsed the 
“Declaration of Independence” of the Palestinian state.  This declaration was part of the Palestinian peace 
programme that was adopted by the PLO which endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and 
called for an international peace conference under the UN, thereby implicitly recognising  the existence of 
Israel.  The message behind this action was to show that the PLO was working towards a new strategy that 
would include a readiness to negotiate with Israel.  For more information see S. Akram, International Law 
and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Rights-Based Approach to Middle East Peace (Routledge, 2011).p. 
154-56. 
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 Mohsen Moh'd Saleh, The Lost Course of the Palestinian Statehood (Al-Masar Al-Ta'eh Li Al-Dawlah Al-
Filastiniyyah) (Doha, Qatar: AlJazeera Center for Studies and Arab Scientific Publishers, 2011) 127 pages. 
16
 In 1993, The Oslo Accords were portrayed by the PLO as a breakthrough in the century-old conflict 
between Palestinians and Israelis. The PLO considered the Accords as a practical step on the ground that 
could make a significant progress in the building of the Palestinian state project.  From the PLO perspective, 
the Accord was designed to create facts on the ground that could give the PLO a chance of moving over to an 
independent Palestinian state rather than dream about it. For more information about the PLO vision of Oslo 
Accords see N. Shaath, 'The Oslo Agreement. An Interview with Nabil Shaath', Journal of Palestine Studies,  
(1993), 5-13. 
17
 Article V of the “Declaration of Principles” states that the negotiations over the permanent status issues: 
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders and relations and cooperation with other 
neighbours, will commence not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period.  The 
Palestinian state was supposed to be declared by the end of this interim period, and all these permanent status 
issues were supposed to be solved through negotiations.  Azmi Bishara argues that the Palestinians accepted 
peace with Israel without reaching an agreement. The Palestinians sat down to negotiate after, not before, 
peace.   For more information about these permanent status issues and the vision about the context of 
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and whether these negotiation will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian 
state or not, see A. Bishara, '4 May 1999 and Palestinian Statehood: To Declare or Not to Declare?', ibid. 
(1999), 5-16. 
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summit was held in 2000 to bring the two sides together in order to solve these remaining 
matters as the final step. The Camp David summit failed, however, to produce a 
compromise on the main issues, including the borders of a future Palestinian state, the 
right of return for Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and the existence of Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank. Note that these final status matters represent the core issues 
that need to be resolved in order to create a Palestinian state.
18
  
 
The Israeli leadership has agreed to negotiate the question of Palestinian statehood. In 
1993, Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo Accords, which paved the way to direct negotiation 
on the question of Palestinian statehood.
19
 However, agreement to negotiate did not mean 
acceptance of Palestinian statehood.
20
  In 2000, Ehud Barak offered a Palestinian state in 
                                                 
18
The failure of the Camp David summit in the summer of 2000 produced and still produces scholarly debate 
about why it failed. Scholarship is diversified over the three parties of the summit: the Palestinian, Israeli and 
American. For Akram Hanieh, a member of Palestinian delegation, Camp David summit was not a 
convention in which the different parties could reach agreement. Hanieh shows that there were serious 
differences between the Palestinians and Israelis especially on two issues relating to the final status: refugees 
and Jerusalem. And the Americans adopted the Israeli position especially on Jerusalem. Akram Hanieh 
discusses the Palestinian vision of what went wrong and who is to blame for the failure of the Camp David 
summit. For more information see A. Hanieh, 'The Camp David Papers', ibid.30/2 (2001), 75-97. Dennis 
Ross, the US envoy for the Middle East, ascribed the failure of Camp David summit to the mistrust between 
the Palestinians and Israelis. According to Ross, Barak, the Israeli prime minister at the time, paved the way 
for this mistrust when he failed to fulfil several commitments previously made by Israel. Ross mentions that 
there were deep gaps between the Palestinians and the Israelis over the permanent status issues which are the 
core of the Palestinian state. Ross argues that the status of Jerusalem was the key question of contention 
between the Palestinians and Israelis. From his side, Barak offered unprecedented concessions in relation to 
Jerusalem. For more information about what went wrong and who is to blame for the failure of the Camp 
David summit, See D. Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2005).   
For Shomo Bin Ami, a member of the Israeli delegation, Barak was interested in peace with Syria rather that 
with the Palestinians. For Barak, achieving peace with Syria was strategically important. After Barak had 
exhausted the Syrian channel, he turned to the Palestinians. Bin Ami argues that Barak came from a military 
background and went to Camp David to make peace. Yet Barak was ready for war should peace prove to be 
unattainable. Barak was out of tune with his Cabinet on the Syrian issue. They advised him to focus on the 
Palestinians. Bin Ami argues that the Palestinians showed flexibility on the question of territory. But they 
moved the issue on Jerusalem to “the very centre of negotiation” in order to put the entire onus for the 
success or failure of the summit onto Israelis.  Bin Ami considered that the failure of Camp David was a 
mark of defeat for the peace camp in Israel for many years to come.  For more information about the official 
Israeli vision of the failure of Camp David, see S. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-
Arab Tragedy (Oxford University Press, USA, 2006). Ben-Ami, S. (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: 
the Israeli-Arab Tragedy, Oxford University Press, USA. P. 240-84.  
19
 The Israeli Labour government came to power in 1992. It signed the Oslo Accord in 1993. This 
government had two different views on approaching the conflict with Arabs:  For Peres, the Israeli foreign 
minister, negotiation was a strategy to achieve peace between Arabs and Israelis. For Rabin, the prime 
minister, negotiation was a tactic which aimed to play the Arabs off one against another so that Israel could 
make fewer concessions to the Arabs. For more information about these two visions, see A. Shlaim, 'The 
Oslo Accord', Journal of Palestine Studies,  (1994), 24-40.   
20
 For Asad Ghanem, the Oslo Accords from the Israeli perspective were ‘significant breakthrough and they 
provoked protests from the right-wing and religious opposition’. The Rabin government at that time 
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87% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
21
 Even Sharon in turn offered a state on 40% of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
22
 In 2009, the current Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu 
responded to Obama’s speech in Cairo and agreed with the two–state solution. In the 
Israeli discourse there is an acceptance of the idea of negotiation an  Palestinian 
statehood.
23
 So, why then is Palestinian statehood still unachievable? 
 
In the course of the last decade, especially after the second Palestinian intifadah, which 
erupted in 2000, the major powers seemed to determine the course of peace-making 
between Palestinians and Israelis. In May 2002, the Quartet was established as an official 
sponsor of the peace process.
24
  The discourse of Palestinian statehood has dominated 
                                                                                                                                                    
perceived Oslo as a practical manifestation of its promise to  make peace with the Palestinians, against the 
backdrop of the Intifadah in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, Israel noted the increase of 
international support to find a solution to the Middle East conflict, especially from the United States and the 
majority of European governments. Ghanem argues that the changes in the international system after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union led to a new global balance of power in favour of the US which entailed to find 
a settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Israeli government intended to eschew international 
pressures which meant they would not accept a Palestinian state. See A. Ġānim, Palestinian Politics after 
Arafat: A Failed National Movement (Indiana University Press, 2010).p. 13-15.   
21
 Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy.p. 250 
22
 For Virginia Tilly, Sharon’s proposal for a Palestinian state built on his lifelong goal to destroy the 
Palestinian national movement and all dimensions of two-state solution. To do so, Sharon created the Wall in 
the West Bank to seal Israel off from security pressures and to force Palestinian emigration and political 
aspiration towards Jordan and the rest of the Arab world.  Tilly argues that Sharon intended to push the 
Palestinians to find suitable lives and political fulfilment through citizenship in Jordan. Sharon intended to 
make the Palestinian state unviable economically and politically in the 1967-borders. The Sharon proposal 
for a Palestinian state is part of a strategy called “soft transfer”.   The proposal was intended to work against 
the spectre of a bi-national state. By implementing the Wall, the West Bank became separated enclaves like a 
set of Palestinian islands in an Israeli sea. The proposal was designed to respond to Israeli security fears and 
the demographic dilemma. For more information about the Sharon proposal for a Palestinian state see V. 
Tilley, The One-State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock (University of 
Michigan Press, 2005).pages 3-7 & 73-75.   
23
 Shlomo Ben Ami, a member of the Israeli delegation at the Camp David summit, states that the 
Declaration of Principle (DOP) established a mechanism for the negotiations to solve the permanent status 
issues in order to establish a Palestinian state.  He states that it is crucial to note that no prior pledge or 
commitment was made by Israel as an outcome of the negotiations. Most of the Israeli leaders agreed to 
negotiate with the Palestinians, but this did not mean that they accepted the Palestinian state. Shlomo Bin 
Ami states that Shimon Peres, the godfather in 1990 of a philosophy of a new Middle East and a Nobel Peace 
Prize winner, opposed the idea of an independent Palestinian state. Shamir, the Israeli Prime Minister 1988-
92, saw Palestinian independence and statehood as the main problems for Israel. Netanyahu’s view was that 
negotiations with the Palestinians would not lead to more than a Palestinian state on 40 per cent of the 1967-
borders. Accordingly, when the Israeli leaders’ agreed to negotiate it did not mean that they were agreeing to 
a Palestinian state. See Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy.pages 150, 194, 
212 & 218. 
24
 The Quartet was established in 2002 and is composed of the USA, the EU, the UN and Russia. Urfan 
Khaliq argues that the Quartet was established with two key objectives: to help to broker a solution to the 
situation in the Middle East and, in the mean time, to allow the partners to take collective action in response 
to events on the ground. The Quartet presented a Roadmap to Peace between the Palestinians and Israelis. 
The Roadmap was designed in three phases; phase I: stop violence, normalise Palestinian life, and build 
Palestinian institutions (to May 2003), phase II: transition (June 2003-December 2003), and phase III: 
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Middle East-related foreign policy-making by global actors – especially the Quartet’s 
members. The two-state solution became the salient discourse of the peace process 
between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. On many occasions, the leaders of global powers 
expressed their support for the two-state solution through different discourses. Thus, the 
issue of the creation of a Palestinian state, according to UN Security Council Resolution 
242, has been at the core of an international consensus on the question. Anne Le More 
argues that the issue of Palestinian statehood reveals a paradox, which is ‘that although at 
the declaratory level there has been a growing acceptance of the two-state solution, the 
feasibility of its materialization dramatically decreased as the decade unfolded’.25 The 
question of a Palestinian state has been high on the international agenda. Many 
international leaders have made speeches that support the Palestinian State. The 
Palestinian leadership has responded to this:   
‘We meet at a time when a great achievement of history is within reach, the 
creation of a peaceful, democratic Palestinian state’.26                                                                 
President George W. Bush, 2005. 
 
‘For more than sixty years they have endured the pain of dislocation. Many 
wait in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring lands for a life 
of peace and security that they have never been able to lead. They endure the 
daily humiliations – large and small – that come with occupation. So let there 
be no doubt: the situation for the Palestinian people is intolerable. America will 
not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, 
opportunity, and a state of their own’.27  Obama Speech in Cairo May 07, 2009.  
 
The American discourse about the peace process in the Middle East is very clear in its 
support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The need for a Palestinian state as a 
starting point for a final and comprehensive peace in the Middle East has been repeated in 
both the Bush and Obama administrations.  Russian arguments about the need to establish 
a Palestinian state are also very clear in the discourse of both Putin and Medvedev. In 
                                                                                                                                                    
permanent status agreement and an end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2004-2005). Therefore, the 
ultimate objective of the Quartet is to implement the ‘Roadmap’ to peace which will lead to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state as a final and comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
by 2005. See U. Khaliq, Ethical Dimensions of the Foreign Policy of the European Union: A Legal 
Appraisal (Cambridge University Press, 2008b).p 283-87  
25
 A. More, 'Killing with Kindness: Funding the Demise of a Palestinian State', International Affairs, 81/5 
(2005), 981-99.p. 983. 
26
 President George W. Bush welcoming President of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas to 
the White House, May 26, 2005. 
27
 Barack Obama, Speech in Cairo, May 07, 2009 
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welcoming the President of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, who 
visited the Kremlin in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev, the then Russian president (2008-12), 
stated that:  
 
‘Russia was one of the first countries to recognise the State of Palestine in 
1989. This was followed by the opening of a fully-fledged embassy of the 
State of Palestine in Moscow, and since then we have been developing 
cooperation and coordination between our countries’.28 Dmitry Medvedev, 
December 22, 2008 
 
In the press release following his visit to Ramallah on 26 June 2012, the Russian President, 
Vladimir Putin (President 2000 – 2008 and 2012 – present), said:   
‘For Russia there is no problem in recognising an independent Palestinian state. 
This was done 25 years ago by the Soviet Union, and Russia, as we know, is 
the Soviet Union’s successor and its position on this matter has not changed’. 
Vladimir Putin, 2012 
29
 
 
Moreover, the idea of a Palestinian state as the solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
has long dominated EU foreign policy. Both Javier Solana and Catharine Ashton, the 
former and current EU foreign policy chiefs, state that:   
‘It would accept the Palestinian state as a full member of the U.N., and set a calendar 
for implementation. It would mandate the resolution of other remaining territorial 
disputes and legitimise the end of claims’. Javier Solana 2009.30  
 
‘Our aim is a viable State of Palestine in the West Bank including East Jerusalem 
and the Gaza strip, on the basis of the 1967 lines’.31  Catherine Ashton statement at 
the League of Arab States, Cairo, 15 March 2010 
 
According to the discourse of global powers, Palestinian statehood is central to foreign 
policy-making vis-à-vis the Middle East, but at the same time it is unreachable. Thus, the 
establishment of Palestinian statehood, as central to the conflict in the Middle East, 
remains a puzzle in global actors’ foreign policy-making. This brings us to the specific 
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 Javier Solana 2009. Reuters, 'EU's Solana Calls for UN to Recognise Palestinian State', 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/12/idUSLC616115; BRUSSELS: Reuters, July 12, 2009). 
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aspect of the puzzle under investigation in this thesis: the question of Palestinian statehood 
in the discourse of major global actors.  
 
Two assumptions inform this thesis. The first is that major western powers, as shown 
above, are not opposed to Palestinian statehood. On the contrary, there is plenty of 
evidence from foreign policy statements, such as those from the EU and Russia, which 
indicates a change in the declaratory policy of major powers towards Palestinian statehood. 
To reach a peace settlement, there are many issues that must be resolved. In the case of 
Palestinian refugees, Michael Dumper points to the Israeli perspective on this question, 
that is,  resolving the Palestinian refugees issue in line with UN resolutions ‘presents an 
existential risk to Israel’. 47 
 
The EU does not support the Palestinian right of return according to Resolution 194 of the 
UN General Assembly. It asserts that the issues of Palestinian refugees ‘must be solved 
through negotiation between the parties of the conflict’.32 The EU does not accept Hamas’s 
authority, despite the fact that it came to power through free and fair democratic 
parliamentary elections in 2006. In addition to this, the EU and Russia have taken part in 
imposing the Quartet’s conditions on Hamas. Plus, the EU and Russia rarely seem to put 
real pressure on Israel to stop the building of settlements in Jerusalem.     
 
Hence, one must ask the question: why do the major powers not then support in action the 
establishment of a Palestinian state? This leads me to my second assumption: major 
powers that accept Palestinian statehood in principle do not seem to be ready either to 
accept actual key conditions or elements that are central to the creation of a Palestinian 
state or to question the Israeli position. As a result, problematic issues such as the siege of 
Arafat, reforming Palestinian public institutions, and rejecting Hamas as a peace partner 
are ignored. This thesis is therefore framed in such a way as to investigate how identity 
and Self-Other perception play a role in defining the notion of Palestinian statehood in EU 
and Russian foreign policy-making.  
For Alexander Wendt:  
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  For more information see B.C. Hostetler, The European Union: Expand, Shrink or Status Quo (Nova 
Science Pub Incorporated, 2006).p. 64-7. 
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‘The framing of problems and research strategies should be question-driven 
rather than method-driven, and if we are not interested in identity- and interest-
formation, we may find the assumptions of a rationalist discourse perfectly 
reasonable’.33  
Accordingly, the study has adopted a main research question as well as a set of sub-
questions that drive and guide the thesis. Thus, the questions are framed in a way that 
favours a constructivist approach to explore the effects of identity and Self-Other 
perception in foreign policy-making. The principle problematic of this research can be 
highlighted through the following principle research question: How and to what extent do 
identity and Self-Other perception shape EU and Russian foreign policy-making in the 
Middle East, concerning their policy towards the establishment of a sovereign and viable 
Palestinian state?  
 
The aim of the question above is to explore identity in two ways, which combine to make 
up the full spectrum of how identity is formulated: perception is twofold. Otherness is 
perceived through ways in which Self-perception is cultivated. Here what is important is 
the ideational basis of identity. The set of norms, values and ideas that construct one's 
identity are the same when it comes to viewing 'otherness'. Edward Said in his well-known 
work, Orientalism, gives an insight into how the 'Occident' views the 'Orient'. His work is 
important in opening new areas of inquiry into Self-Other perception and definition. His 
critique of ‘Orientalism’ as a prism through which 'otherness' is produced according to the 
norms, ideas and values of the Occident feeds, to an extent, into the inquiry being 
attempted in this thesis. Said is perhaps more interested in discourse than in the 
construction of reality, and he concludes that generalisations about the ‘Orient’ are no 
more than constructs informed by the bias of the 'Occident'. The discussion he opens up is 
linked to the constructivist approach's emphasis on ideas and identity in the 'construction' 
of the world around us.
 34
    
 
 
                                                 
33
 A. Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International 
Organization, 46/02 (1992), 391-425.p. 423 
34
 E.W. Said, Orientalism (Penguin Books, 2003).  
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1.4 Key Questions:  
The sub-questions informing the thesis are formulated to correspond to the themes 
mentioned above. The sub-questions are the following:  
1- The first question focuses on the construction of the international identity of the EU 
and Russia. It poses this question:  how have internal developments that occurred 
in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union inform the Self-perception of 
Actorness of the EU and Russia? What kind of capabilities has influenced the EU’s 
and Russia’s perception of actorness and to what extent does these capabilities 
define their foreign policy-making? And how is this emerged Self-perception of 
actorness reflected in perceiving the Middle East?     
2- The second theme focuses on the perception of the Middle East as an opportunity. 
The question here is: how do the EU and Russia perceive the Middle East? And 
how do they portray their interrelations and interconnections with the Middle East 
as ‘Otherness’? How do they perceive the importance and challenges of the Middle 
East and how does this perception inform their perception of a peaceful settlement 
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?  
3- The third question focuses on the promotion of the EU’s and Russia’s role in the 
establishment of Palestinian statehood. The question that drives the discussion here 
is: how have the EU and Russia developed their involvement in the Middle East 
peace process? What are the main contexts that inform the establishment of the 
Palestinian statehood? How do the EU and Russia react to essential events in the 
making of Palestinian statehood?   Why did the Russians vote in favour of the 
Palestinian bid at the UNGA while the EU-as-an-actor did not?  
 
When it comes to the establishment of a Palestinian state, the EU and Russia have major 
roles to play. Therefore, the emphasis in this thesis on EU and Russian foreign policy-
making represents a two-sided case study. Through the examination of the foreign policy 
of the EU and Russia, I want to explore the role that identity and Self-Other perception 
play in the success or failure of peace-making and of progress, or lack of progress, towards 
the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refocus of the research through this case study 
of the EU and Russia represents an attempt to deepen the investigation of the question of 
the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making. In this 
investigation, I will have a close look at  EU and Russian discourses towards Palestinian 
22 
 
statehood through exploring the possibility that the meaning given by ‘text’ may vary 
according to the ‘context’ and the ‘targeted group’. In examining this issue, the thesis aims 
to discover how deep the role of identity and Self-Other perception is in EU and Russian 
policies towards the conflict, as well as how the EU and Russia have adapted to the 
changes in the Palestinian political map – namely the rise of Hamas. This allows for an 
evaluation of to what extent EU and Russian foreign policy is supportive and constructive 
to a viable and independent Palestinian state. My interest in the investigation is twofold: 
First, I am interested in how to re-interpret the absence of a viable and independent 
Palestinian state. Second, I seek to understand how the foreign policy of global 
powers/actors towards Palestinian statehood is based on Self-Other perception.  
 
This is at the core of the problematic I seek to explore in my thesis. It is through an 
exploration of the perceptions that the EU and Russia have on the aforementioned 
questions that I attempt to explore the obstacles that may help to explain the intractable 
nature of Palestinian statehood.     
1.5  Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter one is an introduction to EU and Russian 
foreign policy towards the Middle East Peace Process. The thesis introduces academic 
research in terms of its importance and objectives and defines the chief problematic and 
outlines the key questions that the thesis is attempting to answer. Chapter two provides a 
theoretical and methodological framework. I theorise upon EU and Russia foreign policy 
towards the Middle East peace process by employing constructivism, owing to its 
emphasis on ideas and identity and Self-Other perception. This relates to my analytical 
agenda, which seeks to go beyond the conventional understanding of foreign-policy which 
emphasise the role of ‘power’ to the exclusion of other important dimensions. Lastly, in 
designing my methodology, I define qualitative research as a method of enquiry and 
techniques of data collection of primary information. Also, I use discourse analysis in 
ways that help answer the key questions informing my thesis. Chapter three is a critical 
review of the field of scholarship in foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia in 
general and towards the Middle East in particular. In this chapter I review the main 
characteristics of EU-Russian foreign policy through outlining the roots and schools that 
theorise upon and analyse this important area.  I further review scholarships relevant to 
how the EU and Russia are developing their international identities in the context of being 
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global actors in world politics. The emphasis of this review is on the approaches of EU and 
Russian foreign policy-making and on features of EU collective identity, as well as their 
perception of the Middle East and the issue of establishing a viable and independent 
Palestinian state.  Chapter four contextualises the EU’s and Russia’s identity–building 
and Self-perception of actorness. In this chapter I argue that constructing an international 
identity for the EU and Russia lies at the heart of internal developments that inform the 
making of their foreign policy.   Constructing this international identity is an external 
expectation to meet internal developments. I argue that the increased desire of the EU to 
play an active role in world politics is a response to the massive enlargement of its size and 
economy that took place in the post-Cold War era.  Meanwhile, Russia attempts to reassert 
its international position as a global actor and restore the former Soviet influence in world 
politics, perceived as the guarantor to healing its internal disarray and turmoil. 
Highlighting the differences in this process of identity-building between the EU and 
Russia in key contexts such as principles and values, and soft, economic and military 
power, I explain how this emergent Self-perception of actorness informs and defines the 
making of their foreign policy. This leads to an understanding of how the Middle East is 
perceived and to what extent it informs the Middle East peace process from the viewpoint 
of EU and Russia foreign policy.       
Chapter five contextualises the promotion of the EU’s and Russia’s role in Middle 
Eastern politics and the peace process. I argue that the Middle East is perceived as a region 
of multi-layered interests and challenges. It takes its importance from its geostrategic 
position in terms of security and strategic stability, economic and technological 
cooperation and trade relations, energy provider and stabiliser, and historical, cultural and 
religious ties. I argue that this perception of the Middle East informs the EU and Russia 
peace-making towards establishing Palestinian statehood. Chapter six is an analytical 
discussion on promoting the EU’s and Russia’s role in peace-making towards the 
establishment of a Palestinian state. In this chapter, I argue that EU and Russian 
involvement in peace-making is informed by their Self-perception of actorness and their 
perception of the Middle East. It developed in conjunction with the construction of their 
international identity in the post-Cold War era.  The argument is that the EU’s and 
Russia’s involvement in peace-making in the Middle East is a quest to meet internal 
developments and problems and is viewed as a mechanism or channel for easy access to 
the region. The EU and Russia view this involvement as an objective that provides a useful 
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instrument for pursuing European and Russian objectives and interests in the Middle East 
which they are eager to continue with or without reaching a peace settlement. Chapter 
seven contains the findings and a constructivist reflection about EU-Russian perceptions of 
peace-making.  In this chapter the analysis seeks to situate the question of the role of 
identity and Self-other perception in foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia within a 
comparative context. Thus, the discussion must examine the similarities and contradictions 
in the field of foreign policy-making in both camps. Both have been engaged in finding a 
solution to the conflict from the earliest time, but the question of the Palestinian state is 
still intractable. The comparison focuses on how the EU’s and Russia’s present place on 
the international stage works in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In the 
Conclusion, I summarise the findings of this thesis. Accordingly, I address my findings 
about this central puzzle to show how the thesis contributes to scholarship by framing the 
question in an approach differing from those guided by realist and liberal perspectives. I 
also present the limitations and obstacles that I faced in this study and suggest directions 
and questions that arise from this work to be explored further in future studies.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 Focus 
This chapter is going to frame the theory and the methodology that the thesis seeks to 
employ in investigating the role of identity and Self-Other perception in define making of 
foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process by the EU and Russia.  The focus of 
analysis is twofold. Firstly, a theoretical framework is developed by exploring 
constructivism given its relevance to my thesis owing to its emphasis on ideas and identity. 
This relates to my analytical agenda, which seeks to go beyond conventional 
understandings of foreign-policy emphasising the role of ‘power’ to the exclusion of other 
important dimensions. Secondly, in designing my methodology, I look at how I shall use 
discourse analysis in ways that help answer the key questions informing my thesis.  
2.1 Theorising EU and Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East 
peace process (MEPP) 
 
‘We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards 
us daily. Even policy makers who are contemptuous of “theory” must rely on 
their own (often unstated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide 
what to do. . . . Everyone uses theories—whether he or she knows it or not’. 
                                                                           Stephen M. Walt, political scientist
35
 
 
This section seeks to frame how identity and Self-Other perception influence foreign 
policy-making by the EU and Russia towards Palestinian statehood. In so doing, the thesis 
seeks to interpret the role of identity and Self-Other perception and how they might be 
theorized as a part of the EU and Russia’s foreign policy, especially in treating high profile 
issues such as the question of Palestinian statehood. The theory that this thesis employs 
aims to work as a map that makes the puzzle of the thesis intelligible. The puzzle, as 
identified in the introduction, concerns the discourses of Palestinian statehood by the EU 
and Russia.  Thus, the theory that should be used is one that can provide a better 
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understanding of the conundrum of Palestinian statehood and analysis of multiple beliefs 
and ideas that shape or influence identity and Self-Other perception of the EU and Russia.  
 
Framing identity and self-other perception  
For David Campbell ‘identity is an inescapable dimension of being, and nobody could be 
without it’.36 He defines the constitution of identity that is ‘achieved through the 
inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside,' a 'Self 
from an 'Other,' a 'domestic' from a 'foreign’.37 For William Connolly ‘An identity is 
established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized’.38 
Hence, if there is a difference, identity plays a role in it. Therefor, identity is formulated in 
two ways: perception of Self and Other in the context of differences.  Otherness is 
perceived through ways in which Self-perception is cultivated. In this regard, William 
Connolly asserts that ‘Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference 
into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty’.39 Hence, difference generates an 
identity, which in turn, is formulated into Self and Other, which affects the course of 
interrelations. Moreover, Herrmann and Shannon point to Self-Other perception as having 
a role to play in foreign policy-making. They state that ‘perceptions of the situation define 
which rules, duties, and obligations are relevant’.40   
 
in this context, we can see how the Russian perception of the Self in terms of differences 
generates identity. Similarly, the establishment of the EU demonstrates that there is 
perception of the Self in terms of differences which surely generate an identity. However, 
between the Europeans and Russians on the one hand and the Palestinians and Israelis on 
the other, we cannot disregard the reality of difference, thereby; identity exists somewhere 
and has a role to play in the course of interrelations. Here what are important are the 
contexts (historical, cultural, economic, etc.) which within the identities of the EU and 
Russia are constructed. That is, how the EU and Russia perceive the Palestinians in 
comparison with the Israelis and what are the norms, values, interests and ideas that are 
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formulated in the context of their interrelations. This understanding of the differences in 
the identities of the EU and Russia on one side and the Palestinians and Israelis on the 
other, leads to opening ‘new avenues’ for understanding foreign policy-making of global 
powers/actors towards the Middle East.  This thesis highlights and emphasises the 
influence of identity and Self-Other perception in the process of foreign policy-making as 
a substantial link between the four parties, namely: the EU, Russia, Palestinians, and 
Israelis. Therefore, in the Middle East as in the case of the EU and Russia, identity 
dominates their foreign policy-making, particularly towards the question of establishing a 
Palestinian state, which has deep roots in their historical role in the Middle East. The 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is defined by many factors and beliefs that have influenced its 
course.  Thus identity and Self-Other perception cannot be ignored in understanding this 
long history of the conflict.  
 
Approaches to study foreign policy-making  
Throughout world politics and different historical periods, there have been many theories 
of foreign policy-making. That variety indicates the search for more than one framework 
to account for a number of assumptions that explains and investigates political phenomena, 
and to assert that much work has been done in enriching academic research on foreign 
policy-making. A majority of the work in the field of Middle East conflict recognises that 
there is a requirement for an unconventional theory of foreign policy-making to be 
considered and to open up different ways of thinking and understanding the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict.  
 
Studying foreign policy-making varies among three predominant approaches: the policy 
approach, the historical approach, and the social science approach.
41
 The policy approach 
emphasises the study of policies in the ‘present and near future’ in order to evaluate and 
adjust the process of policy-making through providing recommendations.
42
 The historical 
approach uses the chronology of historical events and their narrative – such as, for 
example, diplomatic history. The historical approach tends to emphasise a ‘historical 
understanding of foreign policy, attempting to recapture the specifics of the time..’. This 
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approach aims to show awareness of factors that influenced foreign policy. It depends 
heavily on primary source documentation (government documents, private papers), and 
produces ‘well-written narratives for a scholarly and more general audience’.43 The social 
science approach, according to Jerel A. Rosati and James M. Scott, tends to be ‘concerned 
with explaining more limited facets of foreign policy in order to identify basic patterns’. 
This approach represents an attempt to ‘understand these patterns through the use of 
concepts and the development of theory’, making use of ‘more systematic research tools 
for collecting and analysing information’.44 
 
The policy approach uses several analytical methods for understanding foreign policy 
processes which explain and interpret states’ behaviour and policies in the international 
arena. The famous one is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which was 
developed by Sabatier (1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) to provide a causal 
theory of the policy processes.  The ACF was developed to ‘provide a coherent 
understanding of the major factors and processes affecting the overall policy process’.45 
Thus, the framework is an approach to ‘illuminate coalition conduct and policy change in 
issues that are categorised by a high level of political conflict’.46 Hence this approach is 
more useful to study domestic policy decision-making that foreign policy-making.  
 
Other models classified under the policy approach are: the rationality or rational choice 
which is defined as a ‘consistent, value-maximizing choice within speciﬁed constraints’.47 
Rational choice is based on a number of premises that inform foreign policy-making such 
as clarified
48
 and prioritised or ranked goals,  which rank outcomes according to the 
‘degree of satisfaction of achieving these goals and objectives’,49 identified alternatives;  
that identify alternatives and their consequences,
50
 and  maximised utility, that provides 
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the greatest amount of net beneﬁts.51 Thus rational decision-makers choose between 
alternatives that provide the consequence which is most preferred.
52
  
The governmental or bureaucratic model,
53
 according to G. Alison, views actions of a 
government as political resultants. It assumes that the making of foreign policy is a result 
of bargaining and interaction amongst various actors in several governmental agencies, not 
the result of calculated decisions by the heads of state. The model centers on the 
decentralisation of foreign policy – making which ‘represents decentralised processes that 
involve various actors in various agencies’.54 It emphasises multiple organisations and 
bureaucracies rather than a single actor,
55
 in which decisions emerge from political 
struggle and bargaining between groups,
56
 therefore, the outcome is a compromise.
57
  The 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) assumes that foreign policy-makers choose between risky 
options by comparing their expected utility values. It posits that decision makers ‘attempt 
to maximize expected utility in their choices between risky options’.58 Prospect Theory is 
a social psychological framework for foreign policy-making in a state of uncertainty and 
risk. It assumes that ‘avoiding loss is more important than securing gain’.59 The 
implication of prospect theory in foreign policy-making is that leaders ‘take risks to initiate 
bold new foreign policy directions’.60  
 
Most of these policy approach models understand the actors’ identities to be ahistorical 
and uniform. The aforementioned models see the actors’ identities as a given and to be 
taken for granted. Taking actors’ identities for granted and as unproblematic undermines 
the key problematic of this study. The thesis sees the actor’s identity as malleable, multiple 
and unstable which needs reaffirmation and reconstruction in view of a changeable world.  
Lacking an account of how identity is constructed and how it influences foreign policy-
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making, the models of the policy approach are unable to problematise the discourse of the 
EU and Russia towards establishing a Palestinian state and why it is still an intractable.  
The Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is one of the frameworks that apply to the explanation 
of domestic as to foreign policy choice.
61
  It bases its premise upon the argument that ‘all 
that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision-makers’ 
acting singly or in groups’.62 The approach builds on learning form a social science 
perspective about human decision-making. Therefore, it does not assume that policy-
makers act in ‘classical rational fashion’.63 Thus, it is good on breaking apart the 
monolithic view of the nation-state as a unitary actor, by focusing on units that are 
comprised within the state. It is characterized by an ‘actor-specific focus’.64 FPA assumes 
that the personal characteristics of leaders, including discourse, problem representation, 
creativity and learning, advisory processes, bureaucratic politics, legislative politics, 
societal groups, domestic political imperatives, and so on are all as relevant to country and 
region experts as much as to FPA analysts.
65
   
FPA assumes that the source of much of a state’s behaviour and most change in foreign 
policies is driven by human beings, acting individually or collectively, which is a very 
common assumption. It grounds its theorising of foreign policy-making on the behaviour 
and thought of human beings. Obviously, all theories of foreign policy-making ground 
their assumptions in human beings’ thinking and acting. The FPA approach looks for 
sources of change and diversity of foreign policy decision-making within a given state’s 
system. However, its main weakness is that it fails to consider the factors and contexts that 
shape or construct the international identity of the states and global actors. It focuses on 
the people and unites that comprise the states but does not investigate how that identity is 
constructed and to what extent it influences the making of foreign policy.  I  am not in 
favour of adopting this approach because, according to Steve Smith, it attempts to 
understand foreign policy  by focusing on treating states ‘as members of a class of 
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phenomena’, and  by focusing on the decision-making process in order to produce an 
explanation, it seeks to generalise about the sources and nature of a state’s behaviour.66 
The refocus of this thesis through the analysis of the role of identity and Self-Other 
perception in foreign policy-making is an attempt to eschew conventional tendencies of the 
study of foreign policy-making in the course of the Middle East conflict. The driving 
forces of the Middle East conflict are not only fixed on power and economic interests.   
The additional factors driving forces are diverse, and identity and Self-Other perception 
play a vital role.  Foreign policy has neither fixed assumptions, nor does it have a specific 
approach in studying politics towards the Middle conflict. Foreign policy is a policy-
making process in which “actions and ideas (are) designed by policy makers of an 
international actor (rather than state actor) to promote a change in the attitudes of other 
actors or in the environment.67 Thus, the EU and Russia cannot make their foreign policy 
outside of temporal and spatial contexts. Hence, foreign policy is a result of these temporal 
and spatial contexts in which identity and Self–Other perception are shaped. The following 
is a debate within social science theories in the realm foreign policy-making  
Schools of Russia’s foreign policy 
In the Russian academic literature there are three different approaches or schools of 
Russia’s foreign policy-making that dominate current discussions and arguments about the 
role of Russia in  world politics. These approaches might enrich my argument on the role 
of identity and Self-perception in the Russia’s foreign policy-making. The approaches  
differ according to their degrees of openness in relation to the west, and to their tactics in 
achieving Russian national interests and foreign policy objectives. Shireen Hunter and her 
colleagues refer to these three schools as: the Euro-Atlanticists, Eurasianists and Neo-
Eurasianists. The divisions between the three schools are built on the integration between 
the demotic primacy and external environment.  In other words, these divisions are based 
on Russia’s identity and Self-perception which is entwined with Russia’s place and 
mission in the world, as will be made clear below.  
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The Euro-Atlanticism School states that the first goal of Russia’s foreign policy is to 
‘create an external environment that would enable it to become a democratic, market-
oriented and civilized nation’. 68 For them  Euro-Atlanticism is a western orientation in 
Russian foreign policy. They assert that Euro-Atlanticists believe in ‘the need to integrate 
Russia into the civilized world and that it must embrace Western culture in its totality’.69 
On the external level, it introduces Russia as a “civilizer” in Central Asian republics. 
Accordingly, Russia should be a “bridge” between Central Asia and the West, and an 
agent of civilisation in collaboration with the West. In the same way, Yannis Stivachtis 
states that the Euro-Atlanticists ‘favour closer ties to the US and Europe’.70 Moreover, 
Lajos F. Szászdi states that Euro-Atlanticism upholds the notion of Russia continuing as a 
‘normal power’, and renounced the ‘idea of superpower’. At the same time, it does not 
accept the US’s Self-proclaimed role as the centre of a unipolar world order, preferring to 
support the formation of a multipolar international system.
71
 Thus, Euro-Atlanticists see 
Russia as a part of western civilization and believe that it should give up its aspiration of a 
superpower in the post-Cold War era.   Shireen Hunter and her colleagues criticise  
Euro_Atlanticists of having an unrealistic expectation  of solving Russia’s problems, 
especially  their political and cultural problems. They view the Russian-western 
partnership as naïve and idealistic, beside the fact that Euro-Atlanticist policy is too 
concessionary towards the West and hence is unequal.
 72 
 
the Eurasianism
73
 doctrine in Russian foreign policy premises a geographical dimension 
(Eurasia) and the ethno-fusion of Slavic and Turko-Muslim  peoples of Russia, and it 
rejects the view that Russia is on the periphery of Europe. 
74
 For Frederick Matern, the 
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Eurasianists  ‘believed in a strong State’, and they ‘put more emphasis on culture’ which is 
‘combined with the Eurasianist political geography’, which was translated by elites and 
policy makers  into a ‘programmatic political philosophy’ covering many aspects like the 
economy, foreign policy, etc.
 75
  These premises were developed and adopted to be a new 
feature of  Russia’s foreign policy called a new or Neo-Eurasianism.  Marlene Laruelle 
refers to Neo-Eurasianism as ‘the most conservative ideology’ that was emerged in the 
post-Soviet era. According to her, ‘it maintains that Russia must unlearn Europe and reject 
the imperialism of European identity’.76 Marlene Laruelle criticises the Eurasianist School 
in terms of historical and contemporary currents of thought that are often difficult to 
identify. Also, the term Eurasianism is beset with numerous ambiguities, paradoxes, and 
contradictions, while it calls for a better recognition of national minorities, especially 
Muslims, or plans for the constitution of a Russo-Turkish axis that would rival the EU as a 
magnet for Europe’s Eastern margins.  
 
The Neo-Eurasianist 
77
 doctrine has been used more and more often to comment on 
Russian foreign policy with Putin is coming to power, according to Marlene Laruelle. 
78
 
She argues that  Eurasianism became  attractive to whoever was questioning  Russia’s 
place between Europe and Asia.  Since Putin’s advant to power in 2000, Marlene Laruelle 
has observed many references to Neo-Eurasianism in Putin’s foreign policy such as : 
Putin’s speech   at the Asian Summit in Brunei in November 2001, where he said: ‘Russia 
has always felt herself to be a Eurasian country’.79 However, she argues that there is a 
doubt whether such aspects of Russian foreign policy truly represent the Eurasianist 
doctrine. At the same time, she points to Neo-Eurasianism as ‘often equated with foreign 
policy discourse or the new Russian patriotic ideology’.80  In the same way, Irina Isakova 
asserts that Russia has demonstrated strength in upgrading its position in the international 
theatre. She states that the Neo-Eurasianists support agreements with China, India, Japan 
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,and  increased co-operation with the Commonwealth Independent States, Iran and the 
Middle East, expanding Russia’s geo-strategic space. 81 
For Shireen Hunter and her colleagues,  new or Neo-Eurasianism is not the same as 
traditional or classical Eurasianism.
82
 They mention that ‘the new Eurasianist school is 
essentially inspired by the ‘realist theory’ of international relations and a desire to retain 
Russia’s great-power status’.  Furthermore, they state that Neo-Eurasianists are not anti-
West, and favour a more balanced foreign policy that also encompasses relations with 
China, other Pacific countries, the central Asia republics, Muslim countries and South 
Africa
83
.  However, Irina Isakova points out that Neo-Eurasianism ‘carries strong anti-
American perceptions’.84 This mean that  Self-Other perception has an influence on the 
Neo-Eurasianist perspectives of  Russian foreign policy.   
 
Approaches to EU foreign policy-making 
For Fraser Cameron, scholars in the political sciences ‘find it difficult to pin a theoretical 
label on the EU’.85 Similarly, Karen Smith argues that there is no single theory applicable 
to EU foreign policy because ‘different conceptual approaches will be appropriate for 
different theoretical questions and illuminate a different set of empirical facts’.86 Although 
there are an enormous number of studies on EU foreign policy, they rarely subject it to the 
same theory or approach. When the literature of the studies of EU foreign policy was 
surveyed, it was found that many theorists and scholars consider it a puzzle. In this regard, 
Karen Smith refers to ‘neorealism; neoliberal institutionalism, intergovernmentalism, 
constructivism; and neo-functionalism
87‘as approaches to the same study. Whereas Mark 
Pollack refers to: realism, intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and 
rational-choice institutionalism as a characteristic set of approaches to the study of the 
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EU.
88
 These approaches should ‘provide a useful starting-point for generating explanations 
of EU foreign policymaking’.89 However, Fraser Cameron argues that the traditional 
confrontation in foreign policy theory is ‘between the realist school and the liberal-
institutionalist school’.90   These approaches might provide more understanding to the 
thesis’s scope.  
  
Realism91 is described as one of the oldest theories in political theory and one which has 
claimed a large space for its arguments.
92
  It offers assumptions or principals that suggest a 
way of dealing with the state on the external level. It assumes that states seek to maximise 
power accumulation and defend their national interests (Morgenthau, 1946)
93
 , puts 
emphasis on the imperative of survival (Mearsheimer,1994)
94
,and focuses on imperative 
security needs(Waltz,1988).
95
 Power, security, and national interests are central to the 
realist understanding of foreign policy-making.  According to Waltz’s perspective 
(neorealist), the state is the dominant actor in an international system; therefore, the state’s 
foreign policies are driven by the desire to maximise its material capabilities in an anarchic 
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world.  Thus, the natural position of the state in the international system is ‘a state of 
war’.96  Subsequently, the state’s behaviour at an external level is driven by the desire to 
maximise its material capabilities and maintain its security conditions in order to survive. 
Because of this, Henry Kissinger points to the level of mistrust among states.
97
 This lack of 
trust leads states to define their alliances according to ‘self-interested’ behaviour.  In this 
regard, Alexander Wendt argues that neorealists believe that ‘Anarchies are necessarily 
“self-help” systems, systems in which both central authority and collective security are 
absent’. 98  The neorealist debate, according to Wendt, has been based on commitment to 
“rationalism”. In contrast, rational choice is treating ‘identities of agents as exogenously 
given and focus on how the behaviour of agents generates outcomes’.99 Therefore, Realism 
addresses identity and Self-Other perception in a narrow concept. For Karl K. Schonberg, 
states have only ‘one essential identity’ that centres on ‘sovereign, Self-interested, 
competitors for power view of the role of identity in world politics’.100 Hence, realism 
places an emphasis on the “Self” that is primarily defined in the context of national 
interests, power and security.    
Furthermore, realism reflects a broader emphasis on otherness. Realism assumes that states 
exist in an ‘anarchic international system’.101 That is, states treat other states on the basis 
of antagonist or foe. Thus, there is a realist equation that is set on Self-interest in contrast 
with the other.   In this regard, Andrei Tsygankov and Pavel Tsygankov argue that realists 
tend to perceive other states as ‘threatening and recommend that they [states] Self-prepare 
to defend its security’.102  
The EU is not a nation state; therefore traditional realists do not generally pay attention to 
the EU as a global actor.
103
 In connection to this, Karen Smith points out many obstacles 
that EU foreign policy is limited by in relation to the realist approach. She argues that the 
realists place an emphasis on these limits and international bodies of the EU ‘cannot 
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overcome these limits’.104 Thus, in the realist perspective, the EU cannot play a vital role 
as a global power in world politics until it becomes a kind of Westphalian federation with 
a central government. Jan Zielonka argues that the enlargement of the EU resembles “a 
neo-medieval empire”. In this realist view  of the process of enlargement of the EU, 
Zielonka poses a model of ‘concentric circles’ for the EU  in which  the states as political 
units “operate in a system without a clear power centre and hierarchy”. That is, ‘multilevel 
and multicentred governance will be the norms’. 105   The model is a guarantee for 
strengthening European identity, where this identity ‘will be blurred and fragile with no 
truly European demos’. 106    
 
However, John Van Oudenaren argues for a view of the enlarged EU from a neorealist 
perspective in which the Treaty of Lisbon ended  five years of political uncertainty in the 
EU in order to play a vital role as a capable and coherent global actor on the international 
stage.
107
  From a neorealist perspective, Van Oudenaren
108
 states four outstanding  
premises which shape the development of the EU as a global actor on the international 
stage.  First, the context of the redistribution of global power that most likely will 
continue, and the emergence of global political, economic and military multipolarity, will 
affect how the EU defines its national interests. Thus, the EU needs to fashion a politic to 
define its interests and think about relations with other powers beyond the crude 
containment of power and the reaffirmation of western solidarity. Second, how the EU will 
deal with the economic crisis and the high level of spending on international aid. Third, 
how the European institutions function in practice, namely the European Council and a de 
facto EU foreign minister (the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy) and finally its relationship with the US.  These four will all factors 
influence the future of the EU as a global actor in world politics.  
Liberalism
109
 is a complex and multifaceted theory which rarely, if ever, exists in a pure 
form.
110 
 In the international realm, the theory seeks to address the possibility of enhancing 
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cooperation and peace, and to achieve the desired end of global welfare.
111
 It assumes that 
states  are socially-adaptive and have high international agential power. That is, the 
international realm is redefined as a realm of possibility and interdependence, which 
enables states to maximise global welfare and create a peaceful, cooperative and orderly 
world.
112
 Thus, interdependence, cooperation and peace are central to the liberal 
understanding of foreign policy-making. Like realism, liberalism considers states as ‘the 
dominant actors in the international system and defines security in “Self-interested” 
terms’. 113 According to Michael Doyle, liberalism has been seen as a counter to realism in 
that ‘liberal states do not go to war with one another’ and states can observe and have 
respect for one another’s individual freedom. 114 Thus, the natural position of the state in 
an international system is a state of peace. 
 Subsequently, there is a trusting behaviour between states based on a set of principles, 
values and institutions which work to achieve the desired end, namely,  peace and global 
welfare. According to Wendt, liberalism is based on a commitment to the ‘rationalist 
model which treats identities and interests as exogenously given and constant’.115 Thereby, 
                                                                                                                                                    
them within two categories: individual-centric liberalism, comprising classical liberalism, new liberalism and 
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Liberalists do not deny the role of Self that is based on a set of principles and values, but 
they place more emphasis on interdependence and institutions to achieve the desired ends.  
Anne Le More’s study highlights the ‘aid for peace’ strategy as a liberal instrument in 
supporting the Middle East peace process and Palestinian state building.   one conclusion 
of this study was that the failure of the aid strategy  ‘reflects the limitations of the 
incrementalist approach under- pinning the Oslo process which did not tackle the main 
political issues to the conflict directly and did not link the 'peace process' to a clear set of 
political objectives’. 116 
Institutionalism as a theory was developed in the study of domestic institutions, and then 
grew until it ‘constituted sources of inspiration in international relation theory’.117. It 
assumes that ‘when states can jointly benefit from cooperation, governments attempt to 
construct such institutions’. 118 Hence, institutionalists foresee that institutions are working 
to reduce obstacles, decrease transaction costs, increase information exchange, establish 
bridges of cooperation between states and facilitate the processes of exchange.
119
 For 
James March and Johan Olsen, theories of political institutions portray political decision-
making primarily as ‘a process for developing a sense of purpose, direction, identity and 
belonging’.120 Thus, Institutionalists point out that these institutions have an ‘independent 
effect on member states’ subsequent negotiating behaviour and policy choices’.121 Hence, 
institutionalism as a theory in foreign policy focuses on how institutions interact and how 
this affects the political behaviour of states or international society. In other words, it 
builds its assumptions on increased cooperation between states.  
 
In the case of the EU, Ben Rosamond argues that the EU is ‘heavily institutionalized’.122 In 
the same vein, Mark A. Pollack argues that the EU is the most institutionalised 
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international organization in the world.
123
 However, Hall and Taylor label three sub-
species of institutionalism: historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism.
124
  
For Dowding, rational choice institutionalism has revolutionised the study of the EU by 
bringing formal techniques to study the nature of the power relationship between the 
complex principal set of institutional actors.
125
 Rational choice institutionalism posits that 
‘human beings are self-seeking and behave rationally and strategically’.126  The supporters 
of this approach to the study of the EU believe that it is ‘able to build knowledge in a 
systematic way’.127 Thus, the multi-institutional character of the EU makes this theory 
attractive to the many scholars who study it from an institutional perspective. The 
institutional perspective of the EU does not deny the influence of identity, but it places 
high emphasis on  rationalism in the making of foreign policy.  
 
New rational choice institutionalism, known as the new institutionalism, proceeds from the 
proposition that ‘institutions matter as  shapers of and influence upon actors’ behaviour 
rather than as mere expressions of political culture’. 128 Normative institutionalism as a 
strand of new institutionalism portrays member states of the EU as ‘thinly-socialized 
actors with quasi-autonomous preferences’, and the member states are committed to 
‘ensuring the Union’s political viability’ and pursue their foreign policy preference within 
an ‘institutionalized setting’.129 According to this theory, EU foreign policy is a 
compromise of states’ preferences. In the liberal institutionalist vision, foreign policy is 
based on a multilateral system, which is ‘the universe of multilateral organizations, 
international law, and multilateral principles, norms and politics’.130 It is worth saying that 
institutionalism with all its strands elevates rationalism in policy decision-making and 
focuses on the role of institutions in shaping and influencing EU behaviour in world 
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politics. To put it another way, it emphasises the role of institutions in determining EU 
foreign policy-making.  
 
Intergovernmentalism, in the case of the EU, refers to the role of national governments as 
the primary actors in the integration process. According to Thomas Risse-Kappen, the 
intergovernmentalist approach sees EU –member states as ‘the principle agents driving or 
preventing progress in the European co-operation’.131  In other words, 
intergovernmentalism considers that the governments of the EU’s 28 members are the 
main actors in determining EU foreign policy-making. In this approach to the EU, national 
governments ‘endorse their interests in a broader system’.132 In other words, the 
intergovernmental approach assumes a convergence of governmental preference and 
interests between the EU’s 28 states in making domestic and foreign policies. At the same 
time it recognises the importance of institutionalisation of the EU’s agents in order to 
reach a global actorness of the EU.    The criticisms of this approach are related to the 
egotism of member states in negotiating their interests and preferences and their 
ineffectiveness in dealing with crisis.
 133
 The leaders of member states have to meet 
periodically to discuss new treaties and this has resulted in crises, and decisions subject to 
states’ preference and interests or to inter-state bargains.    
 
Neo-functionalism developed within the framework of the main theory functionalism, 
which is a theory of international co-operation that deals with ‘specific transnational 
problems such as health or the environment’.134 Also, the theory is based on the hope of 
widening co-operation among nation states that will lead to a weakening of the territorial 
and legal sovereignty of nation-states
135
. In the case of the EU, neo-functionalism 
emerged, according to Fraser Cameron, as a response to the need to increase co-operation 
between European states. It is associated with the work of  Ernst Haas.  For A. Stone 
Sweet and W. Sandholtz, Haas ascribes European integration to three main factors: ‘The 
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relationship between global interdependence, political choice, and the development of 
supranational institutions’.136  
 
However, Fraser Cameron argues that Haas acknowledges that co-operation in the 
European Union is easier to achieve in light of ‘its history and shared democratic 
values’137. Thus it assumes that ‘the spill-over effect of co-operation would lead to a 
growing sense of European identity’.138 Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein state 
that ‘identity played a minor role in Haas’s theory’, also that the theory ruled out ‘any 
deeper changes of identity’139.   Thomas Risse-Kappen states that neofunctionalism 
emphasises ‘an incremental and gradual process of political change’, and argues that this 
change is basically driven by what he called ‘the logic of functional self-sustaining 
processes’ which, according to him, responds to ‘external constraints and opportunities as 
well as internal developments’.140 Thus, neofunctionalism assumes that European 
integration leads to the construction of European identity, but does not explain if identity 
has any influence upon the European decision-making process on an external level.  
 
Constructivism
141
 as an approach to the  study of the EU is ‘trendy’,142 but it came to EU 
studies relatively ‘late’.143  It was introduced by Nicholas Onuf emphasises the socially 
constructed character of international relations.
144
  Constructivism has been developed by a 
number of scholars throughout the last three decades or so. However, most of the literature 
on the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy dates from after the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union or the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War 
represented a sharp shift towards constructivism in the scholarship of International 
Relations. In this regard Katzenstein and his colleagues describe this moment as ‘the 
sinking of the Titanic’ and refer to the second half of  the 1990s in which North American 
scholarship ‘was preoccupied with the issue of whether variants of realism or liberalism 
offered a superior way for explaining the world’.145 According to Fraser Cameron, 
constructivism in international relations ‘emphasizes the social dimension of world 
politics’ and that co-operation among states is high and cannot be ‘reduced to rational 
action or a system of institutional constraints’, as well as holding that state interaction must 
be understood as ‘a pattern of action that shapes and is shaped by identities over time’.146   
 
The search for collective identity and what type of global actorness the EU can play and 
what place and mission the EU has on the international stage, are questions which 
stimulate constructivist debate over studies of EU foreign policy.  The year 1999 is 
considered by Pollack as a turning point in constructivist
147
 studies of the EU.
148
  
Constructivism as an approach in international relations, according to Fraser Cameron, 
places ‘emphasis on the social dimension of the world politics’ and co-operation among 
states is high and cannot be ‘reduced to rational action or a system of institutional 
constraints’. State interaction must also be understood as a ‘a pattern of action that shapes 
and is shaped by identities over time’.149 In studying the EU, Rey Koslowski argues that 
constructivism which focuses on ‘political practice, intersubjective meaning and informal 
norms’ could be used to develop an approach to understanding the EU as a federal polity 
on the international scene.
150
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Theories range from those which consider that the state conducts foreign policy in order to 
maximise its material capabilities, to ones that place emphasis on cooperation and 
interdependence in order to reach peace and global stability, to ones which foresee 
institutions establish bridges of cooperation between states and facilitate the processes of 
exchange, to ones which   consider a convergence of governmental preference and 
interests essential to foreign policy-making, to ones which consider foreign policy of the 
state as a response to its identity. In foreign policy, neorealists ascribe interaction between 
states to anarchy, while liberals attribute interaction to order.   
It is reasonable to expect foreign policy theories to be helpful in interpreting the behaviour 
of the EU and Russia towards Palestinian statehood.  Much in the EU and Russia’s foreign 
policies in the Middle East revolves around international cooperation, economic 
interdependence, accumulating power capabilities, national interests, security cooperation 
and perceptions that are at the heart of the aforementioned theories. These theories suggest 
different ways of understanding the foreign policy of the EU and Russia towards 
establishing Palestinian statehood which provides a base upon which to examine the 
foreign polices of the EU and Russia towards the Middle East peace process, because the 
nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict offers a greater scope for understanding the 
process of foreign policy-making by global powers/actors. Thus, through a constructivist 
approach this thesis aims to investigate how Self-Other perception informs foreign policy-
making, specifically by the EU and Russia, in relation to Palestinian statehood. 
 
2.2. A Constructivist School as an Analytical Frame to Foreign Policy-
making 
  
The constructivist theory is have used to study the discourses of the EU and Russia in the 
context of the Middle East peace process. Using constructivist theory does not mean that 
other theories  are unhelpful or wrongheaded. In regards to the EU’s and Russia’s global 
actorness, I will argue that those political entities are objects in the realm of foreign policy-
making, as ‘global actors’ in the international milieu.151 According to Brian White, the 
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model concentrates on the impact of the EU as a global actor in world politics.
 152
  
Therefore, the approach is to study the EU is the ‘the EU-as-actor’.153 This model was 
chosen to investigate European discourse towards establishing a Palestinian state because 
of its limitations. Brian White states two limitations to the model which are: ‘the focus is 
on outcomes rather than processes’ and whether ‘the EU can be appropriately analysed and 
evaluated as a single actor’.154  Thus, the thesis seeks to investigate the outcomes of the 
EU’s foreign policy towards the issue of a Palestinian state and considers the EU as a 
single actor in world politics. In connection to this, Anastasia Chebakova points out the 
constructivist accounts for the EU’s global actorness. She assumes that the EU is ‘a new 
kind of multi-faced, multi-perspectival construct, which by acting globally changes 
meanings and perceptions of foreign policy and presents a new type of international 
actorness’.155 Russia on the other hand, is a federation and considers itself the legitimate 
successor to the former Soviet Union and seeks to restore its international polarity. In this 
regard, Tsygankov points to domestic perception and debates of international identity as 
factors which dominate the process of Russian foreign policy-making.
156
   
Identity is “central”157 to the constructivist approach in explaining and interpreting patterns 
and processes of foreign policy by states, non-state actors and other polities. For Richard 
Jackson and Matt McDonald, ‘the role of identity is the focal point of competition over 
action: attempts to justify or consent particular policy preferences’.158  From a 
constructivist perspective, analysing the role of identity in foreign policy-making starts 
with the question: ‘how (do) international actors see and define themselves, other actors, 
and the environment in which they interact’.159  That is, ‘Self-Other’ perception by global 
                                                                                                                                                    
institutions in building a common ‘European identity’ and a ‘distinctive moral presence in world politics’. 
Accordingly, the European idealist portrays the EU as a ‘civilian power which is a kind of soft power’. For 
more information see R.Y. Wong, The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005). 
152
 White et al., Contemporary European Foreign Policy.p17 
153
 The discussion on how scholars conceived the EU: as a global actor or as a superpower or superstate, and 
whether it is an international presence or an international identity, are presented in the literature review 
chapter.  
154
 Ibid.p17-18 
155
 A. Chebakova, 'Theorizing the EU as a Global Actor: A Constructivist Approach', (Carleton University, 
2009). 
156
 A.P. Tsygankov, Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Rowman & 
Littlefield Pub Inc, 2010). 
157
 Parmar, New Directions in US Foreign Policy.p20 
158
 Ibid.p20 
159
 Schonberg, Constructing 21st Century U.S. Foreign Policy: Identity, Ideology, and America's World Role 
in a New Era.p4 
46 
 
actors plays a vital role in determining their foreign policy towards high profile issues like 
the question of establishing Palestinian statehood. Christopher Hill asserts this 
constructivist dimension by saying: ‘effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of 
national identity, of a nation-state’s “place in the world”, its friends and enemies, its 
interests and aspirations’.160 
  
Alexander Wendt asserts two basic tenets of constructivism. The first is that ‘the structures 
of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces’. 
Secondly, that ‘the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these 
shared ideas rather than given by nature’.161 According to Wendt, the identities of states or 
actors are constructed by shared ideas, beliefs, and values.  He further argues that “foreign 
policy behaviour is often determined primarily by domestic politics’.162  Wendt 
emphasises the importance of understanding foreign policy-making in the international 
milieu through a lens that centralises the role of identity which is constructed by shared 
ideas.  Thus, the focus is directed at the socially constructed character of foreign policy-
making in which shared ideas, beliefs, values, norms and knowledge are guiding actors. In 
other words, constructivism is a theoretical approach which is interested in how shared 
ideas, beliefs, norms, and values define the internal structure that construct the states’ 
identities and Self-Other perception which affect the making of their foreign policies. 
 
Furthermore, Richard Jackson and Matt McDonald state three assumptions of the 
constructivist approach. First, constructivists view ‘the world as socially constructed’ 
which means that ‘the perceptions, identities and interests of individuals and groups are 
socially and culturally constructed, rather than existing outside of or prior to society’.  
Second, constructivists hold that ‘agents and structures in world politics are mutually 
constitutive’ which  means that ‘agents constitute structures through their beliefs, actions 
and interactions, while structures constitute agents by helping to shape their identities and 
interests’. Third, ‘constructivists view ideational factors – representation, identities, 
beliefs, perceptions and norms – as central to the dynamics and processes of world 
politics’. 163 
                                                 
160
 C. Hill, The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy (Psychology Press, 1996).p8 
161
 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.p 1.  
162
 Ibid.p 2.  
163
 Parmar, New Directions in US Foreign Policy.p20 
47 
 
  
For Gabriel Gorodetsky, Russia sees itself as a great power with special geopolitical and 
geocultural features and these premises govern Russian foreign policy. Russia seeks to 
reintroduce ‘imperial and Soviet symbols and restore enduring national interests and great-
power status’ as an attempt to ‘refurbish its national identity’. 164 Therefore, he sees the 
challenge in establishing a new Russian identity as bearing directly on its foreign policy. 
However, the idea of establishing the EU is the way to create an international identity. For 
Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, the EU seeks to become a ‘powerful international 
actor without becoming a superstate in the processes’.165   
 
Subsequently, constructivist assumptions should provide a better understanding of how the 
perceptions and identities of the EU and Russia were constructed in the course of their 
relations with the Middle East conflict. In this respect, it is important to know what sources 
and bases they draw upon for deriving their identity and Self-Other perception; and in 
which explanatory traditions and ideas they ground their discourses in addressing 
Palestinian statehood.  
 
Strengths of constructivism 
The constructivist approach is especially effective in studying the role of identity and Self-
Other perception in foreign policy-making. Identity and the Self-Other perception of actors 
are constructed through discourse. This is based on language as a system of social 
communication. This leads to a greater depth of understanding of the meaning between 
text and context in the course of studying foreign policy-making. In connection with this 
view, Jeffrey Checkel argues that constructivism, by exploring issues of identity, has 
‘succeeded in broadening the theoretical contours of international relations and leads to 
new and meaningful interpretation of international politics’.166  The second strength of 
constructivism is due attention to process, and thus to social construction as an element in 
any social process.
167
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These strengths make constructivism an appropriate approach to theorising about foreign 
policy-making by the EU and Russia towards Palestinian statehood. It offers an alternative 
understanding of the neorealist and liberal central assumptions of state interaction on the 
international level, including: the meaning of security and the anarchic nature of 
international relations and interdependent relations between states. Constructivism 
emphasises the social aspect of interaction between states which is influenced by shared 
ideas, values, beliefs and norms. Therefore, the foreign policies of the EU and Russia 
towards the issue of establishing Palestinian statehood are influenced by perceptions of the 
Self as well as perception of the otherness rather than being restricted to a security agenda, 
or accumulating material capabilities,   or reaching a desired end of peace and global 
welfare, which is a wider approach.  
 
Weaknesses of constructivism  
As Robert Jervis argues constructivism is not free from weaknesses. He suggests that 
constructivism fails to express ‘how norms are formed, how identities are shaped’ and 
criticises constructivism on the grounds that it does not tell ‘anything about the expected 
content of foreign policies or international relations’.168 In the same argument, Zehfuss 
challenges Wendt’s perspective of identity formation and international relations that are 
not naturally given but constructed by shared ideas. She wonders why the question of ‘how 
either the actors or the ideas about Self and Other get constituted in the first place is not 
part of the account’.169 In her view, Wendt misconceptualises identity construction.  
Zehfuss argues that identity is a complex notion and constructivism cannot encompass 
it.
170
 Michael Smith adds  that constructivism ‘neglects to explain how collective goals are 
made to persist over time and thus influence future behaviour’.171  Using a constructivist 
approach   assumes that there is a relationship between identity and foreign policy-making, 
which is influenced by ideational basis of identities. Therefore, in this view, the EU and 
Russia redefine their foreign policies according to their ideational structure in the course of 
the MEPP.  
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An approach to investigate the role of identity in building global actorness  
This thesis argues that the EU and Russia are “global actors” in world politics. ‘The EU’ 
here refers to a political entity that represents the EU 28 member states, and its foreign 
policy ‘that referring to EU co-ordination of its political relations with the outside 
world’.172 To investigate the process of achieving global actorness, the thesis will use the 
model of Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. This model assumes that global actorness 
is based upon three factors: presence, opportunities and capability: Presence, 
conceptualises the relationship between internal developments and external expectations 
beyond borders, while capability refers to the internal context of external objectives which 
enable or constrain actorness. It is about the capacity of foreign policy instruments to 
respond to viable opportunities to play a global role; opportunity denotes factors within the 
external environment which accommodate the desire of actorness.
173
 The thesis will 
demonstrate that these factors are very clearly present in the discourse of both the EU and 
Russia.  
Through employing this approach, the thesis contends that  the making of foreign policy 
by global powers becomes meaningful and better to understand in process of constructing 
the Self as a global actor. In a changing world constructing or reinventing a sense of global 
actorness and differentiating the Self from Others gives meaning to the making of foreign 
policies by global actors.  The adopted model of identity and Self-Other perception 
emphasise the temporal nature of global actorness and points to the fact that constructing 
and maintaining an international identity is open to re-negotiation, but also limited by the 
influence of internal and external developments. It is central to the constructivist approach 
which is the understanding of identity’s construction within internal and external contexts. 
This construction of identity imbues with contest over building capabilities of global 
actorness.   
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2.3 Qualitative Methodology: Initial Observations 
This thesis uses qualitative research which is a method which social scientists agree meets 
with increasing acceptance.
174
  Qualitative research is one of three approaches to enquiry: 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed, in which the scholar usually makes knowledge claims 
built primarily on ‘constructivist perspectives or advocacy/participatory perspectives or 
both’.175 Thus, a qualitative approach has strengths that support the thesis’ argument 
especially in the nature of analysis/ interpretation and output.
176
 For Dawn Snape and Liz 
Spencer, the aims of qualitative research are directed at:  
‘Providing an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social world of 
research participants by learning about their social and material 
circumstances, their experiences, perspectives and histories’.177   
  
Therefore, qualitative research is well-suited for this thesis.  It enables an in-depth and 
interpreted understanding rather than a general analysis of the EU and Russia’s foreign 
policy-making in the context of the peace process in the Middle East. However, qualitative 
research provides a number of methods that address the research question of this thesis. 
For Jane Ritchie:  
‘A major feature of qualitative methods is their facility to describe and 
display phenomena as experienced by the study population, in fine-tuned 
detail and in the study participants' own terms’.178 
 
Thus, qualitative methods are essential to the study of social and political phenomena. This 
thesis assumes that there is a difference of style and substance in the EU and Russia’s 
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foreign policy-making toward the Middle East peace process. Qualitative research 
provides methods that facilitate the process of description and display these phenomena as 
experienced by former and current diplomats (e.g. those from the EU and Russia involved 
in the making of the peace process in the Middle East). The study of the role of identity 
and Self-Other perception is suited to qualitative methodology. As Jane Ritchie notes: 
 ‘Because of its facility to examine subjects in depth, qualitative research 
provides a unique tool for studying what lies behind, or underpins, a 
decision, attitude, behavior or other phenomena’.179 
 
Furthermore, qualitative research has functions of social investigation. Jane Ritchie states 
four functions of qualitative research: contextual, explanatory, evaluative and generative.180  
These functions shed light on how identity and Self-Other perception influence the making 
of foreign policy and make sense of the efficiency of qualitative research in ways that 
others cannot.  Also, these functions enable the researcher to formulate findings that give 
better answers to research questions which deal with the social construction of foreign 
policy, and the meaning and the context of their construction.   
 
Qualitative Research versus Quantitative Research 
Researchers use either qualitative, quantitative or a mixed method approach in their scholarship. 
Qualitative and quantitative approaches have some overlap. However, for W. Laurence Neuman:  
‘Qualitative and quantitative research differs in many ways, but they 
complement each other, as well. All social researchers systematically collect 
and analyze empirical data and carefully examine the patterns in them to 
understand and explain social life’.181  
 
The distinction between qualitative and quantitative is “not too sharp” as David Sliverman 
and Amir Marnasti argue. W. Laurence Neuman states three differences between 
qualitative and quantitative research: first, the nature of data; qualitative data are in the 
form of ‘words and images from documents, observations, and transcript’, while 
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quantitative data are in the form of ‘numbers from precise measurement’. Second, that 
qualitative and quantitative researchers have different objective in Qualitative ‘analysis 
proceeds by extracting themes and generalizations from evidence and organizes data to 
present a coherent, consistent picture’, while in quantitative research objective ‘analysis 
proceeds using statistics tables, or charts and discussing how what they show related to 
hypothesis’. Third, both often hold different assumptions about social life; in qualitative 
research ‘procedures are particular and replication is very rare’, while in quantitative 
research ‘procedures are standard and replication is assumed’.
182
   
However, qualitative and quantitative research can be, according to Udo Kelle and 
Christian Erzberger, integrated in  to two different concepts. Quantitative methodologists 
frequently speak of a ‘phase-model’, while qualitative methodologists speak of 
‘triangulation’.183   
 
Collecting Qualitative Data 
The academic investigation of this thesis uses methodological techniques based on primary 
and secondary research methods in order to establish how the main research question of 
this thesis is to be researched.  
Primary research methods generally employ observation (Peter Foster)
184
 and asking 
questions (Michael Wilson and Roger Sapsford).
185
 This approach according to Michael 
Wilson and Roger Sapsford, uses ‘interview and questionnaire’ as primary methods of 
data collection. However, Glenn A. Bowen points out, ‘documents’ are also part of data 
collection methods. He defines ‘documents’ in a variety of forms.186   
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Secondary research methods, on the other hand, involve information and data which have 
been already published.   There are a variety of sources accessible for secondary research 
methods, such as: ‘research books, research reports, journal articles, articles reproduced 
online, scientific debates, and analyses of historical events’.187 These secondary sources 
present their own perspectives and interpretations of other scholars of this thesis’s related 
themes. These will provide a wide knowledge and background material providing the 
research framework and context of the making of foreign policy by EU and Russia towards 
the Middle East peace process.  
In qualitative research, most scholars and writers emphasise the importance of primary or 
naturally occurring data in their research and interviews in a natural setting. This thesis 
employs interviews and documents as a primary method of collecting qualitative data. This 
research employs methodological approaches based on the following research 
methods: 
 
Interviews as a Technique of Data Collection:  
Interviews have a strong claim to being probably ‘the most widely used method in 
qualitative research’.188 There are many types of interview, but according to Catherine 
Dawson, there are three common types: ‘unstructured189, semi-structured and structured 
interviews’.190 Since this thesis aims to reach a holistic understanding of identity influence 
on foreign policy-making, unstructured or in-depth interviews are used as the major 
technique of data collection. As Carolyn Mears explains:  
‘In-depth interviews are conversations with a purpose, namely, to sit with 
another and learn what that particular individual can share about a topic, to 
discover and record what that person has experienced and what he or she thinks 
and feels about it’.191 
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Thus, conducting in-depth interviews takes the form of a ‘conversation’ in which the 
interviewee represents his beliefs and experience about the research topic. In the context of 
this research, the objective of using in-depth interview is to gain first-hand information in 
relation to the thesis’ themes. However, there is sufficient information about how identity 
and Self-Other perception influence EU and Russia foreign policy towards Palestinian 
statehood. Hence, the use of in-depth interviews to gain first-hand information is 
justifiable. 
Documents as a Technique of Data Collection: 
Documents or documentary sources constitute a major source of gathering information. 
Glenn A. Bowen (2009) and Ruth Finnegan (2006) state a variety of types and forms of 
this technique of data collection.  For Glenn A. Bowen:     
‘Documents provide background and context, additional questions to be asked, 
supplementary data, a means of tracking change and development, and 
verification of findings from other data sources. Moreover, documents may be 
the most effective means of gathering data when events can no longer be 
observed or when informants have forgotten the details’.192 
A vast range of written and non-written documents will contribute greatly in enhancing 
discussions in this thesis. Written and non-written material on EU and Russian foreign 
policy from media outlets, newspapers and websites as well as special documents related 
to the Middle East peace process underpin the theses arguments. 
Many considerations are to be taken into account when using documentary sources. They 
include the use of sources appropriate to "the research topic, awareness of any twisting of 
the principles, the researcher will select, and a reasonable interpretation of the meaning 
conveyed by the sources".
193
  
Thus, the main research methods used for this thesis are interviews and document analysis, 
utilising first-hand information gathered from interviews, substantive books, journal and 
magazine articles, official reports and documents, statements and the results of research 
studies conducted by a range of different centres, institutions and organisations. A number 
of considerations will be taken into account when using documentary sources, including 
reflections on the general and particular situations forming the context of the research.  
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Multi-methods/triangulation as a technique of Data Collection:  
In this thesis, multi-methods/triangulation194 uses multi-methods of qualitative data 
collection including primary and secondary sources as well as a combination  of 
documents and interviews in data collection techniques.  For Jane Lewis and Jane Ritchie:  
‘Triangulation assumes that the use of different sources of information will 
help both to confirm and to improve the clarity or precision, of a research 
finding’.195  
 
Thus, triangulation is a powerful solution to the problem of intrinsic bias that comes from 
a single data source or method, which  undermines  the validity and credibility of findings 
because of the weaknesses of any single method
196
. Triangulation has strategies for 
reducing systematic bias in the data. Triangulation in this study allows exploring, 
interpreting, and understanding the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign 
policy-making by employing multi-methods of data collection. Triangulation as a strategy 
will work to strengthen findings and enrich interpretations of EU-Russian foreign policy. 
Furthermore, triangulation will be used as a way to strengthen the credibility of the thesis’ 
findings by comparing   the foreign policies  of the  EU and Russia in the Middle East 
peace process.     
2.4. Discourse Analysis as an Analytical Qualitative Method:  
Qualitative research is conducted by many analytical methods. Discourse analysis is one of 
these methods, one that has gained increasing prominence in qualitative research in the 
past decade
197
. In the field of international relations, discourse analysis has gained 
attractiveness as an analytical qualitative method in constructivist theory.
198
  Hence, this 
study uses discourse analysis, which is different from critical discourse analysis,
199
 as a 
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main analytical qualitative method. This thesis uses discourse not as a linguistic concept, 
but, as Michel Foucault
200
 argues, as a language and practice.
201
  The choice of using 
discourse analysis as the analytical qualitative method for interpreting and understanding 
the role of identity and Self-Other perception reflects how the making of foreign policy is 
perceived through socially constructed process: 
‘All actors display their individuality, their self –otherwise, every professional 
in a specific field would have to act in the same way due to their position in the 
field and their acquired symbolic capital. Hence, the identity, the self of the 
actor influences the performance as well’.202  
 
Accordingly, identity and Self-Other perception of actors are perceived in terms of 
discourse. Discourse presents how actors display their ‘Self’ and how they perceive the 
‘other’. Discourse is the use of spoken and written language.  It is based on language as a 
system of social communication. James Gee says ‘we use language to get recognized as 
taking on a certain identity or role, that is, to build an identity here and now’.203 In world 
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politics, language plays a crucial role in every political action and there are 
interconnections between language and power.
204
 To put it more simply, language between 
states is foreign policy.  Discourse analysis, according to James Gee, is about the study of 
the use of language.
205
 That is, in terms of saying (informing), doing (action), and being 
(identity).
206
 Scholars use discourse analysis as a way of introducing critical thinking to the 
way the relationship between text and context is accounted for. The main benefit of this is 
to allow a better understanding of the meaning of discourse, spoken or written, in context. 
Meaning is not simply a crucial mixture of words and things: meaning develops in context-
dependent use.
207  Therefore, meaning draws through context.  What counts in the use of 
discourse analysis is the stress placed on textual meaning but in relation to context.  In this 
regard, Chilton and Schäffner say that ‘a text will be political if its context includes 
participants who are politicians’.208 In other words, as a qualitative method, discourse 
analysis is useful as a way to rework the relationship between text and context, confirming 
the significance of text only as a meaning or a construct to be understood within a context. 
There is no meaning outside context. 
Discourse structures: 
For Foucault, discourse analysis is: ‘a group of statements which provide a language for 
talking about ...a particular topic at a particular historical moment’.209 In this explanation, 
Foucault refers to the use of discourse analysis in terms of meaning -- what is sayable or 
thinkable about a particular topic, object or process, in general. Discourse analysis is thus 
applicable to both written and non-written language, which form discourse. Thus, there are 
layers in this methodological method: the materials (written and non-written 
discourse/text), the manner of talk or written words, the course of talk and given structure, 
and the analyses and interpretations of text by the scholar. Hence, discourse analysis 
assumes that language used in discourse is always thinkable and arguable, making sense 
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through the different ways scholars use it in their analyses. In scientific theses it is 
assumed that many of the used constructs in discourse and speech are 'inner essences'. That 
is to say, identity and Self-Other perceptions exist somewhere within text and context. 
Discourse analysis in this thesis will be used as the main methods in interpreting the role 
played by identity and Self-Other perceptions in foreign policy-making. Discourse analysis 
is considered an interdisciplinary field that involves examining how particular structures 
are linked to meaning in conventionalised ways. In general, testing the making of foreign 
policy by using realist, structuralist, liberal or Marxist paradigms is deeply assessed. But, 
looking at EU and Russian discourses and statements will reveal a different political 
conduct towards the Middle East conflict. The realist or structuralist or Marxist approaches 
are not sufficient to interpret these differences in the discourse of EU and Russia. Identity 
and Self-Other perception constitute the buzzwords that dominate major work in the 
constructivist school in foreign policy-making.210 Thus, the constructivist approach is 
more suitable to use as a way to analyse the role of identity and Self-Other perception in 
the conduct of foreign policy.  
The concept of discourse in foreign policy 
For Ole Wæver foreign policy can be explained and elucidated by ‘structures of 
meaning’.211  Therefore, foreign policy takes place within a framework of meaning in 
which identity and Self-perception as well as perception of otherness are arguably the most 
prominent influential factors. Henrik Larsen argues that ‘the framework of meaning within 
which foreign policy takes place is seen as the basis of the way in which interests and 
goals are constructed’.212  Foreign policy is considered as political statements of interests 
and goals for a country or agent. For Wæver discourse is ‘a system that regulates the 
formation of statements’.213 Discourse here is statements of written or non-written 
language.  
The foreign policies of the EU and Russia are statements that represent their stands and 
position particularly towards Palestinian statehood. Hence, these foreign policy practices 
on the international stage take place with a meaning in which interests and goals are 
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contrasted. For Hall, ‘all social practices entail meaning and meaning shape and influence 
what we do –our conduct- all practices have a discursive aspect’. 214  Thus, foreign policy 
discourses of the EU and Russia have a meaning and this meaning is construed.  This 
thesis assumes that identity and Self-Other perception shape the meaning of the foreign 
policies of the EU and Russia and influence their stands and position on Palestinian 
statehood.   
Discourse analysis in the study of the EU and Russia foreign policy 
The European Union is commonly thought of as an economic project, but the making of 
the EU is to be considered as a political polity. That is, interests and goals are constructed 
within its international identity. This is clear through its foreign policy discourse which 
places emphasis on the place and mission of the EU in world politics.  The study of EU 
foreign policy, according to Henrik Larsen, ‘lends itself well to an analysis of 
discourse’.215 Larsen concludes that there is ‘wide scope for drawing on discourse analysis 
for analysing European foreign policy’.216  In the same vein, Raphael Bossong argues that 
‘EU political discourse is an important factor in explaining developments in EU foreign 
policy and identity’.217  Moreover, Ole Wæver applies discourse analysis as a foreign 
policy theory which can explain and predict European foreign policy.
218
   
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia started searching for its international 
identity through emphasising its status as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. This 
means that the interests and goals of Russia as a super power are grounded in its foreign 
policy discourse. For Leif Christian Jensen and Pål Wilter Skedsmo, discourse analysis 
plays a crucial part in understanding Russian foreign policy discourse because it is ‘an 
intergraded theoretical and methodological approach’ to interpret the framework of official 
discourse of Russian foreign policy.
219
 It grasps how the Russian approach to its place and 
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mission on the international stage is framed by the Russian government. Guillaume Colin 
argues that the use of discourse analysis illustrates ‘integration between grounding in the 
imaginaire and the political struggle’220 for Russia in world politics.  Moreover, Oleksii 
Polegkyi argues that the use of discourse analysis provides understanding of how Russia 
seeks to restore its global centre of power through striving to preserve its influence in the 
world.  Russia seeks to exploit its geopolitical position, economic capabilities and its 
membership of the Security Council, the potential of its soft power,   to enhance its 
external space. In other world, Russia is striving to widen the so-called “Russian world”. 
 Within a constructivist frame, discourse analysis as an analytical method can be used to 
provide better understanding and appropriate interpretation of foreign policies of the EU 
and Russia towards Middle East peace-making. Identity and Self-Other perception can be 
analysed and their influences on foreign policy making by the EU and Russia towards a 
specific issue, Palestinian statehood, can be explored. To explore the powerful model of 
discourse analysis, the thesis will assume that the difficulties encountered by the EU and 
Russia in peace-making towards the Palestinian state was grounded in their identities and 
Self-perception as well as their perception of otherness and the view  of the conflict from 
different metaphorical perceptions.  Identity and Self-Other perception  reside in the text 
and context;  at many political events and occasions, the EU and Russia have expressed 
many statements and action plans which outlined their foreign policy towards the Middle 
East conflict in general and towards Palestinian statehood in  particular.  Hence, this thesis 
will explore identity and Self-Other perception in statements and action plans, and analyse 
how these factors influenced the process of foreign policy-making towards the conflict. 
The use of discourse analysis in foreign policy making by the EU and Russia:  
Analysing the foreign policy discourse of the EU and Russia is based on identity and Self-
Other perception as societal themes. That is, a discursive framework of meaning of 
European and Russian society which is framed within a social and political context. By 
assuming that, discourse analysis will be used as the key methodological method to 
interpret the discourse (written and unwritten) of the EU and Russia towards the 
Palestinian state. Relying on written materials (primary data collected from the political 
statements, speeches, archives documents, newspaper interviews, political manifestos, 
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historical texts for founding figures) and interviews with academic scholars and former 
and current diplomats and officials, I explore the role played by identity and Self-Other 
perception in foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia.  The focus here is on 
discourses that reflect how the Palestinian state is perceived. Discourse analysis will be 
used to display how the EU and Russia see themselves on the international stage when 
they call for establishing a Palestinian state. It will be used also to present how they view 
the Palestinian state when the question of their actorness in the Middle East is taken into 
consideration. And how is the other perceived in the peace equation? Namely, how are the 
Palestinians perceived in contrast to the Israelis? I will analyse the EU and Russian 
discourse on Hamas and how it perceived as a potential peace partner by both the EU and 
Russia. What are the differences between the EU and Russia in their Self-perception when 
dealing with Hamas?  In sum, discourse analysis will be used to interpret the text (written 
and unwritten) in order to allow a better understanding of the meaning of the EU and 
Russian discourse towards Palestinian statehood. It will help to explore how this structure 
of meaning is constructed by the influence of identity and Self-Other perception of the EU 
and Russia. In other words, discourse analysis will help in understanding how discourse 
regulates the political statements and actions (e.g. diplomatic actions, financial and 
economic support, agreements, etc.) of the EU and Russia towards the Palestinian state 
which I argue is constructed by identity and Self-perception as well as by perception of the 
otherness.  Hence, I will analyse the materials (primary collected data), in the course of 
speeches, statements, and given structure, and how they have been interpreted by scholars 
of related texts.         
 
2.5. Conclusion  
This chapter focuses on the problem that informs this thesis as well as it reflecting on the 
theory and methodology that frame the study. The thesis problematises the question of 
establishing a Palestinian state from a different track in foreign policy-making by the EU 
and Russia. It considers the discourse of Palestinian statehood the key puzzle in the EU’s 
and Russia’s foreign policies.  The thesis seeks to investigate how issues of identity and 
Self-Other perceptions play a key role in foreign policy-making in the EU and Russia, 
particularly with regard to the question of Palestinian statehood. 
The thesis draws on approaches in social science which address facets of foreign policy. 
Based on a constructivist approach, it theorises the elements of social interaction that are 
62 
 
influenced by foreign policy-making; these elements have a profound effect on the making 
of foreign policy. It aims to interpret and understand the role of identity and Self-Other 
perception. It uses this approach to provide a better understanding of the conundrum of 
Palestinian statehood and analysis of the social elements such as beliefs and ideas that 
shape or influence identity and Self-Other perception of the EU and Russia.  The elements 
which I study in this thesis are identity and Self-Other perception which influence and 
affect the process of foreign policy-making of the EU and Russia. I examine how the role 
of identity and Self-Other perception influence foreign policy making in the EU and 
Russia, especially with regards to the issue of establishing a Palestinian state.    
This chapter also discusses other approaches used by scholars to interpret foreign policy- 
making of the EU and Russia. The Neorealist approach has little to say about the core 
puzzle of establishing a Palestinian state. It attributes interaction between states to anarchy. 
It is fixed on power and security. Neoliberals also narrow the issue of establishing a 
Palestinian state, arguing for interaction between the Israelis and Palestinians. The support 
of the global powers to the question, they add, comes from a door of cooperation which 
can achieve the desired end, peace and global welfare. Both approaches rest on a rational 
choice in processing the issue of Palestinian statehood. A rational choice has little to say 
about the EU and Russian foreign policy in relation to the Middle East peace process. A 
rational choice is premised on a neorealist perspective and upon a security agenda. It is 
also premised on a neoliberal perspective which calls for interdependence between states.   
Whatever the context of the EU and Russia foreign policies towards the Middle East, 
issues of identity and Self-Other perception play a central role in the making of these 
policies. Despite this ubiquitous role for identity and Self-Other perception, few scholars 
to date have theorised these social elements in the case of the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. I address this gap by using the constructivist approach that highlights the 
role of identity and Self-Other perception in the Middle East process.  
However, the thesis also employs a qualitative enquiry in answering the research questions 
through two data collection techniques. Interviews will be conducted with officials who 
are part of the policy decision-making circles and practices; these interviews are designed 
to use primary information. I will also interview officials who contributed to the EU and 
Russia foreign policy-making processes.  Primary data collection enables me to assess the 
validity and credibility of the given information.         
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 Secondly, I carry out a document analysis of obtained official documents, statements, and 
specialist publications. This allows for investigating beliefs and perceptions of policy 
decision-makers in both the EU and Russia who were part of the foreign policy-making 
process.    
I will use discourse analysis as an analytical qualitative method to analyse the collected 
data and information.  Discourse analysis will be used to explore the role of identity and 
Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making: the materials (discourse/text), the manner 
of speech, course of the talk and given structure.  To explore the power of this analytical 
method, I will assume that the ineffectiveness of the EU and Russia foreign policy towards 
Palestinian statehood lies in how they portray themselves as well as how they perceive 
others.  These perceptions are found in the texts and contexts of statements and action 
plans that outline the EU and Russian foreign policy towards Palestinian statehood. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING:  
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE FIELD OF SCHOLARSHIP 
Focus 
The focus of the review in this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I shall review the main 
characteristics of Russian foreign policy. To this end, I shall outline the roots of how 
identity and Self-Other perception influence the course of foreign policy-making  towards 
the Middle East in general and towards the issue of establishing the Palestinian state in 
particular. Secondly, I shall review the main characteristics of the EU’s foreign policy and 
how the EU is developing its international identity in the context of a global actor in world 
politics. The emphasis of this review is on features of EU collective identity as well as its 
perception of the Middle East and the issue of establishing a viable and independent 
Palestinian state.  In this chapter, I shall look at how I can widen the base of information 
and knowledge of foreign policy in ways that help in addressing the problematic informing 
this study.  
3.1 Understanding the Russian Foreign Policy  
The roots of Russian foreign policy come from historic mutual relations with successive 
empires. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the Russian Federation resulted in 
a rethinking of Russian foreign policy. According to Bobo Lo, the search  for identity and 
a sense of purpose in the new Russia’s foreign policy ‘is one of the four weakness areas 
that faced Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union’.221 The end of the Cold War 
resulted in a new international environment, in which Russia had to struggle to secure its 
place. Bobo Lo states that ‘identity and self-perception became issues about Russia’s place 
in the post-Cold War international environment’.222  Identity and Self-perception became 
critical issues in planning for a new concept of Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet 
era.  
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Russian Foreign Policy and the Legacy of the Soviet Union 
Shireen Hunter and her colleagues discuss the evolution of  Russia’s foreign policy 
perspectives in the post-Soviet era and state that ‘Russia is the legal successor state of the 
Soviet Union, but clearly is not the Soviet Union’s geographical successor’.223 In this 
regard, Ludmilla Selezneva points out that Russia in the post-Soviet era  has ‘no imperial 
status’ and it ‘began to formulate a completely new outlook on foreign policy’.224 Thus, 
the legacy of the Soviet Union is very clear in the new Russia’s foreign policy. Ludmilla 
Selezneva argues that the new Russia’s foreign policy is ‘a mixture of the liberal ideology 
of those who wish to westernize, and the ideology of a Great Russian Statehood, but with a 
clear domination of the latter’.225 Russian state identity in the post-Soviet era still kept 
some of these truths; Bobo Lo in this regard states that ‘Events in the post-Soviet decade 
undermined many of these ‘truths’, but did not destroy them’. Moreover, he argues that 
‘Russian foreign policy is still based on the assumptions that; Russia had been, was and 
would always be a ‘great power’, and a transcontinental entity: neither exclusively Slavic, 
European nor Asian, but Eurasian and global’.226 Furthermore, Lo makes the point that 
Russia’s foreign policy is, in the most generous understanding of the term, ‘universalist’ – 
inclusive, multifaceted, and flexible as to means.  
 
The role of leadership in the Russian foreign policy-making: 
In the historical legacy of Russia, charismatic leadership has played a central role in 
formulating Russian foreign policy. Bobo Lo argues that Putin
227
 benefited from the state 
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of anarchy in the late Gorbachev and Yeltsin period that opened the discussion and debate 
about  Russian national identity and the western experience of the importance of economic 
foundation as a prerequisite of military power and international influence. This dichotomy 
gave Putin an opportunity to ‘embrace virtually every conceivable type of national 
identity, but in flexible and undogmatic fashion’.228 Thus, Putin’s foreign policy seemed to 
be pro-European. Lo refers to the arguments by commentators that the principle feature of  
Russian foreign policy during the first round of Putin’s presidency was ‘Eurocentrism’,229 
in contrast to the ‘America-centrism’  of Yeltsin’s period230.On the same lines, Ludmilla 
Selezneva asserts that Putin’s foreign policy was characterised  by ‘pragmatism’ since 
‘Putin himself declared the policy of non-isolationist’ and this policy has been 
‘predominantly European-oriented’.231 Dmitri Trenin shares the same argument of a 
Eurocentric approach in  Putin’s foreign policy.232  Putin in his first presidential term was 
trying to readjust Russian foreign policy in a European form and to move away from the 
Americans.  
 
According to Bobo Lo, Putin tried to secure  ‘valuable support from liberals at home and 
in the West’ and, at the same time, ‘concluded friendship and cooperation agreements with 
China, North Korea, and India, and increased Russia’s evolvement in the Asian-Pacific’. 
233
 Thus, Putin during his presidency has been working on the reorientation of Russian 
foreign policy to resume its international identity as a global power.  
 According to Lo, Putin tried to ensure ‘a plausible concordance between ambitious self-
perceptions and uncomfortable realities’ and at the same time has been ‘careful to apply 
identity according to context and moment’. 234 This means that, Russian is working to 
reconstruct its international identity in the context of world politics.   
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3.2 Identity and Self-Other Perceptions in Russian Foreign Policy-
Making 
Historically, the clash of Self-perceptions in Russia’s political class led to a dichotomy in 
Russia’s place and mission in the world. This dichotomy ended with the advent of 
communist rule in favour of notions of a communist ‘world revolution’.235  By the end of 
the Cold War, the debate over  Russia’s place and mission increased among the political 
class. Bobo Lo states that, ‘Identity and self-perception became issues about Russia’s place 
in the post-Cold War international environment’.236 While Gabriel Gorodetsky sees that 
the challenge in establishing new Russia’s identity ‘bears directly on its foreign policy’.237 
Russia sees itself as a great power with special geopolitical and geocultural features.  
These basic facts govern Russian foreign policy according to Gabriel Gorodetsky. Hence 
Gabriel Gorodetsky sees Russia as seeking to reintroduce ‘imperial and Soviet symbols 
and restore enduring national interests and great-power status’  in an attempt to ‘refurbish 
its national identity’. Also, he considers the attempt to reformulate a new Russian national 
identity to be  ‘a sine qua non for a definition of Russia’s role in the New World Order’.238 
In the same way, Bobo Lo asserts that ‘civilizational location’ and ‘Russian place and 
mission in the post-Cold War world’ were and still are the two key issues in conceptions of 
Russian identity. Thus, identity and Self-Other perception that lean on civilizational 
location and the Russian place and mission in the world are central to Russian foreign 
policy-making. 
 
Civilizational location 
The civilizational dimension in Russian foreign policy refers to the Self-perception in the 
competition with others in the international arena. According to Bobo Lo, this dimension 
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plays an important role in foreign policy-making in the post-Soviet ear, where it ‘acted to 
fuel already powerful animosities over policy’.239 Peter Shearman states that Russia’s 
elites, as a part of the new civilizational competition with the west, came to refer to the 
term ‘sovereign democracy versus western liberal democracy’.240  According to Peter 
Shearman, Russia, under Putin’s leadership, ‘moved away from the liberal democratic 
model of development’ and adopted its own model of democracy. One of the basic 
objectives of the foreign policy concept, issued by Medvedev in 2008, is ‘creating an 
objective perception of Russia in the world as a democratic state with an independent 
foreign policy’.  This objective is directed against the dominating position of  western 
civilization and Russia claimed to be a “sovereign democracy” in order to be: ‘respected 
abroad, an alternative value centre, as it were, as opposed to Western democratic 
Messianism’.241 
 
Thus, the reconstruction of Russian state identity on the world scene is a particular 
question for Russian foreign policy decision-makers.  The Russian foreign policy schools 
differ in their view of the civilizational location of Russia. While Euro-Atlanticists see 
Russia as not standing too far apart from the Western civilization, Eurasianists and Neo-
Eurasianists place emphasis on Russian culture and geography and reject the view that 
Russia is on the periphery of Europe and maintain that Russia must unlearn Europe. The 
post-Soviet era witnessed a change of two visions of Russian civilizational location, while 
Yeltsin’s period was characterized  by a vision of ‘integration and strategic partnership 
with the West’242, Putin’s period was characterized by a greater emphasis on the 
uniqueness of Russian culture, geography, and its civilizational dimension.  
 
Russia’s place and mission in the world 
Russia has a unique location between Europe and Asia, as it forms a bridge between the 
two continents. Eurasianism, as one of the main Russia’s foreign policy schools, is the 
most relevant school  in this dimension.  According to Jeffrey Mankoff, Eurasianism 
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means ‘Russia’s fundamental identity is linked to its geographical position’.243 In this 
regard, Russia focuses its foreign policy on ‘competing with the west’244 and sees the west 
as ‘a direct geopolitical competitor to Russia, much as it was during the days of the Cold 
War’.245 This distinct quotation  influenced  Russia’s foreign policy makers and thinkers as 
well as the intellectual elite.
246
   The debates on Russia’s place and mission in the world 
reveal how deep the thinking of the Self and Other lie in the making of Russian foreign 
policy. Studying and taking into consideration these geopolitical and ideational factors 
present a better understanding  of the course of Russian foreign policy. These factors place 
an emphasis on the context of the practice of Russian behaviour on an external level and 
how these factors construct Russian state identity. Russia’s state identity is constructed 
within the frame and context of its perception of the Self as well as perception of Others.   
 
Russian Self-perception has deep roots in Russian history where Russia looks to itself as a 
great power and the successor of deep-rooted empires. Thus, Russian perception of 
otherness is based on a set of these historical and ideational factors that, without a doubt, 
influence the making of Russian foreign policy. The following is a brief survey of 
literature concerning Russian perception of other related actors and fields dealt with in the 
thesis.    
 
Perception of the EU 
Russian concerns about EU enlargement led them to establish a new foreign policy 
concept which held that ‘the EU’s emerging military-political dimension should become 
an object of particular attention’.247 These concerns are reflected in Russia’s Medium-term 
Strategy (2000–2010). The strategy calls for a ‘strategic partnership between Russia and 
the EU and states that this partnership can ‘achieve a pan-European system of collective 
security based on equality without dividing lines’. 248 The EU as a rising global actor in 
world politics has, especially with the process of enlargement that included  former Soviet 
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Union republics and the growth of NATO power capabilities and membership, profound 
effects on Russian foreign policy-making towards it. Margot Light, John Löwenhardt and 
Stephen White argue that the EU’s policy of membership is ‘separating Europe into 
insiders and outsiders’249 thereby affecting the non-member countries that were considered 
‘outside’ the European forum.  The policy has had an effect on the ways in which non-
member states ‘perceive themselves and their environment’.250 The argument of Margot 
Light, John Löwenhardt and Stephen White show that Self-Other perception has a 
profound role in influencing the making of foreign policy between Russia and the EU. In 
other words, there is an identity existing between the layers of the process of decision-
making that has influenced their mutual foreign policy-making between the EU and 
Russia.  
 
Both the rise of the EU as a global power and the expansion of the NATO alliance to 
include some of towards the former Soviet republics has affected Russian perception of the 
EU.  The NATO exclusion of Russia has profound effects on the domestic and foreign 
policies of Russia.
251
 The NATO policy enhances a Russian Self-Other perception which 
has a ‘negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO’.252  The NATO unitary actions in 
Kosovo and Serbia enhanced the negative attitudes in Russian -EU relations also. The 
Russian elites saw the new NATO strategic doctrine in 2000 as a threat which undermined 
Russian security. In other words,  NATO’s exclusion of Russia and the accession of new 
members from former Soviet republics ( NATO’s military doctrine) have been perceived 
by Russia as a strategic threat to its national security. This strategic step confirmed the 
fundamentalist nationalist view in relation to Europe and the USA where ‘NATO and the 
USA were widely seen as synonymous’.253  
Marcel de Haas argues that it was Russia’s disappointment    over cooperation with the EU 
and NATO’s alliance strategy that resulted in ‘a turning point in threat perception’.254 In 
response, Haas argues, Putin in 2000 signed a revised version of the foreign policy 
concept, in which Russia placed an emphasis on its Self-perception as “a great power” and 
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its high priority was a ‘political, military and economic cooperation and integration’255 
within the former Soviet republics, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).   
 
Perception of the USA 
In the Russian foreign policy schools there are difference views on the relations with the 
USA. The Euro-Atlantic school emphasises the importance of close ties and relations with 
the USA. Jeffrey Mankoff states that ‘Atlanticists look toward the United States as a 
strategic partner’, but  at the same time they look on  it as ‘a model for the role that a 
restored Russia can play in the world’.256 In this Euro-Atlanticist view there is also a Self-
perception  that is  nostalgic  towards  its past as great power.  However, Neo-Eurasianists 
see the American presence in Central Asia as a new ‘geopolitical situation’ that forms a 
critical threat as it is seen as pricking ‘Russia’s soft underbelly’. 257 According to this 
school, the USA  is seen as a source of threats and as  putting Russia on the defensive. The 
Russian foreign policy concept which was signed by Putin in 2000 placed an emphasis on 
the need for Russia to strengthen its influence in international politics to restore its position 
as a great power. 
258
 
 
The USA’s policy, such as the enlargement of NATO’s membership among former Soviet 
republics, USA/NATO unitary intervention in Kosovo and Serbia, the USA’s withdrawal 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the planned US missile shield in Poland, has 
enhanced  Russia’s negative attitudes towards the USA in the post-Cold War era. In this 
regard, Roger Kanet asserts that Russia adopted a foreign policy concept in 2008, in which 
‘the Putin–Medvedev leadership has more and more concentrated on the hazards to Russia 
presented by foreign enemies, of which the ‘United States is virtually always listed 
first’.259 These military steps supported the Eurasianists’ and Neo-Eurasianists’ views  on 
Russia foreign policy-making and reinforced  the Russian Self-perception as in contrast 
with the USA and the perception of the USA as a source of threats to Russia national 
interests.  In connection with this, Roger Kanet states that Russia’s leadership, especially 
Putin, has ‘turned to the Cold War past in order to develop a strong sense of national 
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identity’.260 Thus, Russian foreign policy towards the USA is not free from Russian Self-
perception that is based on how Russia perceives itself in  world politics. Russian decision-
makers have a belief in their differences from Americans which shapes and reconstructs 
Russian state identity.   The new Russian state identity  is shaped by and shapes  a set of 
principles and values that support the desired objective of Russia to restore its global 
position as a superpower. 
 3.3 Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East  
The geographical link between Europe and Asia is one of the main premises of Neo-
Eurasianism.  Irina Isakova describes Neo-Eurasianism as a ‘geo-strategic model’ and 
states that ‘the political supporters of this approach have no political preferences towards 
potential allies’.261 According to this premise, Russia sees itself as ‘bridge state’ especially 
with resources-rich central Asia and rich Middle East countries. Thus, the Middle East is 
in the vital sphere of Russia.   According to Irina Isakova, Russia is a ‘continental shortcut’ 
from Northern Europe to the Middle East and the Mediterranean, thus Russia works to 
upgrade its influence and expand its geo-strategic space. Also, she states that Neo-
Eurasianism calls for ‘re-establishing relations with former allies and friends in the Middle 
East’ and classifies this foreign policy as ‘pragmatism’.262 In the same vein, Roland 
Dannreuther argues that Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East from a 
geopolitical perspective  has two major elements. The first is geographical propinquity that 
governs ‘the degree of national interest in the region on its southern borders’. In this 
context, Middle East countries like Iran, Turkey, and Iraq are more important and the rest 
of the Arab world is less important to Moscow. The second is the strategic importance  of 
the Middle East which is in the scope of the strategic interests of Russia.
263
 Furthermore, 
Marlene Laruelle argues that  Russia competes with the USA in the Middle East and its 
foreign policy is at eye level with the United States, therefore she rejects it as an 
expression of a Eurasianist perspective in  Russian foreign policy-making  towards the 
Middle East. 
264
Moreover, Robert O. Freedman argues that Russia decided to formulate a 
new strategy that can enhance Russia’s image in the Middle East and counter US influence 
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by exploiting its weakened position due to the negative image resulting from  the 
American war on Iraq and Afghanistan.
265
     
 
 Russia’s role in the Palestinian Israeli conflict 
Since Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967, the two state solution for the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict ha become a peace project for all actors in the international community. 
According to Ben Soetendorp, the Soviet Union adopted the two-state solution for one 
overall objective, that is, to prevent a Pax Americana.266   Breslauer argues that the Soviet 
Union did not rank  the solution highly on the list of foreign policy priorities; it wanted to 
be a part  of any Middle East peace settlement. Russia as the legal successor of the Soviet 
Union sought to reactivate its relations with Middle Eastern countries. In terms of the 
position of Palestinian statehood, Russia adopted the same position as the Soviet Union 
had taken. During the Yeltsin period,  Russia had been passive towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. When Putin came to the power in 2000, the significance of the Middle 
East peace process increased.
267
  The Russian presidential diplomacy that Putin led in the 
Middle East, especially to Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, was an attempt to 
search for a role and to ‘balance relations with both the Arabs and Israel’.268   
 
 Russian-Israeli relations cannot be omitted in the context of studying Russian-Palestinian 
relations. Ilya Bourtman states that Russian-Israeli relations became more significant  than 
in the Soviet era and that Putin had ‘done more than any other Russian leader to improve 
the economic and strategic ties with Israel’.269 For Roland Dannreuther, there is a 
difference between Russia and the former Soviet Union  in how they perceive Israel. In the 
period of the Soviet Union, Israel was perceived from an ideological perspective as ‘the 
Zionist and imperialist enemy’, while Russia has shed this ideological perspective and is 
now ‘wholly driven by pragmatic interests and geopolitics’.  Moreover, the mass 
emigrations of Russian Jews has ‘mellowed Russian perceptions of Israel’ and driven 
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Russia to build a substantial ‘domestic political force’ which has  led to the improvement  
in  Israeli- Russian relations.
270
 
Unlike the other Quartet members, Russia does not consider Hamas as a terrorist 
organisation.
271
 The Hamas victory in the 2006 election is one of the developments that 
changed regional dynamics. For Kreutz, Russians viewed this victory as ‘an American 
political setback’. 272 Putin characterised the American setback by considering Hamas’ 
victory as a ‘heavy blow’ to the US- led  peace making in the Middle East and  as a proof 
of the need for a ‘multilateral approach’ to the Middle East peace process. 273 However, 
Kreutz argues that by engaging Hamas with Iran and Syria, Russia wants to ‘uphold its 
image as an honest powerbroker and to maintain good relations with all players in the 
Greater Middle East’.274 However, the Russian perception of Hamas led to ‘a break in the 
Quartet’s façade of unity’.275  Similarly, Robert O. Freedman argues that the Russian 
invitation to Hamas undermined the Quartet’s conditions276 that were imposed on Hamas. 
Russia considered these conditions as ‘unrealistic’ at that time. 277 The Russian perception 
of Hamas is different from the EU and this can be ascribed to Russian Self-perception in 
contrast with other global powers.  
3.4 Understanding EU Foreign Policy 
Over the last two decades the EU has become an economic and political weight that has 
extended its effectiveness in world politics.  EU foreign policy has generated strong 
discussion and debate among researchers and policy-decision-makers around its place and 
mission in the international arena. This section reviews some literature about the role of 
identity in the EU foreign policy.   The literature used in this review relates to the EU as a 
political entity that represents the EU-28 member states and the concept of EU foreign 
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policy refers to ‘EU co-ordination of its political relations with the outside world’.278  
When scholars study and discuss EU foreign policy, various questions arise. Since the EU 
is a confederation
279
 of 28 independent states: Is there a EU foreign policy? Is the EU 
considered as a global actor? Is the EU a superpower or a superstate? 
In answer to the first question, there are two arguments: for  Federiga Bindi and Jeremy 
Shapiro,  the EU is ‘neither a nation-state nor an intergovernmental organisation’, so it 
remains a ‘peculiar institution’.280 In relation to the foreign policy goals and objectives of 
the EU, Federiga Bindi and Jeremy Shapiro assert that ‘the EU as a collective does not 
know what its foreign policy goals are’.  More than that, Gisela Mueller-Brandeck-
Bocquet points out that EU certainly does not play a ‘significant role in the world 
politics’.281Additionally, Federiga Bindi and Jeremy Shapiro state that the EU foreign 
policy has ‘evolved as a patchwork and ugly amalgam of different issue areas that were 
thrown together with little thought to overall strategy’. 282  
 
Thus, EU foreign policy faces a number of obstacles that affect its effectiveness in 
international affairs. For Karen Smith, the member states ‘can act autonomously’  in the 
international arena  and they can also   ‘seek to protect their vital interests and block 
decisions that contravene them’.283 In addition, Smith criticises the effectiveness of EU  
foreign policy, where the member states ‘have not created collective capabilities to match 
the expectations of coherent, effective international behaviour’.284 In the same way,  
Federiga Bindi and Jeremy Shapiro criticise EU effectiveness by referring to problems 
facing EU foreign policy towards the outside.  For them, ‘consensus among the EU 
partners, lack of institutional coherence and the multiple actors representing the EU 
abroad’285 are key obstacles to the effectiveness of the EU foreign policy. Similarly, Gisela 
Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet ascribes the state of effectiveness to ‘national egoism, 
distinctly divergent foreign policy interests of the individual members, inefficient decision-
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making system’.286 However, in a less sharp view, Michael Smith sees EU foreign policy 
representing a ‘least likely’ case not only in EU affairs but in international relations more 
generally.
287
 
 
Reuben Wong, on the contrary, considers EU foreign policy as being based on the notion 
of foreign policy as ‘actions and ideas designed by policy makers of an international actor 
(rather than a state actor) to promote a change in the attitudes of other actors or in the 
environment’.288 In this argument the EU is defined as ‘a significant international actor 
which not only makes foreign policy, but also exerts a significant influence on world 
politics’.289 Thus, EU foreign policy, according to Ruben Wong’s argument, is much wider 
than the narrow conventional notions that are based on the state-centred view of 
international relations.  
  
In response to the second inquiry, there are two views  of the role of the EU as a global 
actor in world politics: Fraser Cameron, Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, and Sonia 
Lucarelli argue that the EU is increasingly; ‘presented as an international actor with a 
principled behaviour in foreign policy’290; it is ‘unique in the set-up and character of goals 
and values’291; and has become ‘widely recognised as playing an important role in many  
different policy areas’.292 Karen Smith in contrast, sees that the EU has become 
‘increasingly an important international actor’, but it has an ‘ineffective’ role in world 
politics and its foreign policy has  ‘little influence on third countries or international 
relation in general’.293  However, she argues that the EU has an ambiguous mission in the 
world that  has ‘no EU values or interests because there is no policy from which such value 
and interests can arise’. 294  
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To return to whether the EU is a superpower or a superstate, Fraser Cameron argues that 
the EU is clearly ‘not a military superpower like the US’ but it could be an ‘economic 
superpower’, as ‘much of the EU’s power derives from its economic strength’.295 Federiga 
Bindi and Irina Angelescu states that ‘the EU wants to become a powerful international 
actor without becoming a superstate in the process’.296 However, Kolinda Grabar-
Kitarovic argues that the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 led to the strengthening 
of ‘the role of the EU on the global scene’, but it remins ‘a soft power at the best’.297 
Hence, the EU has become increasingly an important global actor in terms of its economic 
strength.   
3.5 Identity and Self-Other Perception  in EU Foreign Policy 
The EU as a political phenomenon, has attracted many scholars in foreign policy studies. 
The question that  is asked is: Why do the EU’s 28 member states need to join together in a 
united entity?  Is it a matter of identity or economic interests? In my reading of literature 
on European identity and foreign policy, I found that EU identity is still problematic and is 
not identified on both internal and external levels. The matter of EU identity is a tricky 
issue and has attracted considerable attention from many scholars. Larsen argues that 
because the EU is ‘not presented as a sovereign’ entity, ‘the terms like [identity or genuine 
identity] are frequently used in relation to the EU’s international actorness’.298   
 
The relationship between EU foreign policy and its identity has been discussed by many 
scholars. Christopher Hill and William Wallace argue that ‘the European Community rests 
upon a relatively weak sense of shared history and identity’299and they ascribe the 
ineffectiveness of EU foreign policy in world politics to this weakness of identity and 
collective action.  In the same vein, Karen Smith argues that the EU is not  a community 
which expresses a collective identity and common interests and, ‘until the EU becomes 
such a community, it will never be able to formulate and implement effective, legitimate 
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foreign policy’.300 Hence, Karen Smith poses the identity as a precondition to realising an 
effective foreign policy.  
However, Christopher Hill and William Wallace do not deny the possibility of 
constructing a European identity. They link  the weaknesses of EU identity  to ‘the diverse 
historical experiences of the EU member states, and the lack of ‘the influence over 
education’ which member states had themselves used to ‘strengthen communal identities’. 
But at the same time they recognise that the process of ‘forging of identity takes time’301  
and they indicate  that the enlargement of the EU might ‘help(s) to foster a sense of shared 
identity’. 302 However, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman argue that the EU has cultivated 
an international identity which is ‘valid for the analysis of the EU as an actor in the 
international system’.303 This international identity is demonstrated by many EU foreign 
policy discourses in which are embedded some of the following notable features:  
 
The Civilizational dimension in EU foreign policy:  
Values and principles, as Sonia Lucarelli argues, should guide EU foreign policy. She 
quotes from the Laeken Declaration that ‘Europe as the continent of human values, the 
Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution …. Europe needs to shoulder its 
responsibilities in the governance of globalisation’.304  In the same way, Federiga Bindi 
and Jeremy Shapiro assert that the promotion of democracy, and issues of human and civil 
rights are ‘at the very heart of the EU foreign policy discourse’.305 Moreover, Karen Smith 
states five objectives of EU foreign policy which set a civilizational dimension for the EU 
in world politics, namely, the promotion of human rights, democracy, good governance 
and prevention of violent conflicts are ‘key elements of EU international identity’, and 
these objectives are a ‘step forward towards a more effective assertion of EU international 
identity’.306 This set of aspects of the civilizational dimension in EU foreign policy paved 
the way for greater influence of the EU as a global actor in world politics.  Thus, when the 
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EU presents itself in the context of civilizational aspects that means there is a Self-
perception of the EU upon which it is acting in world politics.     
 
The EU’s mission and place in the world 
With the wide enlargement in the last decade, the EU has come to play a significant role 
on the international stage.  The place and mission of the EU has emerged  as a vital matter. 
For Fraser Cameron, the EU has a mission in the world that represents a commitment 
towards ‘democratic institutions, liberal values, human rights and regional stability’307. In 
the same vein, Sonia Lucarelli argues that the EU derived its mission and place in world 
politics from ‘its history and its historically-developed and formed values and principles, 
and an [ethics of responsibility] towards others’.308  
 
However, Stefania Panebianco points out that in 2001 the European Commission portrayed 
the EU role in world politics as a global actor with ‘political and moral weight’, but 
recently (2009) has  replaced the ethical dimension of the EU’s foreign policy by ‘a more 
pragmatic vision of the EU’s global role’309. Similarly, Christopher Hill argues that the 
EU-member states  broadly subscribe to the notion of an ‘ethical foreign policy’, but the 
war in Iraq revealed the tension between ‘ the two kinds of ethics imagined in Europe:  the 
right of intervention and pacific methods of conflict resolution’.310 In this regard, the 
matter of whether the EU is a civilian power or a military power is still arguable and 
attracts many scholars.  The notion of ‘civilian power Europe’ was coined by François 
Duchêne.
311
 This notion dominated the debate on the role of the EU in world politics for 
several decades.
312
 Jan Orbie argues that the EU  presented itself as a global actor on the 
international stage and ‘the prevailing European discourse is constructing the EU as a 
civilian power’.313  Accordingly, the EU seeks to expand principles and values and act as a 
peace and democracy stabilizer in the international milieu. Romano Prodi, in 2000, said 
‘We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global 
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development’.314 The above argument indicates how the EU perceives its international   
actorness  on the  international stage and how the EU international identity was 
constructed in the context of its mission and place in world politics.  
 
The EU’s Relations with Russia 
The enlargement of the EU reached 28 states, creating a supranational entity with the 
largest state bordering with Russia. For Fraser Cameron, Russia has a numerous status so it 
‘required a special relationship with the EU’.315 EU foreign policy towards Russia is 
determined  by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA),
316
 the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the ENP’s main financial instrument, the ENPI.317  
According to Steven Blockmans, Russia has ‘a strategic position in the EU foreign policy’ 
and it is a ‘major factor in the EU’s security and prosperity, the third trading partner, and a 
major supplier of energy products’.318 These factors represent key axes in EU-Russian 
relations.  
 
Meanwhile, identity and Self-Other perceptions have a considerable presence in  EU-
Russia relations.   She agrees with Blockmans about the strategic partnership between the 
EU and Russia. Lara Piccardo refers to the ‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ 
which was signed in 1994 as ‘the cornerstone’319 of EU and Russia’s relations. But Russia 
did not renew this agreement which expired in 2007. For Lara Piccardo this means that 
‘the Russian political elite have instead returned to a ‘bipolar logic’, looking at the West as 
a competitor or an enemy but not as an ally’.320 Also, Steven Blockmans points to Russia’s 
desire to pursue ‘enhanced bilateralism’ as a better means for developing ‘the EU-Russia 
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relations’.321 In this matter, the role of Russian Self-perception and the EU perception of 
Russia are highly present in this equation.  
Furthermore, Fraser Cameron considers that Russia’s ruling system tends to be 
‘authoritarian’ and this situation ‘pose(s) a problem for the EU, which is seeking to 
develop a values-based foreign policy’.322 However, in 2004, the EU launched the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to reinforce relations with neighbouring countries. 
According to Steven Blockmans, Russia ‘excluded itself from the ENP’.  He suggests that 
Russia did so because  ‘the EU had tried to apply it to Russia in the same manner as to any 
other neighbouring country’.323 This meant that Russia’s  Self-perception as a political 
heavyweight or great power affected its relations with the EU and also that the EU’s 
perception of Russia as being like any neighbouring country, drove Russia to exclude itself 
from the ENP. In relation to this view, Steven Blockmans asserts that Russia has favoured 
the development of its strategic relations with the EU, ‘based on a relationship between 
equals’.324 Between both, the EU and Russia, identity and Self-Other perception have a 
considerable role to play in their foreign policy.    
 
The EU’s Relations with the USA 
TheUSA and Europe relationship have been international allies since 1945.   According to 
Christopher Hill and William Wallace, the western European states rebuilt their foreign 
policy during the period of reconstruction after 1945 on ‘the basis of a compromise 
between sovereignty and integration’ accepting ‘American protection and leadership for 
their defence’.325 In this regard, Fraser Cameron argues that ‘The US is the most important 
partner of the EU and often shares a similar analysis of threats but then takes different 
views on how to counter such threats’.326  In the same way, Andrew Moravcsik asserts that 
the conventional wisdom that transatlantic relations are in bad shape and disarray, is ‘100 
per-cent incorrect’.327   
                                                 
321
 Blockmans, 'EU-Russia Relations through the Prism of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument',  (p175 
322
 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy.p117 
323
 Blockmans, 'EU-Russia Relations through the Prism of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument',  (p175 
324
 Ibid.p175 
325
 Hill, The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy.p10 
326
 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy.p90 
327
 Bindi, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World.p203 
82 
 
However, EU-USA relations are based on many shared civilizational dimensions that are 
enforced through mutual co-operation.  The issues
328
 of promoting peace and stability, 
democracy and development, and respect for human rights and individual liberty are at the 
core of the EU-USA partnership.
329
 Notwithstanding, there is a Self-Other perception of 
the EU vis-a-vis the USA. In this regard, Fraser Cameron mentions Javier Solana’s view of 
this perception which is ‘a confrontation between the religious vision of world affairs in 
the White House and the secular vision of the Europeans’.330 However, the EU puts an 
emphasis on the desire to be conceived from abroad as a ‘civilian power’, by using  
‘economic and diplomatic instruments’ in world politics.   For Ole Elgström and Michael 
Smith, this Self-perception is ‘a feature that has been asserted to distinguish the EU from 
the US’.331  
3.6 EU foreign policy towards the Middle East 
The Middle East occupies  considerable attention from the EU for a number of resources, 
the most significant of which  is the geographical interlock. Promoting change in the wider 
Middle East is one of the agendas that led to ‘a growing divergence between America’s 
perceptions and European perceptions’.332 In relation to this, Fraser Cameron states that 
‘the US talked of a ‘war on terrorism’; Europeans talked of ‘a fight against terrorism’.333 In 
2004, the Palestinian Authority and Israel were considered as part of the European 
Neighbourhood policy that the EU launched in 2004 to cover a number of countries near 
the EU. The policy is ‘supposed to be based on common values and interests including 
Democracy’.334 In this regard, Fraser Cameron states that the EU is ‘committed to help 
bring more democracy to the Middle East’.335  The EU adopted the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership to reinforce its strategic relations with Middle Eastern countries along with the 
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European Neighbourhood Policy. For Stefania Panebianco, the policies are working as 
‘two complementary wings’ of EU initiatives towards the Middle East.  Thereby, 
Panebianco argues that the EU’s relations with Middle Eastern states are identified 
according to ‘different priorities, goals, and instruments’. The core shared assumption of 
the two policies lies in ‘integration’. Stefania Panebianco argues that the integration of the 
Middle East countries in the EU internal market will produce a ‘spillover effect of radical 
structural reforms’ in different aspects (legislative, administrative, and institutional) which 
will be conducive to ‘greater political and democratic change’. Hence, Panebianco states 
that the EU acts as a ‘soft power whose international action follows the logic of utility’. 
Accordingly, EU-Middle East relations are presently concentrated more on security 
interests and needs than on ideas, principles, and values.
 336
 
 
EU foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue  
The geographical and strategic ties between the EU and the Middle East entail active 
involvement of the EU in the Middle East conflict in general, and the Palestinian-Israel 
conflict in particular.  For Ben Soetendorp, the EU has a strategic interest to ‘play a central 
role in the Arab-Israeli peace process’,  and it also  uses its financial aid to the Palestinians 
to make ‘itself clearly visible in the peace process’.337 The establishment of the Quartet on 
the Middle East gave ‘the EU the ability to create a more effective presence in the Middle 
East’.338 The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has a growing strategic meaning for global 
powers; therefore, the EU has increasingly aspired to become ‘an actor in the conflict’.339  
 
EU-Israeli relations cannot be omitted in understanding the European discourse towards 
Palestinian statehood. Officially, EC/EU involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
started as a ‘response to the 1973 war’.340  EU-Israeli relations were designed according to 
“the EU-Israel Action Plan” of 2004 as a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy.341  
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Accordingly, Israel has ‘the most developed relations with the EU’.342 Raffaella A. Del 
Sarto argues that the strategic ties between Israel and the EU are not only relevant to the 
Action Plan but also that they are relevant to ‘the EU’s evolving foreign policy ambitions 
in the Middle East’. 343 For Alfred Tovias, Israel is much closer to the EU ‘not only 
geographically but also politically, culturally and economically’.344  
 
In relation to the EU involvement  in the Middle East peace process through the Quartet, 
Soetendorp ascribes  it to the new function of the High Representative of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and the desire to improve ‘the capacity of the EU to speak 
with one voice’  and to work in world politics as a ‘unified actor’.345 In addition, he argues 
that the ‘EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process’ reinforces ‘the central 
position and responsibility of the High Representative in the making of a common 
European foreign policy’.346 The EU is searching to reassert its dynamic role in the Middle 
East process in order to assert itself as a global power on the international stage.  
 
However, the EU view of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not unified. In this regard, 
Urfan Khaliq refers to a ‘difference of views among the different EU actors’ and refers to 
this difference as ‘not surprising’347. Also, he refers to another problem related to the EU 
membership of the Quartet, that is, that the EU has three representatives in the Quartet: 
‘the External Relations Commissioner, the High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and a representative from the Member State which holds the 
Presidency at the time’.348 Accordingly, Urfan Khaliq states that ‘there have been 
differences of view between the representatives of the Union’.349  
 
Furthermore, Soetendorp ascribes the inability of the EU to undertake active participation 
in the Middle East process to the American wish for ‘no interference’ from the EU and the 
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EU  being an ‘unacceptable mediator to Israel’. 350  , Urfan Khaliq has criticized how the 
EU ‘tried to align itself with the perspective of the United States’, which led the USA to 
‘dominate’351 the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.  
However, ever since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, the EU has 
been one of the largest financial donors towards Palestinian state building. The EU 
supports the democratic transformation of the Palestinian Authority and sponsored the 
parliamentary elections in 1996 and 2006.   Hamas engaged in the municipal and 
parliamentary elections that were held in 2005-06, but it was classified by the EU and 
other states and organisations as a ‘terrorist organisation’.352 Hence, the overwhelming 
victory of Hamas in the 2006 Parliamentary elections shocked all concerned parties.
353
 
Hamas formed and led the tenth Palestinian government. This essential development in the 
Palestinian political map pushed Hamas to be a key player in the Palestinian landscape.  
The Quartet, composed of the US, the UN, the EU and Russia, made  its political and 
financial cooperation with the Hamas-led government conditional on Hamas’  recognition  
of Israel, renunciation of  violence and acceptance of all  previously signed agreements.
354
 
Accordingly, the EU stopped  sponsoring the Palestinian Authority and boycotted the 
Hamas-led government. According to Rouba Al-Fattal, the EU policy focused on 
compelling Hamas to moderate its policies towards Israel and the peace process.
355
    
 
Nathan J. Brown introduced an approach to deal with Hamas, namely,  that is “moderation 
through engagement”.356 This approach suggests engaging Hamas in the peace talks which 
could help to in convince Hamas to moderate itself in accordance with the Quartet’s 
conditions. Carolin Goerzig argues that the Quartet’s conditions were intended ‘as basis or 
framework for a potential peace process’ and that the three conditions come as ‘a package 
and inseparable’, thereby forcing Hamas to comply with them, it ‘makes compliance 
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problematic’.357  Accordingly, Goerzig argues that the EU’s emphasis upon the Quartet’s 
conditions as the way to accept Hamas as a peace partner means that the EU is ‘becoming 
prisoner of its own rhetoric’.358 Therefore, the EU is chained to its ‘own scope to take 
action and prevent mutual understanding and progress’. 359 Thus, Goerzig says that the EU 
could approach the problem from a different angle and it could use “a carrot-and –stick 
policy” which could engage Hamas to become a part of the peace process.  
3.7 Debate over the conventional and modern understanding of foreign 
policy-making towards the Middle East Conflict 
 
Debates over the Middle East conflict highlight the set of norms, values, interests and 
beliefs that have both theoretical and practical significance for the study of foreign policy-
making in the Middle East. The Middle East is perceived from many perspectives that 
have practical significance for the study of foreign policy by global powers. Edward Said’s 
360
 famous work ‘Orientalism’ focuses on ‘the orientalist stereotype’ of the Middle East 
and how the orientalists have described and imagined the Middle East as a ‘unique oriental 
cultural entity’. Said explains how the orientalist context shapes the Self-Other perception 
of the western powers, and highlights the orientalist stereotyped image of the Middle East 
which has  influenced the policy decision-makers for a long period.  Dietrich Jung and 
Morten Valbjørn perceive the Middle East conflict in ‘‘the context of cultural diversity’. 361 
They refer to the differences in norms, traditions and values that have shaped the identity 
of the Middle East. Bozeman (1994),
362
  and Huntington (1997), portray the Middle East in 
the context of a unified Islamic entity that has been shaped by the Islamic religion and 
Arabic traditional cultures.  According to Huntington, the Middle East identity is 
embodied in the primary sources of the Islam, and he puts the relation between the East 
and the West in ‘the context of clash of civilizations’. 363   
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Discussions about foreign policy-making towards the Middle East by Arab scholars are not 
free from ‘power’ and ‘oil-centric analysis and interpretation of global actors who have 
influence in the Middle East.   AbedEl-Atheem Hanafi  problematises the role of ‘oil’ in 
analysing foreign policy-making in the Middle East. He argues that natural resources, 
especially oil, play a vital role in the making of foreign policy in the Middle East.
364
 
Ahmad Youssef problematises the use of ‘power’ by the US and its allies in occupying 
Iraq and its regional and international effects.
365
 Most studies that deal with foreign policy-
making in the Middle East are characterised by an obsession with power and oil-centric 
analysis. This obsession that arises in foreign policy studies leads to a cul-de-sac: the 
hegemony of power-centric and oil- centric understandings of East-West relations that 
leads to the continuation of armed conflict in the Middle East.  The language used is that 
of violence. Furthermore, political regimes in the Middle East will continue to maintain 
their political singularity, and in so doing will shape public opinion in favour of prolonging 
military confrontation. However, it remains to be seen how the ‘Arab Spring’ will change 
these realities.  
The conventional understanding of foreign policy-making towards the Middle East peace 
process (MEPP) is problematic. There are a huge number of scholars dealing with the 
conventional assumptions of foreign policy-making towards the Middle East in 
comparison with a much smaller number dealing with the concept of identity and Self-
Other perception. Realist, Marxist, and liberal scholars focus on conventional assumptions 
to interpret the making of foreign policy by EU and Russia towards the MEPP. Hence, the 
question of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making is largely ignored 
in existing studies about Palestinian statehood. 
 Roland Dannreuther
 
challenges the conventional assumption that the external factors 
involved in the MEPP are driven either by neo-realist strategic competition or by the 
constraining power of domestic lobbies, or by a mixture of both.
 366
 He argues that 
approaches based on such assumptions fail to explain adequately  the policies adopted not 
only by the United States, but also by other key external actors who have been historically 
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engaged in the MEPP — the Soviet Union and the European Union. Karl K. Schonberg 
argues that a realist analysis which focuses on ‘material capabilities and interests alone’ is 
not   sufficient to explain the evolution of global power, especially  that of the USA in the 
21st century, emphasising the relevance of constructivist approach which ‘acknowledge[s] 
the role of ideology and identity in the shaping of policy in this era’. 367   
 Schonberg employs the constructivist approach to explain his argument in which national 
identity and ideology are critical variables in determining friend and foe, opportunity and 
threat in the process of foreign policy-making. Ben Soetendorp ascribes the EU 
involvement in the MEPP to the desire and ambition to realize EU identity in world 
politics as a global actor, in order ‘to speak with one voice’ and to work as a ‘unified 
actor’. 368 Moreover, Shibley Telhami and Michael N. Barnett challenge the conventional 
realist assumptions that international politics holds a monopoly on the state’s interests or 
homogeneity of state interests.
 369
  They conduct their research on the foreign relations 
between Middle Eastern states. Their research has built models based upon the relationship 
between identity politics and regional politics. Studies that deal with the concept of 
identity and Self-Other perception in the foreign policy realm is a trend that is likely to 
continue.
370
  
Thus, the establishment of a Palestinian state is an issue in foreign policy-making for most 
global actors having some role in the Middle East conflict. So, the failure to date to 
establish a Palestinian state brings to analysis the dynamics of theories of foreign policy. 
Realism, liberalism and constructivism are the common theories used by scholars to 
analyse and interpret political phenomena in the field of foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. The framework of this thesis is determined on the basis of a key assumption of the 
importance of the role played by identity and Self-perception in the process of peace-
making by global actors. The thesis takes as its case study the case of EU and Russian 
foreign policy discourse. Constructivist approach is helpful to use in the analysis and 
interpretation of EU and Russian foreign policy in light of our emerging awareness of 
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identity and Self-perceptions as essential elements in defining peace-making. These 
debates reveal to what extent difference and diversity in identity and Self-Other perception 
play an important role in defining how Palestinian statehood is perceived and how global 
powers act towards MEPP. This thesis highlights the role of identity and Self-Other 
perception in foreign policy-making which is becoming the central argument of this study. 
Therefore, I shall address identity and Self-Other perception concepts which will be found 
throughout the thesis.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IDENTITY–BUILDING: 
THE CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE EU’S AND 
RUSSIA’S SELF- PERCEPTION OF ACTORNESS 
 
 Focus 
In this chapter I argue that the construction of an international identity by the EU and 
Russia lies at the heart of internal developments that inform the making of their foreign 
policy. To this end, the analysis in this chapter is threefold. Firstly, I explain how the EU 
and Russia have constructed an international identity in the light of internal developments.  
The analysis takes into consideration key developments that occurred in the aftermath of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union which influenced the perception of actorness on the 
international stage. Secondly, I outline key contexts of capabilities in which the EU and 
Russia intend to assert their presence and visibility as global actors. This is to interpret the 
guides that define foreign policy-making by both actors. Thirdly, I highlight how this 
emerged Self-perception of actorness pushes both forward to look for opportunities behind 
borders. In this regard I explain how “neighbourhood” is perceived in the search for global 
actorness. This leads to understanding how the Middle East is perceived and to what extent 
it informs EU and Russian foreign policy, particularly the Middle East peace process.       
4.1 The Context of the EU’s and Russia’s Discourse: The Construction of 
Identity 
The surprising collapse of the Soviet Union was an historical moment which affected the 
course of both global powers and actors. In the aftermath huge changes in the world order 
have emerged. This collapse formed an historical context for many dramatic power 
transformations in world politics. Consequently, post-Soviet Russia and the EU have 
experienced challenges and transformations both internally and externally. Within this 
historical context, the identities of Russia, the successor to the USSR, and the EU, which 
played a major role in the Cold War, have come to the fore.  
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Boris Yeltsin, the first president of the Russian Federation said: 
 ‘The Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic has been peacefully 
replaced by the Russian Federation. The state has changed its legal identity’. 
Yeltsin 1993
371
  
 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union has in many ways brought a new discourse to Russia’s 
internal developments and external expectations. It brought questions about Self-
representation and its significance in the comity of nations. How should post-Soviet Russia 
present itself on the world scene? How should the identity of the new state reflect Russia’s 
rich history?   In the Yeltsin period, Russia’s state identity became a quandary.  There is a 
rich and diverse history which is mainly based on the legacy of the former Soviet Union 
and the heritage of Tsarist Russia with their various capabilities in different arenas. At the 
same time, there are weaknesses, challenges and threats in a multitude of areas which have 
faced Russia for decades and have now become critical. The breakup of the Soviet Union 
has shaken Russian society and caused crises on both internal and external levels. Clearly, 
the collapse has left Russia in an identity crisis. The new state’s identity occupied a 
substantial amount of space with debates and discussions occurring in most social classes.  
 
Foreign policy-makers and the Russian elite sparred over whether Russia should become a 
European or a Eurasian power, go westward or eastward and what role Russia should seek 
to play on the international stage. Clear divisions arose and the planning of Russian foreign 
policy varied among different streams of the Russian political spectrum. Pogos Akopov 
describes designing Russian foreign policy during the Yeltsin Period as a war between the 
pro-western model supporters, the pro-former Soviet Union and the Eurasianists who have 
influenced Russia’s foreign policy in recent years.372    In this debate, the legacy of the 
Soviet Union was perceived in two ways: some saw this legacy as a cause of weakness and 
undermining of Russian power status on the international stage, looking towards America 
as ‘the model of future Russia without losing the long-cherished feeling of equality’373 ; 
while others perceived this stance as a disaster, urging Russia to assert her legitimacy as a 
                                                 
371
 T. Borisova and W.B. Simons, The Legal Dimension in Cold-War Interactions: Some Notes from the 
Field (Brill, 2012).p 127. 
372
 Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Pogos Akopov, President of Association of Russian Diplomats. ', 
(Moscow, 2013i). 
373
Ibid. p. 77. 
92 
 
Eurasian power by constructing a new model.
374
 Not surprisingly, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union has deeply affected  Russia’s Self-perception.  
 
The new identity needed to reflect the aspirations of the Russian people and meet their 
expectations at both internal and external levels. Subsequently, Russia has declared itself 
the legal successor not only to the former Soviet Union but to pre-revolutionary Russia as 
well.
375
 This means that post-Soviet Russia is seeking to inherit the entire legacies of both 
the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia.
376
 Russia’s discourse places emphasis on this legacy:  
‘We have a huge territory, large amounts of natural resources, solid industrial 
potential, an impressive list of outstanding achievements in science, 
technology, education and art, a glorious history regarding our army, navy, and 
nuclear weapons. By using its authority Russian power has played a significant 
-- and in some periods determinate -- role in events of historic proportions’. 
Medvedev 2009377 
 
The discourse here presents internal developments in Russia over successive epochs. It 
stresses the significant role played by Russia in global historical events.  Russian Self-
perception in light of its history, economy, industry, science and geostrategic position has 
played a role of Self-identification and construction of identity. Russia is the world’s 
largest country and is a bridge between two continents. It is part of Europe, East Asia and 
the Middle East which are among the world’s most important regions. 378 For centuries, 
Russia has been a great power.
379
 The experience of empire, in both the former Soviet 
Union and Tsarist Russia has given Russia a sense of greatness and actorness in world 
politics. Russia’s place as an active global player has been assured ever since ‘the building 
of the empire by Peter the Great’.380 The collapse has opened the door to question the new 
Russia’s place and mission on the international stage.  
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Historically, Russian identity developed in the context of being the ‘Third Rome’, through 
the period of Tsarist Russia
381
 and then secularised to ‘world revolution’ during the Soviet 
period.
382
 Therefore, Russian identity was constructed through a form of 
‘exceptionalism’.383  Constructing an identity that can give explicit meaning to internal 
developments as well as to external expectations on the world stage has been and is an 
objective.
384
  
In respect of the EU, Javier Solana says:  
‘In Western Europe, the last 50 years have seen spectacular progress: from 
conflict and disarray to freedom, peace and stability’. Solana 2002 385  
Solana emphasises the significant transformation that has happened in Western Europe 
over the last 100 years.  The move from war to peace and from disarray to stability and 
prosperity constitutes considerable shifts in EU internal developments.  For Ian Manners, 
the EU was created in ‘a post-war historical environment’.386  This environment is a 
combination of, on the one side, a spirit of harmony, peace,
 387
 trust, cooperation and 
solidarity among the countries of Europe to heal the effects of the Second World War,
388
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and, on the other, a common cultural, historical and religious heritage.
389
 The EU’s identity 
has emerged in the context of peace, cooperation and solidarity with the aim of achieving 
prosperity for all its member-states.
390
 For Sir Graham Watson at least three elements can 
be distinguished in EU identity: peace, solidarity and prosperity for its member states.
391
  
EU internal developments, in the light of bridging the differences among its member states 
and reaching collective actions for agreed objectives, has created a sense of actorness and 
increased external expectations.  Moreover, Solana in his discourse shows a sense of the 
European ‘Self’ in contrast to Otherness. He says:  
‘Beyond Western Europe the past decade has seen tectonic changes in the geo-
political environment: the fall of communism; the dissolution of the Soviet 
bloc; a transformation of Central and Eastern Europe; the imminent re-
unification of Europe; and the development of a new constructive relationship 
between the Euro-Atlantic Community and Russia’. Solana 2002 392 
In this discourse the internal developments in regards to peace, stability and prosperity 
have a deep impact on perception of the ‘Self in terms of re-unification’ in contrast to the 
Other in light of fall and dissolution. In other words, the context of the consequences of 
WWII and the environment of polarisation during the Cold War influenced the 
construction of the EU’s Self-perception.   That means the Solana view of the EU is within 
a context of competition in the sense of a desire to play a role as a global actor. Solana 
describes the EU as an ‘attractive pole of stability, democracy and prosperity’.393 This is 
put in the context of internal and external developments that he refers to, as having a 
‘meaning’ to the EU as an international player. The discourse here is the question of Self-
presenting i.e. asking who we were, what we are and what we want to be. The matter of 
collective identity as a ‘European’ is inspired by the EU discourse of Self-perception.  It 
has helped Europe to heal from wars and destruction. In addition, this discourse stresses 
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the framework of European peace and cooperation after WWII and during the Cold War, 
confirming the fact that working together is the only way towards fostering political and 
social conciliation, reinforcing economic prosperity and maintaining European solidarity. 
Therefore, the European ‘Self’ has been and is perceived within this context in which 
external expectations are driven by the sense of actorness.  
Furthermore, constructing an international identity appears to be a complex process. The 
sense of collective identity of the EU member states derives not only from the presence of 
active institutions and organisations but also from European common values, norms and 
standards, which the EU sets and develops. While for Russia, the sense of collective 
identity of its member states stems not only from the constitution and its federal system but 
also from traditional values such as Russian Orthodox Christianity
394
, a geographical 
position in the heartland of Eurasia and the ethno-fusion of Slavic and Turko-Muslim 
people of Russia
395
 as well as the legacy of the former Soviet Union and Tsarist heritage.  
The presentation of ‘Self’ has been reflected in many ways such as returning to the old 
State’s emblem of a two headed eagle.396  
The matter of identity can neither be conceived nor fulfilled without taking a full account 
of the wider historical, political, social, and economic context of the great events of the 
twentieth and twentieth-first centuries in which the EU and Russia find themselves. 
Notably, the EU and Russia have coincided in their emergence and in the process of 
constructing a new identity on the international stage. While the EU strives to construct a 
sense of global actorness, Russia struggles to secure the former USSR a place in world 
politics. The EU’s and Russia’s discourse of identity and Self-Other perception both have 
a history of challenges and struggle to overcome the past’s problems. While Russia’s 
discourse focuses on recovering from weaknesses resulting from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the EU emphasises the strengthening of its collective identity and the enhancement 
of its enlargement. Whereas the EU seeks influence in central and Eastern European 
countries, Russia faces many problems especially in terms of geographic territory and 
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geostrategic sphere. Hence, the collapse of the USSR has pushed both the EU and Russia 
into a soul-searching process.   
Between soul-searching and Self-reinvention: seeking a role on the international stage   
The fall of both the Berlin Wall (1989) and the Soviet Union (1991) paved the way for a 
genuine opportunity for the EU to enlarge itself by recruiting the countries of central and 
Eastern Europe. The phrase ‘soul-searching’ has been used by the French political scientist 
Dominique Moisi to describe the EU quest for identity during this period.
397
 The changes 
in the USSR gave the EU an opportunity to create a new geopolitical landscape. Western 
Europe seized this opportunity to maximise its status as a “net exporter of stability”.398 
However, the EU emphasises common normative values and principles that ensure that 
Europe is bound together by these basic values.
399
  This includes the normative 
foundations upon which the international identity of the EU has been constructed 
alongside the institutional framework which member states have established.  Ian Manners 
identified five ‘core’ norms which comprise ‘the acquis communautaire and acquis 
politique’: peace, liberty, and democracy, the rule of law and respect of human rights 400 
which have become the main features of the EU’s international identity.  In this context, 
the EU is interested in the idea of naming itself as a civilian or normative power.
401
   
 
Russia, in its turn, has been engaging in a process of Self-reinvention in order to introduce 
a new identity. Russia is very keen to reinvent itself as a strong and great power on the 
world scene.  In the last 10 years of Soviet life, massive weaknesses in different areas 
appeared. In the years following the breakup, Russia’s power capabilities steadily declined.  
Therefore, Russia’ ‘Self’s perception was viewed within the context of the country’s 
weakness and decline. This formed the context for decision-making. Regaining Russia’s 
past greatness became a key question, but it was perceived in different ways. The 
mainstream Democratic Russian Movement came to strongly influence Yeltsin’s foreign 
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policy at its inception.
402
  The clash between Russia’s power status and its foreign policy-
making became acute in the post-Soviet era.  A growing dissatisfaction arose with Yeltsin’s 
foreign policy, especially with his policy towards countries of the Soviet sphere.
 403
  
Russian policy-makers and elites long to regain Russia’s past greatness. At the end of the 
Yeltsin period, Russia had to set a new course in foreign policy.  In 2000, Vladimir Putin 
came to power with the slogan 'Great Russia' and 'Strong Russian Statehood'’.404 This 
slogan dominated Russian discourse towards external relations. The discourse focused on 
securing a ‘great power status’ in world politics and policies designed to affirm Russian 
influence and dominance in the post-Soviet sphere. Thus, with the advent of Putin to 
power in 2000,  Russian foreign policy has increasingly been guided by what is known 
politically as the “Putin Doctrine”. The doctrine refers to the priority of recovering for ‘the 
Russian state the political, economic, and geostrategic assets lost in the Soviet collapse’. 
405Accordingly, the doctrine puts emphasis on the recovery of the former Soviet Union’s 
assets and  maintaining Russia’s influence and domination in this sphere.   
On the eve of the new millennium, the EU succeeded in attracting many Central and 
Eastern European states. More than 10 countries applied to take up EU membership. It was 
the largest enlargement of the EU which had ever taken place.  For Julie Gilson, identity-
building in the context of enlargement is one of driving forces behind the EU’s aspiration 
of global actorness.
406
  The Self-presentation, in terms of geographical spill-over, 
economic power, the peace project among long-standing enemies and a unique political 
and cultural experiment in the projection of values such democracy, freedom and 
collective solidarity, lie at the heart of EU’s Self-Other perception regarding global 
actorness in the world. The EU’s discourse makes it extremely clear that it is very 
important for the EU to be visible in the international sphere and to remain a leader in 
many international aspects such as the promotion of democracy, and of economic and 
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political values. These developments have increasingly posed questions about the EU’s 
place and mission in world politics. For Alun Jones and Julian Clark, the EU strives to 
gain meaning, actorness and presence in international affairs.
407
  The Laeken Declaration 
asks:  
‘What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is 
finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power 
able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for 
many countries and peoples?’ Laeken Declaration 2001408 
 
In striving to be visible, the EU member states committed themselves to a common foreign 
and security policy by signing and ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.
409
 Since that 
time  serious concerns have emerged in the EU regarding its role in world politics and to 
what extent it could be a global actor. In the course of these concerns, the position of the 
Higher Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR-CFSP) was 
created by the signing of Amsterdam Treaty in 1997.
410
 This debate has increased 
gradually and become very critical during the first decade of 21
st
 century.
 411
 In 2009 the 
Lisbon Treaty came into force whereupon global actorness became a key goal for the EU.  
 
While the Maastricht Treaty (1993) designed and framed the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon  
structured EU foreign policy.
 412
 In the course of the EU’s development, CFSP constitutes 
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the spotlight searching for an international identity in order to play an external role and 
present deep insights into its global actorness in world politics. This attempt can be traced 
back to the European Political Co-operation (EPC)
 413
 meeting in November 1970; when 
the six European member states tried to give its internal market a joint and common 
foreign policy to cover issues of general interest and those of direct concern to Europe. 
The EPC represents the first framework for a common European policy projected to the 
outside world. This foreign policy is based on principles and norms rooted in the EU’s 
perspective. Thus, EU foreign policy takes its shape from the grass-roots of the European 
community.   
 
Russia, from its side,  formulated a foreign policy concept which fits into the broader 
agenda of Russia’s strategic aspirations and strategically designed guidelines that envisage 
‘medium-term’ updates approximately every five years’.414 This is a natural update of 
Russia’s interpretations of local and international changes since 1993. For Andrew 
Monaghan there is a ‘strong sense of continuity in the new Foreign Policy Concept’ 
towards asserting that Russia has the potential to play an active role in world politics.
415
 
The concept points out:  
‘In the past decade Russia has been able to utilize additional possibilities of 
international cooperation that are opening up as a result of radical 
transformations in the country; Russia has advanced significantly along the road 
of integrating in the system of world economic ties; it has joined a number of 
influential international organizations and institutions. Through its intensive 
efforts, Russia has managed to strengthen its positions in a number of principal 
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areas in the world arena’. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 
2000 
416
 
 
Most of the foundation of the new Russian foreign policy was designed by former Soviet 
experts and leaders. This is very clear in the foreign policy concept with its emphasis on 
Russia as a great power and ‘as one of the most influential centers of the modem world’.417 
There is little doubt that the new Russia’s foreign policy is a resumption of the Soviet 
Union’s foreign policy with some amendments according to the new situation. Which is to 
say that the new Russian foreign policy remains committed to reinforcing Russia’s 
position  internationally while maintaining Russian dominance over the former Soviet 
sphere  is still its top priority.  
It focuses on bolstering Russian global actorness, economic recovery and growth and 
demonstrating the power ability to pursue its goals at internal and international levels. At 
the same time, Russia seeks to keep its foreign policy apart from polarisation and focus on 
realising Russia’s national interests. Putin said that ‘the Cold War is a thing of the past’.418 
In addition, Sergey Lavrov underlines that Russia’s foreign policy is ‘neither "pro-
Western" nor "anti-Western”. 419 He stresses that it is in the interests of Russia. 420 In the 
meantime, it taking into account the mutual interests of other states that Russia considers 
as ‘the guarantee of effectiveness and reliability of such a world order’.421 In the light of 
this,  Russia’s discourse focuses on building a ‘multipolar system of international 
relations’.422  
 
In a changing world, the quest for actorness is a continuous process. Therefore, the foreign 
policies of the EU and Russia are designed to create a favourable external environment 
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with the purpose of reinforcing their internal development and underpinning their peoples’ 
ambitions. In the case of Russia, Medvedev says:   
‘What will be Russia’s place, and hence the place of our descendants, heirs, and 
future generations, among other nations in the global labour market, in the 
system of international relations, in global culture? What must we do to 
steadily improve the quality of life of Russian citizens today and in the future? 
To allow our society to become richer, freer, more humane and more attractive? 
So that Russian society can give to those who desire it a better education, an 
interesting job, a good income, and comfortable environment for both personal 
life and creative activity?’ Medvedev 2009 423 
The question of Russia’s place is a priority in the making of foreign policy. 
Medvedev emphasises the need to secure an external environment to sustain Russia’s 
national interests and underpin the future of Russia in world politics. Russia is paying 
serious attention to opportunities to enhance its influence.  The questioning here is 
about Russian Self-representation in the context of expectancy about her position on 
the world scene. However, asserting Russia’s quest for quality of life for her citizens 
and making Russia a pole of attraction are at the core of its foreign policy-making. In 
reality, this is questioning the Russia’s “Self” vis-à-vis “Other”. Clearly, Russia 
increasingly attempts to give a political and strategic direction to its foreign policy. 
Similarly, the EU is motivated to create a favourable external environment to secure 
its future. Barroso says:    
‘The world is at a turning point. So is Europe. Our action now will determine 
the vitality of the European model of society for future generations. It will 
determine how much influence we have in shaping a new world order, how 
well we use our assets to assert Europe's interests and values in the age of 
globalisation…. We face a choice: either we collectively shape the new order, 
or Europe will become irrelevant’. José Manuel Barroso, 2009 424 
Barroso stresses the need for a united European response at global level in order to 
determine the future of the EU in world politics. The EU has an opportunity to influence 
the shaping of the world order. The Self-perception of both the capability plus the 
opportunity to play such a role informs the Barroso discourse.  Soul-searching at a global 
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level informs EU discourse on world issues. This discourse on the future of Europe - will it 
become relevant-versus-irrelevant - demonstrates that the EU has an instinctive desire at its 
core to be a global actor. It is about the question of representing the “Self”, and about how 
the “Other” is perceived in the context of expectancy of the EU’s place and mission 
globally. However, asserting ‘Europe’s interests and values’ is fundamental in constructing 
the EU’s motivations in foreign policy-making. It defines the EU “Self” vis-à-vis “Other”. 
Clearly, these interests and values  dominate the EU discourse at an external level. The EU 
cannot easily project values without asserting interests in its foreign policy-making. Thus, 
it increasingly attempts to give a political and strategic direction to its foreign policy.  
The EU’s and Russia’s discourse on their global presence reflects a range of internal 
capabilities and external expectations which have combined to motivate the EU and Russia 
to expect a role to play. Also, they are looking for an opportunity to experience their power 
capabilities. In terms of actorness, a variety of capabilities strengthens and in some cases 
broadens the success of playing an active role in world politics. The successful exercise of 
actorness depends on capabilities which can underpin the seeking for an optimal 
positioning on the international stage.  That means that the EU and Russia as ‘political 
constructs’425 involve not solely ‘being’ but also ‘saying and doing’. The context of a 
changing world at the beginning of the twentieth-first century has encouraged the EU and 
Russia to enhance their visibility and assert their identities in the world sense.  
4.2 The Discourse of Capabilities 
The EU discourse in this regard is continuous and derives its incentives from internal 
capabilities in order to assert its meaning and presence in world politics. Solana says:  
‘It is my belief that in this global age a Union of our size, with our interests, 
history and values, has an obligation to assume its share of responsibilities. 
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(….) we are increasingly encouraged to play a fuller part in international 
affairs’.  Javier Solana, 2002426 
The EU discourse relies on its power capabilities, which is to say, its normative, civilian, 
economic and stabilising powers, all of which have boosted and furthered the presence of 
the EU globally. Its emphasis on such capabilities has certainly been remarkable over the 
past decade.  Based on this discourse of capabilities, Solana says that: ‘the question, 
therefore, is not whether we play a global role, but how we play that role’.427   To this end, 
the EU has developed a wide range of institutional bodies and intra-EU coordination 
policies such as, for instance, the European Neighbourhood Policy. Moreover, the EU’s 
discourse shows a clear sense of its ability to exercise its capabilities and play an active 
role in international affairs. Solana articulates that Europe is increasingly encouraged by 
others ‘to play a fuller part in international affairs’.428 
Russia presents a completely different story. The Russian lack of capabilities has been 
acknowledged as causing the collapse of the former Soviet Union and limiting present-day 
Russian influence in world politics.  The last years of the former Soviet Union and the first 
years of the new Russia were very hard for Russian leaders at many levels, particularly the 
economic and political. These years are branded on the Russian memory as years of 
weakness. With Putin coming to power, Russia has been working to rebuild its Self-
perception as a great power and to project this image abroad. Foreign policy-making has 
been shifted to give it a more robust ‘great power status’ position.  Putin has also 
prioritised the reinforcement of economic sectors. He says: 
‘The economic weakness of Russia continues to be another serious problem. The 
growing gap between leading nations and Russia pushes us towards becoming a third 
world country. The figures of current economic growth should not be any cause for 
comfort: we continue to live in conditions of progressing economic lag. I would ask 
you to pay special attention to this’. Vladimir Putin 2000429  
 This acknowledgment of weakness has caused Russia’s foreign policy to take a new turn, 
focusing on the need to reinforce Russian national capabilities in order to have the 
wherewithal to be effective internationally. Russian foreign policy-makers want never to 
return to those years of weakness when Russia ‘seemed to be a dependent of the western 
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powers’.430 Putin's discourse on Russia's position among the comity of nations was deeply 
affected by this Self-perception of weakness. Putin points out that only a ‘strong or 
effective’ state is able to create conditions for prosperity.431 Russia’s policy-makers and 
elite are widely convinced that the roots of Russia's decline in influence lay in weaknesses 
in the areas of the military, economy and technology. 
432
 However, for Robert Donaldson 
and Joseph Nogee,  Russia’s geography, its experienced population, natural resources and 
military capabilities - especially its nuclear weapons expertise - are in themselves a 
‘guarantee of its on-going status as a great power’. 433  
 
Putin’s strategy in formulating foreign policy is to concentrate on those capabilities which 
do the most to generate prosperity and security in order to regain the influence that will 
enable Russia to play a leading role in world politics. Building and strengthening Russia’s 
actorness on the international stage is assumed to be a prime shaper of Russian foreign 
policy.  In 2000 a Russian foreign policy in 2000 states that:  
‘While the military power still retains significance in relations among states, an 
ever greater role is being played by economic, political, scientific and 
technological, ecological, and information factors’.434 
So, the EU and Russia perceive their ‘Self’ in light of a number of capabilities that 
underpin their actorness and greatness. This view is based on a number of realities that lie 
in both the present and the past. Russia’s discourse of capabilities defines priorities in the 
process of foreign policy-making and performs the task of filling voids perceived in terms 
of weakness. This discourse is increasingly apparent in Russia’s leaders, where the 
objective of regaining greatness informs the process of policy-making. Sergey Lavrov 
stresses that Russia has capabilities which enable it to play an active role in shaping world 
politics. He says:  
‘We now have the resources to participate not only in realizing world policy on 
most issues, but most important - we have acquired the possibility and capacity 
to participate in the elaboration of approaches which can later be realized’.435 
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 While Russia’s discourse rests upon three geostrategic imperatives in foreign policy: 
‘Russia as a nuclear superpower; Russia as a great power; and Russia as the regional—
political, military, and economic—superpower’.436 The EU’s discourse rests on four main 
concepts in foreign policy: the EU as a normative power
437
; the EU as an economic power; 
the EU as a soft power and the EU as a peacemaker.
438
  Ginsberg argues that perceptions of 
actorness influences actual actorness.
439
  For example, this Self-perception of actorness 
embodies an assumption that should construct a distinctive role for both the EU and Russia 
in the world arena.
440
 These perceptions of actorness constitute contexts in which both the 
EU and Russia exercise and reinforce their capabilities. Capabilities mean power and 
power is ‘no longer viewed as monolithic and uni-dimensional, but rather as 
multidimensional’.441 Exercising capabilities within a context gives meaning and enhances 
the presence of an actor. In the making of foreign policy, placing primary emphasis on the 
capabilities of states is a way of drawing attention to their potential power’.442  Therefore, 
the EU’s and Russia’s attempts to build international positions by using their capabilities 
have been driven by Self-perception which can be identified in a number of contexts: 
Values and Principles as Context for an International Identity  
 
“I have a passion for Europe. It is far more than just a market – its 
achievements inspire pride, its potential rouses the imagination. It is a 
Community of values, founded on human dignity, freedom, equality, and 
solidarity.... Moving ahead in this way, Europe can promote its values and 
interests not only in her immediate neighbourhood. Europe can become a true 
partner in leadership on the global scale.” José Manuel Barroso, 2009 443 
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The context of normative power constitutes the main reference for EU foreign policy 
actions. The EU emphasises the projection of European norms and values to create a 
widening reach of European geo-politic links to its neighbourhood.
444 
The projection of 
these values and principles asserts the collective identity of the EU which can be seen as 
an outcome of these elements. Hence, European norms and values play a role in the 
discursive construction of the EU’s international identity.445 The EU can be considered an 
‘imagined community’ with a ‘normative basis for collective identity’.446 Understanding 
this historical narrative in the context of the enlargement process is crucial for 
understanding the EU’s contemporary foreign policy.  
 
Accordingly, the EU has placed human rights, the promotion of democracy and the 
spreading of good governance at the heart of its foreign policy both in its geographical 
neighbourhood and in the world in general.  To show its commitment to these principles, 
the EU, since 2009, has published an annual report called EU Action on Human Rights and 
Democracy in the World. Furthermore, the EU has set out a number of instruments, 
initiatives and action plans in non-EU countries which demonstrate a serious commitment 
to human rights and democracy
447
  while the Council of the EU has adopted eight 
‘Guidelines’ that represent a strong political expression of the EU priorities in this field.    
In addition the EU created the position of an EU Special Representative for Human Rights 
whose mandate began in September 2012. The position aims to enhance the effectiveness 
and visibility of the EU’s human rights policy.  
 
In contrast, Russia considers itself a civilized power but not a civilian or normative power 
despite considering itself a ‘natural member of the European family’.448 At the same time, 
however, it insists on its differences from Western Europe. Russia does not, for example, 
perceive itself as a defender of European values. It cannot compete with the EU on this 
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ground. Its leaders have referred to “Russia’s sovereign democracy” which is ‘not much 
different from democratic practices of the Western countries’.449 In the meantime, Russia 
also emphasises its Christian values and traditions. It has tried to promote old values that 
are associated with its Tsarist heritage, especially values and norms stemming from 
Orthodox Christianity and traditional Russian culture. In February 2008, a documentary 
film entitled ‘The Destruction of the Empire: a Byzantine Lesson’, was aired by the 
Russian state TV channel. The film was repeated and followed by 45-minutes of 
discussion and debate which came to the conclusion that Russia ‘could exist only as an 
Orthodox empire’.450  That is Russia in the light of norms and values which highlight 
Orthodox values. For Andrei Piontkovsky, ‘Russia’s next civilizational clash will be 
rooted in religion and culture’.451 The constitution defines Russia as a secular state with 
Islam, Judaism and Buddhism as traditional religions alongside Orthodox Christianity. 
 
Economic Capability as Context 
When it comes to the concept of power, economic capability is one of the most 
significant factors in terms of foreign economic relations. The ability to act on the 
international stage depends very much on economic capability. 
   
‘Our size and interests dictate that we play a central role in the world. Consider 
this fact: the European Union accounts for almost 30 per cent of the gross 
world product. In comparative economic terms this makes us equivalent to the 
United States or to the rest of the world, excluding Japan. Moreover, we are the 
most important trading partner in the world, with substantial economic links to 
every other region’. Javier Solana, 2002 452  
 
The EU discourse focuses on the economic capabilities of its member states and how it has 
become one of the largest economies in the world.  It emphasises the EU as a single 
market with member-states, a major world trading power with sustainable economic 
development, and, in terms of goods and services, its GDP is (in 2012) bigger than the US 
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economy.
453
 In the last two decades, the EU has achieved an unprecedented level of 
economic, financial, legal and political integration. This deep-rooted integration has 
underpinned its role as an international actor
454
 simultaneously leading it to become an 
economic giant.  This power has encouraged the EU to punch above its weight on the 
international stage.
455
  
 
The exertion of great influence in world politics has been confirmed by many EU political 
leaders. In addition to Barros’ views, Catherine Ashton, in addressing the European 
Parliament before her formal appointment as a Higher Representative, emphasised that the 
EU should do more to ‘punch its weight politically’.456  We find the EU present at G8 and 
G20, along with the biggest economic blocs, pursuing a competitive economic policy with 
the likes of Russia and China. The EU puts considerable emphasis on partnership with 
economic groups such as Asian and other economic forums. This feature has been 
discussed by diverse scholars who conclude that this practice has enabled the EU to gain 
considerable meaning and presence in the domain of economic power.
457
   
 
Russia during the late Soviet and Yeltsin periods had no significant economic advantages 
to compare with economic giants such as the US, the EU and China. Since the coming of 
Putin, Russia has prioritised the enhancement of its economy. The foreign policy concept 
in 2000 states that:  
‘The main priority in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in 
international economic relations is to promote the development of the national 
economy, which, in conditions of globalization, is unthinkable without broad 
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integration of Russia in the system of world economic ties’.458 
Under Putin’s leadership, Russia’s foreign policy has focused on enhancing and reinforcing 
its economic capabilities to compete with other economic powers and enhance its ability to 
play a global role in designing and drawing-up world politics. Lavrov stresses that Russia’s 
foreign policy has been drawn up to ‘create favourable external conditions for the 
economic development of the country and improvement of the life of the Russian 
citizens’.459 Russian foreign policy is balanced between the quest for regaining greatness 
and the need to realise the prosperity of Russian citizens. Russia is striving to achieve 
prosperity for her citizens along with stable economic growth which can prevent a relative 
collapse such as happened to the Soviet Union.   
Accordingly, Russia has become a member of the Group of Eight. It justifies this 
membership in light of the speed of its ‘integration into the world economy and the 
creation of favourable external conditions for the economic and social development’.460 For 
Russia, G8 is an opportunity to realise Russian interests and to promote Russian 
approaches to a number of priority global problems such as ‘international energy 
security’.461  In addition, in 2009, Russia participated in establishing BRICS, as an 
international forum, to encourage commercial, economic, political and cultural cooperation 
between China, Brazil, India and South Africa.
462
  
 
Military Power as Context 
Russia, contrary to the EU, clearly sees its economic development and its ‘greatness’ as 
very much associated with its military muscle. Putin says:   
‘We will not be able to strengthen our international standing, develop our 
economy and democratic institutions, unless we are able to protect Russia’.463  
The military-industrial sector is one which Russia prioritises in terms of support and 
development. Putin frequently encourages the global audience to focus on Russia’s position 
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in world politics as a nuclear superpower. Russia’s Self-perception is that being a nuclear 
superpower in the context of nuclear military power gives Russia a rightful place in the 
comity of nations. Putin often underlines the importance of respecting a strong Russia. 
Medvedev has also emphasised the significance of Russia’s military power. He has said 
that Russia ‘will be well-armed. Well enough so that it does not occur to anyone to threaten 
us or our allies’.464 Military capabilities play an important role in Russia’s foreign policy 
and her international relations. Russia is keen to frame its international relations in the 
context of its military capabilities.  
On the other side, the EU, under the European Security and Defence Policy, has designed 
its unified military structure, but, at the same time, it emphasises its strategic partnership 
with NATO in which most of its member states are members.   Thus, European Security 
and Defence Identity were run under NATO which has been serving its security and 
defence purposes.  The EU discourse of capabilities in this context focuses on the EU-
NATO cooperation in crisis management. In 2003, the EU launched its first-ever 
peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, Operation Concordia.  Since then, the EU has 
increased its military presence through launching some 30 peace missions and operations 
inside Europe and beyond.
465
 In contrast to Russia, the EU stresses the normative purposes 
of its military capabilities in spreading peace and conflict prevention.
466
 
 
Soft Power as Context 
‘We act. Supporting the forces of hope. Fighting the causes of worry. And very 
concretely so. With means and money. The European Union is the world’s 
largest donor of development aid and a major donor of climate finance for the 
poorest nations’.  Herman Van Rompuy, 2011. 467 
 
The EU has presented itself as a perceived successful master of ‘Soft Power’. At 
European level, the EU has succeeded in implementing a swift and smooth 
transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. The discourse in this regard focuses on 
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enlargement as the clearest empirical success of its so-called soft power.
468
  
Moreover, in the Balkans the EU’s efforts have been perceived as proof of its soft 
power
469
since it  managed to overcome acute political polarisation among the key 
players in that troubled region. That policy has built a kind of acceptable rules of the 
game among the key players by using soft power.  
 
At world level, the perception of soft power has been enhanced by the ratification of  
the Lisbon Treaty which states that ‘supporting developing countries’ efforts to 
eradicate  poverty is the primary objective of development policy and a priority for 
EU external action in support of the EU's interests for a stable and prosperous 
world.
470
  Accordingly, the EU has become the largest donor of development aid and 
climate finance. EuropeAid has delivered aid through programs and projects in about 
19 themes across the world.
471
 It delivers aid through a set of financial instruments 
that ensure EU effectiveness at external level.
472
 Moreover, the EU is represented 
through 139 EU delegations and offices around the world as well as running 10 
civilian missions in conflict zones. These delegations and civilian missions underpin 
the EU presence and reinforce its influence globally.  
 
In comparison, Russia has tried to revive the USSR approach by focusing on Culture and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
473
 From the Russian perspective, Culture and 
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Art are very important elements in constructing an international identity. Andrei Kokoshin 
argues that it is impossible for Russia to be a great power without ‘a cultural civilizational 
identity’.474 At its periphery, Russia has developed a network of relations with the 
Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS). This is based on an ‘infrastructure of ideas, 
institutions, networks and media outlets’.475 It has financed many NGOs and think-tanks 
that engage in activities which serve and enhance Russia’s influence within the CIS.476    
 
In 2000 Russia’s foreign policy concept pointed to the promotion of a positive perception 
of Russia as a key objective, therefore, the 2007 Russian foreign policy survey increasingly 
referenced Soft Power in the discussion on the need to diversify Russia’s foreign policy 
network in terms of cooperation in Culture, Science, parliamentary diplomacy and the 
international activity of civil society institutions.
477
 Thus, Russia focuses on Culture and 
NGOs as elements of Soft Power.
478
  The survey relied heavily on cultural initiatives and 
NGOs as instruments of Russia’s foreign policy479 so the discourse focussed primarily on 
Culture and Art. Putin stressed the need for culture in reinforcing Russia’s international 
relations:  
“Russia has a great cultural heritage, recognized both in the West and the 
East. But we have yet to make a serious investment in our culture and its 
promotion around the world. The surge in global interest in ideas and 
culture, sparked by the merger of societies and economies in the global 
information network, provides new opportunities for Russia, with its 
proven talent for creating cultural objects. Russia has a chance not only to 
preserve its culture but to use it as a powerful force for progress in 
international markets.” V. Putin 480 
 
Putin is increasingly interested in using soft instruments and smooth policies to construct 
interrelated contexts to underpin Russia’s influence in the world. In 2003, Russia 
celebrated the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg.  Putin considered this event as a sign 
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that Russia ‘has risen from its knees and is being born anew’. 481 In furtherance of this 
policy, Russia was an assiduous host at large international cultural events in order to 
change and construct a new Russian image.   Besides Putin, Sergay Lavrov, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, is an advocate of using Culture, Art and NGOs as instruments to underpin 
Russian diplomacy. For Paul de Quincey, Russian Director of the British Council, culture 
is one of the main elements which can play a role in underpinning ‘diplomacy and business 
ties by making it easier to take advantage of opportunities’.482  In tune with this idea, 
Russia has established or renewed a number of cultural centres, NGOs and media outlets to 
enhance Russia’s positive image around the world; some of these bodies are the Imperial 
Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS),  Russia Today (RT) and the voice of Russia (RUVR).  
         
The EU seeks to play a role as a peace-maker in many conflict zones. Peace is at the core 
of the EU discourse on both the internal and the external levels. The Nice Council Meeting 
states that: 
‘…the European Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg 
tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union: humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking’.483 
This is how the EU manifests its international identity as a peace protector, encourager and 
creator. The EU Self-perception of peacemaking rests on its long history as a peace project 
and rich experience of engagement in mediation and dialogue processes.
484
 This perception 
has been developed and promoted as a part of the EU security strategy, in other words, the 
perception of peace has been built on the foundation of ‘prevention engagement or 
preventive policy’.  This implies that peace policies create better environments in terms of 
security, trade and economy. The strategy states that ‘preventive engagement can avoid 
more serious problems in the future’.485  Accordingly, the EU has endorsed many policies 
that came under the foundation of prevention engagement.   
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Solana in 2006 said that ‘if you don’t like preventive wars, you must develop preventive 
policies’.486  In this context, the EU sees its peace, prosperity and stability lie in a secure 
environment within and outside its borders.  This view has been adopted within the 
European security strategy in which the promotion of human rights, democracy, spreading 
good governance, underpinning social and political reform, supporting transparency 
standards, fighting both corruption and the abuse of power and establishing the rule of law 
are the best means of strengthening the international order.  
 
On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the EU’s capacity in peace-building, 
mediation and prevention of conflict.
487
 Within this context, peacemaking has become one 
of the key features of EU foreign policy. The EU established a program for the prevention 
of violent conflicts,
488
 adopted a concept to strengthen EU mediation and dialogue 
capacities,
489
 launched the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in 2007, and created a conflict 
prevention, a peace building and a mediation instruments division within the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) to support its mediation capacity. Moreover, the EU has 
currently (2012) ten Special Representatives (EUSPs) in different conflict zones and 
troubled regions. This feature gained special recognition when the EU won the 2012 Nobel 
Peace Prize. In order to embody the perception of actorness, the EU seeks to be involved 
in a variety of activities around the world. Solana seems to hold a strong belief that ‘being 
on the ground has helped the European Union to play a greater political role, including in 
preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution’.490   
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Russia has a different approach to peace-making and conflict resolution. No doubt Russia 
is eager to enhance its image in the world as a peacemaker, but only under United Nation 
Security Council (UNSC) authority. It insists that the use of force on the world scene 
‘should be possible only when authorised by the UN Security Council’.491 In Russia’s 
2000’s foreign policy concept, strong emphasis was placed on peacemaking under the UN 
umbrella. It states that:  
‘Russia regards international peacemaking as an effective instrument for 
resolving armed conflicts, and calls for the strengthening of its legal foundation 
in strict accordance with the principles in the U.N. Charter…. The need for and 
degree of such participation shall be measured against the national interests and 
international commitments of our country. Russia proceeds from the premise 
that only the U.N. Security Council has the authority to sanction use of force 
for the purpose of achieving peace’.492  
In this discourse, peace-making is limited to Russian national interests. Russia 
perceives its participation in peacekeeping missions as an objective that ‘would 
strengthen the case for demands, corresponding to Russian interests’.493 It has taken 
part in about 15 peace-keeping missions under the UN umbrella.
494
 Russia sees the 
UN as ‘a universal forum endowed with a unique legitimacy’.495 As a permanent 
member of this forum, Russia is very keen to activate its participation in UN 
activities that would realise its ‘national interests’.496 In light of this quest, Russia has 
defined her diplomatic mission to the UN as to: 
‘Ensure our weighty representation in the bodies determining UN policies in 
questions of management, budgetary planning, financing, procurement 
activities and so on’. 497    
Russia places more focus on participating in UN activities which enable it to influence 
world processes and to secure its power status. This discourse on peace-making is aware of 
benefits that could be gained through such activities. The discourse emphasises the 
viability of considerable potential for Russia to play a role in such multilateral efforts. 
With the coming of Putin to power, Russia is asserting its global actorness by using its 
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permanent membership at the UNSC.  From 2000 to 2012, Russia used its veto in the 
Security Council eight times.
 
Putin seeks to re-brand Russia as a superior country so we 
find Russia using its permanent membership of the UN Security Council as a counter force 
to US domination there. It sees itself as an ‘independent’ global actor on a par with the US 
and China. Putin has shown this desire to maintain and reinforce Russia’s place among the 
comity of nations. At the Munich Conference (2007), he condemned the US building of a 
unipolar system which from his perspective undermined ‘world security’.498   
4.3 An Opportunity between “Neighbourhood” and “Multi-victor” 
Policy:  Wider Political and Geostrategic Vision 
For both the EU and Russia, looking for opportunities to increase influence, first in their 
immediate environs and then extending it to other spheres, is a key object to accommodate 
nominated actorness. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the new Russia and the 
EU sought opportunities to underpin their influence. While the EU sought to spill-over 
towards Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Russia established the Commonwealth 
Independent States (CIS). The EU seized this opportunity and succeeded in attracting most 
of the CEE states to join its club, whereas Russia succeeded in maintaining and restoring 
the former Soviet Union influence in the Caucasus and central Asian countries. Identity 
and Self-Other perception played a vital role in these movements of attraction and 
recentralisation. The EU perceived the Central and Eastern European states as a natural 
geostrategic sphere with which they shared many things in common while these states 
perceived themselves as European in terms of geography, a shared history and a need for 
stability, security and prosperity which they saw as linked to the EU. In comparison, 
Russia has portrayed the former Soviet republics as a natural and historical geostrategic 
sphere to accommodate its desire for regional actorness. For that reason, Russia adopted 
the ‘Near Abroad’ policy to enhance their influence and reaffirm its regional actorness and 
dominance.  
 
The coming of Putin to power brought a new dimension to Russia’s foreign policy.  Russia 
has begun to play ‘an entirely different role’ which is determined by ‘the multivector 
character of Russian foreign policy’.499 Russia’s foreign policy is diversified and oriented 
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towards ‘a balanced development of relations with the countries of the West and East, and 
North and South”.500 It focuses on building Russia’s capabilities by integration in the 
world economic and political system. It centres on creating an external environment that 
underpins and enhances Russia’s ability to diversify its international relations. 501  
 
According to the 2007 Russian foreign policy survey, ‘multilateral diplomacy’ is the key 
method of governing Russia’s international relations ‘at global and regional level’.502 This 
method has implications for foreign policy-making. Accordingly, Robert H. Donaldson 
and Joseph L. Nogee, argue that Russia ‘has pursued balance-of-power’ which imply 
measures taken by Russia to enhance its power by ‘whatever means are available’.503  The 
Survey points out a number of premises that guide Russia’s international relations, namely, 
that Russia’s foreign policy proceeds from Russian national interests that constitute vital 
requirements for Russia and its citizens, that the firmness of Russia’s international position 
hinges on its internal strength and that the security of Russia cannot be isolated from its 
security and stability in a global and regional context.  Based on these premises Russia is 
looking for opportunities to reinforce its global actorness. The Survey states that:   
‘The qualitatively new situation in international relations creates favorable 
opportunities for our intellectual leadership in a number of areas of world 
politics. In other words, it is about Russia’s active participation not only in 
carrying out the international agenda, but also in shaping it’.504  
 
The discourse shows that changes in international relations have created opportunities for 
Russia to lead and be a key player in shaping world politics. It builds on the belief that 
Russia’s stability, security and prosperity, based on its active role on the international 
stage, helps to create a favourable external environment.  
 
The EU responded to the prospect of decisions on enlargement taken in 2002. The 
European Council invited the Commissioner Christopher Patten and the Higher 
Representative Javier Solana to work on ideas related to neighbouring countries. The joint 
memo by Patten and Solana to the Council drew attention to the geostrategic dimension in 
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the EU’s external relations with its geographical proximity.  The memo introduced the 
concept of a ‘Wider Europe’ as a framework of EU relations with neighbouring countries. 
The discourse of a ‘Wider Europe’ points to different domains. These include the EU 
presence in geographical context which needs actions to be taken
505
, an opportunity 
offered by enlargement to achieve the EU’s interests and objectives and the capability of 
the EU for developing a new range of policies towards its neighbouring countries, which is 
a discourse of actorness. Moreover, the communication states that:   
‘Over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, 
stability and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be 
distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours…. 
The neighboring countries are the EU’s essential partners: to increase our 
mutual production, economic growth and external trade, to create an enlarged 
area of political stability and functioning rule of law, and to foster the mutual 
exchange of human capital, ideas, knowledge and culture’. EU Commission, 
2003
506
 
 
This Self-perception, proved by opinion polls in 2006 and 2007, show that EU citizens tend 
to have a positive perception of relations with neighbouring countries.
507
 Thus, EU Self-
presentation in its policies towards its neighbours shows the EU’s centralist tendency even 
as the discourse shows the ‘centrality’ of the EU as a source of action which  falls into 
identity-oriented policies.
508
  Hence, the EU discourse in dealing with its neighbours is 
characterised by the desire of actorness in its geographical sphere as a part of identity 
construction.   Within this discourse, the EU has launched ‘the Neighbourhood Policy’ 
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(ENP)
509
 and set up various financial instruments and a number of action plans.  These 
action plans are bilateral which entails an agreement between the EU and its partner 
countries. Every action plan sets out an economic and political agenda with selected 
priorities.  Action plans constitute a reform agenda within the context of the EU’s vision 
underlies the Self-Other perception.  
In the context of reinforcing their actorness, both the EU and Russia increased their focus 
on the Middle East and Mediterranean Sea as a geostrategic nerve centre of world politics. 
Historically, the Sea has witnessed many wars among many powers all attempting to 
control this geostrategic region.  Seven EU member-states are part of the Mediterranean 
coastline while Russia has sea borders with two countries in the Middle East, Turkey and 
Iran. More than this simple fact of geography, both the EU and Russia have deep 
historical, cultural and economic bonds with this region. Thus, the Middle East poses an 
opportunity for Russia and the EU to enhance their actorness and influence on the world 
scene.  
4.4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I argue that the EU’s and Russia’s construction of an international identity 
is affected by a number of internal and external developments. These developments 
influence the making of foreign policy by both actors.  I focus on understanding the 
construction of the EU’s and Russia’s international identity in the aftermath of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  Within this wide context, I discuss how the EU strives to construct a 
new international position, and the post-Soviet Russia struggles to secure the former 
international position of the USSR. Through the discussion, I find that playing an active 
role in world politics is motivated by the experience of actorness that is rooted in history, 
and the desire to overcome the past. On the Russian side, the internal developments arising 
from the breakup of the USSR, have influenced Russia’s construction of a new 
international identity. Russia emphasises the recovery of its economy, strengthening its 
territorial integrity, and    securing its internal security. Overcoming the weaknesses and 
securing its position as a legal successor to the former Soviet Union have driven its foreign 
policy-making on the international stage.  On the EU side, the building of EU global 
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actorness has been influenced by the historical transformations that have happened in 
Europe over the last 60 years: from destructive world war to the Union as a reconciliation 
and peace project. These developments have created a sense of actorness that has been 
influenced by internal developments.  
Based on these roots of Self-perception, I have contextualised the perception of actorness 
of the EU and Russia which is based on a variety of capabilities that are reflected in the 
design of foreign policies by both. The EU discourse of capabilities relies on its normative, 
civilian, economic and stabilising powers that constitute domains within the EU which can 
boost and further its visibility and presence on the international stage. The emerged Self-
perception through these contexts lies at the heart of EU foreign policy-making.  Russia 
focuses on its position as the legal successor of the former Soviet Union, military 
capabilities, gas and oil assets and permanent membership at UNSC.  Accordingly, both 
actors have developed strategies and policies to enhance their influence and underpin their 
actorness in world politics. The EU has developed a wide range of institutional and intra-
EU coordination policies such as HR-CFSP and ENP. With Putin coming to power, 
Russia’s foreign policy placed a major emphasis on securing actorness status in world 
politics by increasing the focus on restoring the influence and dominance of the former 
Soviet spheres which became known as the ‘Putin Doctrine’. It focuses on restoring 
Russia’s position as one of the most influential centres in the world. Accordingly, the 
constructed Self-perception plays a major role in defining the process of peace-making 
towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
PERCEPTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN CONTEXTS: 
PROMOTING THE EU’S AND RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
 Focus 
The argument in this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it focuses on the importance of the 
Middle East from EU and Russian perspectives as well as changes that affected their 
perception and the region as well. Secondly, it contextualises the EU’s and Russia’s 
perceptions of the Middle East concentrating on four areas: security and strategic stability, 
economic and technological cooperation and trade relations, energy provider and stabiliser, 
and historical, cultural and religious ties.  The emphasis here is on the perception of 
Otherness constructed within different contexts which possesses the most employable 
capabilities that assert actorness.  The third part is a comparative analysis of these contexts 
in relation to internal developments and external expectations. This chapter looks at how 
the importance and challenges of the Middle East are perceived that help widen 
understanding of the policy-making of the EU and Russia towards a peace settlement.  
 
5.1 The Middle East as an Opportunity: The Importance and Challenges 
for the EU and Russia  
How is the Self-Other perception revealed in the interpretations of the Middle East as an 
opportunity? In this regard, readings of changes in the world order and of the rise of new 
global actors are subject to Self-Other perception. During the first decade of the new 
Millennium many events affected the course of Middle East politics. The failure of the 
Camp David II summit between the Palestinians and Israelis, and the eruption of the 
second Intifadah in 2000, the events of 9/11, the results of  the so-called “War On 
Terrorism” and the following events such as the war on Afghanistan and Iraq, the removal 
of Sadam from power,  America’s troubles  in both countries, the crisis of capitalism in 
2008 and the rise of new global economic actors such China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa as well as the “Arab Spring”, have affected the course of policy-making in this 
region.  
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These changes and fluctuations have caused fluidity in the making of Middle East politics, 
which has posed a challenge to all international players but especially to the US.  The US 
has faced serious challenges in attempting to maintain its influence in the Middle East.
510
 
These challenges created an opportunity for old international players to take up their 
previous roles in the region. The discourse of the EU and Russia has come to this reality 
with added emphasis on the necessity of seizing this opportunity. Barroso, the President of 
the European Commission, said: 
 ‘The world is at a turning point. So is Europe. Our action now will determine 
the vitality of the European model of society for future generations’. 511   
 
Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in turn, has focused on the need for Russia to seize 
this opportunity. He said:  
 ‘Today the world is changing rapidly…. This opens a new “window of 
opportunity” for developing international relations’. 512 
 
The EU and Russia perceive these changes in world politics as an opportunity which 
should be seized to secure their visibility and influence. In their view the US is declining 
especially in an important region like the Middle East. Thus, both want to enhance and 
underpin their global actorness in the Middle East.  
EU involvement in the Middle East can be traced back to the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) which agreed on a collective action in the Middle East conflict.
513
 With 
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU gradually increased its involvement in Middle 
Eastern politics. The Barcelona Declaration at the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Conference 
constituted a focal point comprising  the normative bases upon which European foreign 
policy is formulated. It places prime emphasis on political, security, economic, financial, 
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social, cultural and human affairs partnerships.
514
 This involvement has developed to 
reflect EU Self-perception through the course of enlargement.  
 
The massive enlargement at the onset of the 21
st
 century had powerful effects on the EU 
discourse on the Middle East.
 515
 In preparing for the biggest enlargement, in 2004, new 
geostrategic dimension emerged and, consequently, the EU discourse began to address its 
place and mission in this new sphere. For Steven Everts, the Middle East is ‘not only a 
priority but also a test case’ in the light of the EU’s growing foreign policy ambitions.516  
Thus, perception of the Middle East is largely influenced by European self-perception in 
terms of prosperity, security and stability on the one hand and how the EU perceives its 
place and mission on the world scene on the other. In this regard, the EU designed the 
‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP) on the basis of which the EU has extended its 
influence in the Middle East.  
 
The ENP constitutes a new strategy of widening the EU influence in the countries around 
Europe, especially the Middle Eastern ones. For Alun Jones ‘the “making” of a 
“Mediterranean region” is an actor-centred, open-ended process through which the 
Europeanization of space is sought’.517 518 Thus, EU capability in terms of its normative, 
political and economic power on the one hand and potential opportunities on the other, 
plays a role in the Middle East and informs its foreign policy. The ENP reveals the EU’s 
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attempt to create privileged forms of close relationships with its neighbours, irrespective of 
what their historical relation had been.  
 
This discourse has been translated into a massive presence on economic, security and 
normative terms. It can also be seen as a response to expectations and aspirations of being 
under the EU umbrella and anticipation of both member states and citizens to meet global 
challenges in today’s world. Mainly, the policy is about making Euro-Mediterranean 
borders work better in responding to EU member states’ citizens’ concerns for security, 
stability and prosperity.
519
   
 
From Russia’s side, an important shift took place in the whole of Russia’s  foreign policy, 
particularly in the Middle East, reflecting the Self-Other perception newly born in the post-
Soviet era.  The perception of the Middle East changed visibly from Yeltsin to Putin. 
During the Yeltsin period, the role of the new Russia in the Middle East was marginalised 
due to internal instability, and political and economic transformation.
520
 Roland 
Dannreuther, however, argues that, at the beginning of the Yeltsin period, Self-perception 
in terms of economic and strategic weakness on the world scene forced Russia to articulate 
a policy which would be thoroughly differentiated from traditional Soviet policy towards 
the Middle East.
521
 Dannreuther points out that Russian interests lie more in ‘cooperation 
than confrontation with the West’.522 The Self-perception that emerged in that period led to 
the absence of Russia as a global actor in the Middle East process. 
 
 In 1996, when Primakov became foreign minister, Russia started to construct a more 
visible presence in this region.523 He succeeded in establishing a ‘policy of balances’.524  
Russia has consistently seen itself as a global actor on the international stage with the right 
to have a significance role in the region. Thus, the shift in Russia’s foreign policy towards 
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more engagement in the Middle East started with the need to reinforce its influential status 
on the international stage as an active global actor. This engagement increased with Putin’s 
coming to power.                                     
 
Russia has increasingly looked for an active role in Middle East politics aiming to reassert 
Russian influence in the region.  Russia nowadays puts emphasis on balancing its policy 
towards all parties. It re-designates friends and foes in the Middle East. In this process, the 
new Russia goes beyond the “communist” perception of  the different parties to the 
conflict. For Leon Aron, Russia has increased its visibility in the Middle East on the basis 
of ‘the cultivation and protection of former Soviet client’.525  That is, Russia wants to 
secure and develop what the Soviet Union used to enjoy in the Middle East, much, if not 
most of which is, according to Aron, ‘as counterbalance of the United States’.526 In the 
same way, Rand group argues that Russia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East was 
driven by a belief that Russia, as a “great power”, ‘should play a role in such an important 
region’.527 Which is to say that Russia wants to translate its past relations and historical 
ties with the Middle Eastern countries into a real influence that enhances its position as a 
global actor.
528
  
 
Therefore, to both Russia and the EU, partnership with Middle Eastern countries is 
strategic, and the choice, as stated by Solana, Barroso, Putin and Lavrov among others, is 
not whether to have strategic relations with the Middle East, but simply what form those  
relations might take. The importance of the region influenced the discourse of the EU and 
Russia and forced them to rethink and revisit their framework and approaches to the 
region. Lavrov underlines the importance of the Middle East and asserts that Russia ‘never 
departed from this strategic area’ considering it as a ‘vector of Russian foreign policy’ 
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while witnessing an appreciable increment in ‘the most diverse fields’.529 In contrast, the 
EU position has been elaborated as part of ‘wider Europe framework’ in which their Self-
perception as a global actor is predicated on the premise that ‘if you don’t like preventive 
wars, you must develop preventive policies’.530 For Solana, the region of the Mediterranean 
is an area of ‘major importance and opportunity for Europe’. 531  
 
Russia has revised its policy towards the Middle East which is framed within the 
geostrategic direction in which its involvement as an actor is ‘an indispensable component 
and an important tool for ensuring the national interests of Russia’.532 Thus, it could be 
argued that, the developments in Self-perception of the EU and Russia during the last 
decade have influenced their perception of the Middle East, which has become an even 
more geostrategic space of concern in different contexts. These contexts largely depend on 
how the Middle East is perceived in terms of Otherness by both Russia and the EU. 
5.2 Perception of the Middle East: Contexts of Importance and 
Challenges     
  
‘With the Mediterranean Arab countries, Europe has a partnership which 
covers political and security dialogue, economic relations, including the 
creation a free trade area, and social and human relations ... The main objective 
of the EU in its relations with the Arab World is to promote prosperity, peace 
and stability, thereby not only contributing to the welfare and security of the 
region, but also to its own security. Problems of terrorism and WMD 
originating there have a direct impact in Europe. In this context, the solution of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict is essential. There will be little chance of dealing fully 
with other problems in the Middle East until this conflict is resolved; such a 
resolution is therefore a strategic priority for the EU’. R. Prodi, J. Solana and C. 
Patten, 2003. 
533
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‘Russia has historically strong ties with the region. Russian-Israeli relations in 
the political, economic, cultural and humanitarian spheres are dynamic. Our 
relations with the Arab world are wide-ranging in politics, economics, military-
technical cooperation and cultural ties. And our contacts after the war in Iraq 
attest that the authority of Russia in the region is strengthening significantly. 
Many Middle East states expect that partnership with Russia, like partnership 
with other leading players, will eliminate the current 'disbalance' in the Middle 
East’.534 
 
Through this discourse the Middle East has been perceived as a region of multi-layered 
interests and challenges: an area of interrelated economic relations, especially in trade and 
energy, an area of intersecting historical relations in terms of religion and civilization, an 
area of insecurity where threats of what so-called “terrorism” originate, as well as an area 
of instability with rather undemocratic and authoritarian regimes. For the EU, security, 
stability, energy and economic and trade relations are essential contexts in its relations 
with the Middle Eastern states, while Russia has extended these contexts to include 
religious ties and technology and military cooperation.  Accordingly, the EU and Russia 
have redefined and re-contextualised the importance and challenges of the Middle Eastern 
region both in common and in different contexts in light of their perception of ‘Other’ 
which are mainly based on internal developments and external expectations. In other 
words, the Middle East is perceived as a vital sphere in two ways: Self-perception in the 
light of internal developments in the fields of prosperity, security and stability; and 
perception of the ‘Other’ in the light of external expectations in matters that enhance and 
underpin their actorness. These matters can be identified in a number of contexts:   
 
Context: Security and Strategic Stability  
Strategic concerns that relate to security and stability have played a salient role in the 
construction of EU and Russian foreign policy in the Middle East. The war in the North 
Caucus region
535
, especially in Chechnya and Dagestan, and then 9/11 and the US-
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declared “war on terrorism” have weighed heavily on Russian and EU perceptions of the 
Middle East.
536
 In the post 9/11 period, European and Russian discourse on security issues 
increasingly emphasised partnership against the so-called “war on terror”. In this context, 
the EU and Russia are similar in that they both perceive the Middle East as a source of 
threats and insecurity which have a direct effect on their territory. For Prodi, J. Solana and 
C. Patten, threats of terrorism and WMD originating in the Middle East have a direct effect 
in Europe.
537
  The Middle East, in which the EU and Russia interact in their own strategic 
interests, is perceived as an area of increasing insecurity and instability. Even Russia is 
much concerned about neighbouring countries’ security which could directly affect 
Russian internal security and could cause political instability and social unrest.  Rikard 
Bengtsson argues that security matters play a major role in constructing the EU discourse 
towards neighbouring countries.
538
 So, in such areas of concern, perception of the Other 
defines the boundaries clearly on the two banks of the Mediterranean. This has been 
emphasised by the Barcelona Declaration and the European Security Strategy which focus 
on the security partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean countries.  
 
The Declaration states that ‘all participants pledge to promote and strengthen security by 
all means at their disposal’.539  Similarly, the European Security Strategy in 2001 re-
identifies the Middle East within this context. In the whole picture, mounting instability 
and insecurity due to a number of reasons such as increased levels of poverty, corruption, 
social injustice and autocratic governance, the failure of the Camp David II peace 
conference, the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada, and the rise of non-state actors 
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have contributed to influence the EU’s perception of the Middle East. The discourse 
perceives the region as an area of political instability, authoritarian regimes, and 
humiliation of human dignity, the abuse of human rights and the absence of transparency 
and the rule of law.
 540
  Within this context, the EU’s Self-perception as a normative power 
informs the design and implementation of policies that address these matters.  
 
The Russian Foreign Policy Survey in 2007 refers to the Middle East as a ‘zone of 
destabilization’ within which, what it called, ‘ideas of Islamic fundamentalism’, have 
spread.
541
  Igor Khrestin and John Elliott argue that Chechnya is the single issue that most 
shapes Putin's thinking about the Middle East.
542
 In this context of stability and security, 
the Middle East is informed by the perception of the Self and Other. The Muslim 
population is estimated to be 15-20 million in the EU
543 and about 20 million in Russia.544 
The sectarian conflict in the Balkans which has led to NATO military intervention against 
the former Yugoslavia heavily affected Europe. Thus, the EU is much concerned about 
interrelations, especially in terms of security,  with the Middle East countries which have 
directly affected the EU’s internal security and could create political instability and social 
unrest. In contrast, the wars in the North Caucasus seriously shook Russia leading to 
bloody conflict.
545
  
 
The Soviet experience in Afghanistan and Russia’s experience in the North Caucasus, 
created a sensitive and very worrying atmosphere, highlighting trans-border security 
problems that interconnect with cultural and religious relations with the Middle East.  
Russia’s National Security Strategy 2020 considers that social stability and ethnic and 
denominational harmony are essential to guarantee Russian national security.
546
 In this 
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regard, Russia aims to keep the North Caucasus and other Islamic republics in the 
Federation from becoming ‘an anti-Russian cause célèbre’ in the Middle East the way 
Afghanistan did in the 1980’s.547 Russia is worried about the connections between the 
Jihadist movements especially in the Caucasus area and their counterparts in the Middle 
Eastern countries.
548
 Security concerns and their spin-off are a top priority in Russian 
foreign policy-making. So Russia is working to undermine what is perceived as the 
sources of its security problems by focusing on terminating the support and cutting the 
links with state and non-state actors in the Middle East.
549
   
 
In relation to this, Russia encourages its state-Muslim institutions to participate in 
activities in the Middle East that could contribute towards softening tension and enhancing 
rapprochement with moderate Islamists in the Middle Eastern countries.
550
   Accordingly, 
the Russian Council of Muftis conducts dialogue with ‘moderate Islamists in the Middle 
East’.551  Russian policy focuses on minimising tension with Muslims inside and outside 
Russia. This policy is designed to undercut the growth of extremism and to undermine the 
possibility of providing a secure shelter to those groups from the Middle East that are 
considered a security threat to Russia.
552
 Also, Putin announced a turnaround in Russian 
policy towards the Islamic world when said that ‘Russia is a Muslim country as well’.553 
For Shamil Sultanov, security is one of the driving forces behind Russia’s Middle East 
policy forcing it to seek a rapprochement with the Islamic world. Russia aims to remove 
the tension that increased with the first and second Chechnya wars and to create a network 
for lobbying, manipulating and harmonising interests in the Middle East.
554
 Practically, 
Russia has become an observer member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
                                                 
547
 Mark Katz, 'Moscow and the Middle East: Repeat Performance?', Russia in Global Affairs, /003 (2012), 
144-53. 
548
 Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Alexei Fenenko,  Lead Researcher, the Institute for International 
Security 
Studies, Ras', (Moscow, 2013h). 
549
 Ibid. 
550
 Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Shamil Sultanov, President of the Center for Strategic Studies- Russia-
the Islamic World ', (Moscow, 2013g). 
551
 Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Rushan Abbyasov, Deputy Chairman, Head of Adminstartion, Russia 
Muftis Council', (Moscow, 2013f). 
552
 Interview, 'Interview with Alexei Fenenko,  Lead Researcher, the Institute for International Security 
Studies, Ras'. 
553
 Rinat Mukhametov, 'Russian Muslims and Foreign Policy', Russia in Global Affairs, /003 (2012), 110-20. 
554
 Interview, 'Interview with Shamil Sultanov, President of the Center for Strategic Studies- Russia-the 
Islamic World '. 
131 
 
(now the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (ISESCO). Also, Russia welcomed Hamas leaders to Moscow. 
 
Context: Economic and Technological Cooperation and Trade Relations 
The geostrategic position of the Middle East, linking Europe, Asia and Africa, give it an 
importance in world politics. This importance attracts most global actors to share benefits 
through playing an active role in this vibrant region. It is perceived as a highway and 
vibrant centre of world trade. It is not common for economic powers such as the EU and 
Russia to ignore this fact.  In their discourse, both the EU and Russia have placed an 
emphasis on the importance of the Middle East as an opportunity in economic and trade 
terms.  Russia’s main priority is the development of its national economy which, of course, 
must be integrated into the world economy, therefore, its foreign policy is designed to 
minimise any risks related to this.
555
  Russia intends to widen its capabilities by integrating 
with neighbouring economies. Removing obstacles that would burden the Russian 
economy and obstruct its growth and development is an important motivator behind 
Russian involvement in the Middle East.
556
 
  
Against this background, Sergey Demidenko argues that the Middle East is perceived as 
offering an opportunity to strengthen and raise the capabilities of Russia’s economy.557 
According to this discourse, the priorities in the region are defined as ‘to restore and 
strengthen its position, particularly economic ones’.558 This view was confirmed by the 
2007 Russian Foreign Policy Survey in which Russian involvement in the Middle East 
‘appears to be an indispensable component and an important tool for ensuring the national 
interests of Russia’.559 The Survey recommended that the state ‘step up economic and 
energy diplomacy’ and embody Russian influence by creating financial and industrial 
structures to promote economic collaboration.
560
 Thus, Russia sees the Middle East as key 
to building its actorness through reinforcement of economic, technological, and military 
                                                 
555
 Concept, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation',  ( 
556
 Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Vectoria Panova , Specialist in Russia Foreign Policy', (Moscow: 
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (UNIVERSITY) OF the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, 2013e). 
557
 Scholar Interview, 'Interview with  Sergey Demidenko', in Higher School Of Economics (ed.), (Moscow, 
2013d). 
558
 Concept, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation',  ( 
559
 Federation, 'A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy'. 
560
 Ibid. 
132 
 
ties. Putin has paid close attention to the Middle East as a foreign policy vector ever since 
the second term of his presidency.  He extended Russia’s interests to enhance economic, 
technological and military ties with the Middle Eastern countries. Russia’s policy towards 
this vector is to establish qualitative ties in order to meet internal needs for security and 
prosperity.  In 2005, Putin made the first historic visit to Israel, the Palestinian Authority 
and Egypt. In 2007, he made the first visit by a Russian President to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Iran.
561
  
For a long time Russia has been ‘the world’s second largest arms supplier’ to the Middle 
East, second only to the USA.
562
 And the Middle East is the second largest arms market 
for Russia with 14.2 percent.
563
 While Self –perception as an economic power affects the 
course of Russia’s policy towards the Middle East, military power, one of the main 
strengths which it inherited from the Soviet Union, plays an extra role in this policy. 
Keeping and developing such military capabilities, especially high-tech weaponry, needs 
new markets. Russian cooperation with Iran on nuclear and missile programmes is a part 
of this policy. In his official visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, Putin offered 
cooperation in high-tech weaponry.
564
 In this regard, Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee in the upper house of the Russian parliament, points to 
Russia’s interest in winning a Saudi order for tanks.565 This demonstrates the change in 
Russian policy towards the arms market from the former Soviet Union when it sold arms 
only to anti-Western countries.   Current Russian policy is about increasing its exports to 
as many customers as possible.  
However, the contradiction is that Russia is an importer of Israeli weaponry. Russia is 
interested in technological cooperation with Israel, especially in unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs).  In 2010, Russia and Israel signed the first-ever military cooperation agreement, a 
framework to facilitate the signing of new contracts between the two countries.
566
 Russia’s 
perception in the field of high-technology compared with other technology actors such as 
the US, China, and Japan, is to recognise the existing gap.  Being a pioneer country in this 
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sector motivates Russia to strenuous efforts to search for opportunities in other states for 
two reasons: to enter new markets in order to facilitate growth and boost high-tech 
industries and to establish a stable channel to exchange experience to promote 
development in high-tech industries, especially with Israel.  Cooperation with Israel has 
been seen as a solution for Russian weakness in this sector. In contrast, the EU perceived 
the area as a promised market for information and communications technology.
567
  From 
1999 to 2007, it funded the Euro-Mediterranean Information Society project (EUMEDIS) 
that aimed to promote information and communication technologies.
568
 
 
The discourse on the EU’s policy in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries is to 
project trade relations and economic integration as a recognised objective. The Wider 
Europe initiative states that ‘regional trade and integration is a recognized objective’.569 In 
the EU’s view, the creation of a large Mediterranean market has positive effects, such as 
stability and prosperity, for both the European and Southern Mediterranean peoples. The 
EU’s Self-perception as an economic union at its inception and since has proven accurate 
as it becomes one of the world’s biggest economies playing a significant role in designing 
and carrying out its foreign relations. Over the coming years, the IMF estimates that about 
‘90 % of the world demand will be generated outside the EU’.570 Thus, opening up more 
market opportunities is a key priority in the EU’s foreign policy. The EU discourse on 
relations with neighbours places high a priority on establishing and maintaining close 
economic cooperation and partnership.
571
  
 
The Middle East and North African countries
572
 as a group are one of the EU largest trade 
partners and constitute a considerable opportunity for productivity growth, that which 
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increases trade openness is crucial to improve economic growth in a durable manner and 
growth needs to be largely export-driven through sustainability and sufficient demand.
573
  
Building and strengthening economic ties with the Mediterranean countries started in 
Barcelona with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
574
 This interest in enhancing and 
increasing economic ties continued under the European Neighborhood Policy and the 
Union for the Mediterranean. The main focus towards this region centres on economic 
relations which includes free trade areas, preferential trade agreements, and easy access to 
energy resources.
575
 This has been implemented through bilateral association agreements 
and then action-plans under the ENP. For this purpose, the EU concluded association 
agreements with the majority of countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean.  
These bilateral agreements work as a framework and a basis for the gradual liberalisation 
of trade movement across the Mediterranean Sea and set out the conditions for economic, 
social and cultural cooperation. The aim is to provide a free trade area for the 
Mediterranean in which the EU is the main player.
576
 In addition, the EU discourse focuses 
on cooperation in the transport sectors that can underpin closer relations and improved 
market access. The ENP states that “Generating more trade and tourism between the Union 
and its neighbors, requires efficient, multimodal and sustainable transport systems’.577  
Between 2010 and 2012, the Mediterranean countries together represented 8.6% of EU 
external trade.
578
 In line with this, the EU, in 2007, signed a free trade agreement with the 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC is the fifth largest export 
market of the EU.
579
  
 
Context: Energy Provider and Stabilizer 
For Mary Tétreault, the Middle East region is the geographic ‘"center of gravity" of the 
world’s fossil fuels.580 In addition, the Mediterranean Sea is perceived as an ‘oil and gas 
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transit region’.581 It is perceived as a highway of the global energy trade.582 Countries of 
the Eastern part of the Mediterranean such as Turkey, Syria, and Egypt, are at the 
crossroads of the world’s energy trade. The existing and planned web of pipelines that 
carries hydrocarbon resources from east to west and from south to north increases the 
geopolitical and strategic importance of this region. Turkey and Egypt are at the crossroads 
of the world’s energy trade thus giving an importance to Syria and Palestine-Israel as well. 
However, according to the MEDPRO Energy Reference Scenario, hydrocarbon production 
will increase in the South and East Mediterranean region and the largest part of this 
increase will occur primarily in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria. Hence, the Levant Basin 
is estimated to be one of the world’s largest hydrocarbon resources. This MEDPRO 
scenario estimates the growth in oil production from 249 Mtoe in 2009 to 318 Mtoe in 
2030 and natural gas from150Mtoe in 2009 to 294 Mtoe in 2030.
583
 If these estimates are 
confirmed, the MEDPRO Scenario suspects that this area could become ‘a world-class 
hydrocarbon province’.584 Considering only this potential increase in oil and gas 
production in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region, the Middle East remains a 
great opportunity for both the supply and marketing of energy. 
 
 EU discourse acknowledges the Middle East’s and North Africa’s importance in the 
context of energy. The ENP states that:  
‘The European Union is the world’s largest energy (oil and gas) importer and 
the second largest consumer and is surrounded by the world’s most important 
reserves of oil and natural gas (Russia, the Caspian basin, the Middle East and 
North Africa). It will increasingly depend on imports, from its current level of 
50% to 70% by 2030, on present projections. Neighbouring countries play a 
vital role in the security of the EU’s energy supply’. 585   
 
In this discourse, the perception of the Middle East is based on the EU being the world’s 
largest energy importer. The European demand for cheap gas pushes it towards looking for 
opportunities in neighboring markets. The argument is that the Middle East is perceived as 
an opportunity for energy providers and the need to escape from heavy dependence on 
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Russian gas and oil.  The oil and gas discoveries in the Levant Basin are one of many 
geopolitical and strategic interests that force the EU to participate actively in the making of 
Middle East politics.  
 
Rather, this matter is perceived as a threefold opportunity: firstly, to diversify European 
providers of oil and gas. Europe is one of the largest customers of natural gas and its 
overwhelming dependence on Russia gas is a serious matter that concerns the EU.
586
 For 
Sir Graham Watson the overdependence on Russian gas and Gulf oil is a threat to the EU’s 
energy security.
587
 Thus easy access to accessible sources of energy is an advantage and 
could ‘free the EU from overdependence on Russian Gas’,588 especially since Cyprus as a 
member of the EU, has the right of access to this field. Secondly, disputes and unwise 
management of exploitation’s rights could lead to further destabilising of the region. The 
division of Cyprus, the dispute between the two parts, and the desire of Turkey to play a 
role in this area as well as the dispute between Lebanon and Israel could aggravate 
instability and insecurity in this nerve of the world’s trade movement. Thirdly, hesitation 
to play an active role in this area would create an opportunity to regional and global 
players such as Turkey and Russia to take the lead.  
 
Therefore, the EU is interested in playing a major role to secure more energy independence 
through enhancing its political and economic existence in the Levant Basin. For Sir 
Graham Watson developing EU policy in this region is very important as an alternative to 
the EU’s dependency on Russian Gas.589  Similarly, Patrick Nopens argues that the EU 
should actively be involved in reassuring that energy reserves in this area are ‘managed in 
such a way as to supplement a Third Energy Corridor’.590  In this regard, through Cyprus 
and Greece, the EU strengthens its cooperation with Israel, which is one of the major 
regional players in the Basin. Thus, military cooperation between Greece and Israel has 
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increased.
591
 The continuity of oil and gas flows and price stability are significant matters 
for EU stability and prosperity. 
 
In contrast, Russia sees itself as the biggest gas producer, therefore it uses energy as a 
foreign policy tool to defend its national interests and enhance its influence around the 
world. Reflecting on the above views of the importance of the Mediterranean, Russia 
considers itself as the ‘energy hub’ of natural gas flows from Eurasia, especially countries 
such as Turkey and Syria.
592
 Precisely the politics in the Middle East have a bearing on 
Russia internal developments.   Based on its perspective as the largest producer of gas, 
Russia has improved its relations with the Middle East in order to stabilise oil and gas 
prices which occupy a high priority on an internal level. Victoria Panova points out that oil 
and gas prices in 1996-1999 and 2003 saved Russia from collapse twice. Therefore Russia 
is resolved to enhance its influence in the Middle East.
593
 Russia’s policy aims are to 
secure Russia’s share of the oil and gas market.   
 
Russia has long looked for opportunities in the oil and gas industries and the construction 
of gas and oil pipeline networks in the region. In 2004 Russia entered the Saudi fuel 
market when its biggest integrated oil company, Lukoil Holdings, was awarded the right to 
explore and produce natural gas in one of the world’s largest oil fields.594. It is also 
interested in a pipeline linking Nigeria with Libya across the Sahara. Russia proposed 
establishing a ‘gas consortium’ with other gas producers with a view of dominating the 
global gas market. This matter was discussed during Putin’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
the UAE and Iran in 2007.
595
   
Furthermore, Russia is very keen on having a share in the natural gas in the Levant Basin. 
Gazprom and other giant private companies are making concerted efforts to establish a 
strategic commercial edge in developing gas production in this area. The reserves of oil 
and gas in the Levant Basin make it an attractive geopolitical and economic prospect for 
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Russia. Accordingly, Russia and Lebanon, in October 2013, signed a memorandum of 
understanding on cooperation in the energy field. In the same way, Russia has shown a 
strong interest in investing in Cypriot energy which became evident during the 2013 
Cypriot financial crisis. In addition, it has signed operator agreements with Israeli gas 
companies.  
However, Medvedev, in his official visit to Syria in 2009, demonstrated Russia’s 
determination to take part in promising projects in the field of oil refineries and gas 
network pipeline construction.
596
  In 2011, a $10 billion deal was signed by Syria, Iraq and 
Iran to carry natural gas from Iran’s huge gas field in the South Pars to Iraq and Syria and 
eventually on to the European market.
597
 To protect its interests, Russia reinstated its 
military presence in the Middle East with an announcement of the reestablishment of the 
squadron in the Mediterranean which it had dissolved 20 years ago. It is clear that Russia 
intends to enhance its military presence in the region in order to underpin its political 
leverage and enhance its actorness.
598
  
 
Context: Historical, Cultural and Religious Ties  
The perception of the Middle East in this context has emerged in the course of 
civilizational place and mission which is based on values and principles that rely on 
history, culture and religion. For Russia, placing a greater emphasis on its own uniqueness 
is an objective of its foreign policy.
599
  Promoting a positive image of Russia in the world 
through popularising the Russian language, culture and education is one of the main 
objectives indicated in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2000.
600
 Putin stresses the 
importance of Russian culture and education. He said ‘we must work to expand Russia's 
educational and cultural presence in the world’.601  It is seen as one of the soft-power 
instruments in building Russia’s identity.602  Putin emphasises the need to expand Russian 
                                                 
596
 Dmitry Medvedev, 'Article in Syrian Newspaper Al- Watan', <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/212>, 
accessed 08/09 2013. 
597
 F William Engdahl, 'Putin’s Geopolitical Chess Game with Washington in Syria and Eurasia',  ( 
598
 Inna Soboleva, 'Russian Navy Plans to Reestablish Mediterranean Presence', (Moscow: Russia behaind 
the Headlines, 2013). 
599
 Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy (Wiley, 2008). p 8-12. 
600 Concept, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation   ,'(  
601
 Vladimir Putin, 'Russia and the Changing World', Russia Today, 2012a. 
602
 Gabriel Gorodetsky, Russia between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshhold of the 
Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2003b). 
139 
 
culture, especially in Russian-speaking communities or countries previously linked or 
interested in her culture and educational sciences.  
Accordingly, the Middle East is perceived as a target to promote Russia’s image and 
enhance its ties with Russian-speaking communities. In this regard, many countries in the 
Middle East have such communities which are linked to the Russian education system and 
sciences.  More than 100,000 families in the Arab world are related to families in 
Russia.
603
 In addition, the Russian-speaking community in Israel is the third-largest such 
community in the world.
604
  Syria and other countries such as Iraq and Egypt have been 
linked for some time to Russian culture and education by virtue of their close relations 
with the former Soviet Union. Similarly, Russia has opened many centres of science and 
culture in such cities as Beirut, Cairo, Alexandria, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Bethlehem.    
 
In contrast, the Wider Europe Initiative has set up a new vision for the next two decades 
during which the EU intends to reflect the development of closer and more coherent 
relations with its neighbours.  This vision is based, among other things, on ‘intensified 
political and cultural relations’ between the EU and its neighbours.605 In this regard, the 
EU is interested in building up a ‘cultural interchange’ that facilitates common interests 
with its neighbours.
606
 Cultural interchange and cooperation is perceived, among other 
things, as a promoter which creates a ‘positive image’ of the EU in the neighbourhood 
which serves to underpin its actorness.
607
 It provides ‘foundations for, inter alia, deeper 
political relations, enhanced cooperation on justice and security issues, environmental 
improvement and governance’.608  Thus, the EU sees there is an importance in enhancing 
the dialogue between cultures and free exchange of ideas between cultures, religions and 
traditions. With this in mind, the EU between 1998 and 2013 funded the Euromed Heritage 
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projects which emphasised the added values of common cultural heritage for dialogue and 
mutual understanding.
609
  
 
The EU is interested in international public relations that serve to enhance its image to its 
in neighbours.  The discourse focuses on the Middle East countries as a public sphere 
where it is interested in improving its image through enhancing the ‘mutual understanding 
of each other’s cultures, history, attitudes and values, and to eliminate distorted 
perceptions’.610 For this purpose, the EU focuses on the promotion of ‘cultural, educational 
and more general societal links’.611  Many of the Euromed projects designed to realize 
these objectives such as EuroMed Youth, FEMISE-Socio-economic research, Media and 
culture for development in the Southern Mediterranean region, EU Partnership for Peace – 
EUPfP, Erasmus Mundus – External cooperation window, MEDA-ETE - Education and 
Training for Employment (2004-07), etc.  
 
Furthermore, historically and religiously, the Levant, and especially Jerusalem, is full of  
religious symbolism for the three Abrahamic religions.  The EU and Russia yearn to boost 
their leverage in the holy places and enhance their spiritual connection with the land of Christ. 
In the post-Soviet era, communist ideas are no longer accepted as a social drive on an 
internal level, therefore, Moscow finds that Christian Orthodox values steming from 
Tsarist times are a solution for a social vacuum. The Russian Church succeeded in 
introducing religious instruction in public schools and restoring its properties inside and 
outside Russia.
612
 The increase in the Church’s influence in public life and state policy has 
brought the Middle East strongly to the front. In this context, Russia perceives the Middle 
East as a multi-layered opportunity: firstly, to enhance the internal social contract, 
secondly, to reinforce its actorness in terms of representing Orthodox Christians around the 
world, and thirdly, to boost its influence in the region and spread Russian culture. During 
the Byzantium Empire the church was in the service of the state as a social drive.
613
 That 
is, principled values were in the service of the state not vice versa. The decline of the 
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former Soviet Union, as many Russian academics argue, is due to its becoming so devoted 
to communist values and no longer relying on economic strengths as the engine that once 
made the Soviet Union a great power.   
 
  In 2008, Kirill I become the Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus.  Kirill I has 
managed to reshape Church-state relations in a way that is considered as a ‘veritable 
revolution’.614  This is seen in Putin’s speech at the Valdai Club in which he centres on 
Orthodox Christianity as an indispensable value to Russian society.
615
  Historically and 
religiously, the Levant is linked to the Third Rome myth.
616
  The Levant runs deeply into 
the history of both the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia.
617
  In 1882, Tsarist Russia 
established the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS) to serve Russian policy 
objectives.
 618
  Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, it was attached to the Russian 
Academy of Science under the name of the Russian Palestine Society.
 619
  In 1992, its old 
name and former position were restored with the purpose of ‘supporting Orthodoxy in the 
Holy Land (including Syria and Lebanon)’.620 The revived IOPS became very active in the 
patronage of the Christian presence and situation in the Middle East, especially under the 
leadership of the former Russian Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin. Thus, Russia heightens 
its place in the Orthodox world especially in the region, as well as in its former republics 
and Eastern European countries. In other words, Russia’s policy serves to improve its 
ability to operate as a soft power and give her the opportunity to intervene as a defender of 
the rights of Orthodox minorities across the Middle East and even in the whole world. In 
addition, its increased visibility as a defender of Orthodox Christianity serves to spread 
Christian values inside Russia which are seen as a solution to demographic problems that 
Russia is very apprehensive about.  
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In contrast, although most of the states in Europe are secular, nevertheless they are linked 
spiritually to Palestine where most of the old Christian holy places are. But the EU would 
like to represent itself as a defender of European values and norms rather than to play the 
game of defending Christianity. Historically, a number of the EU countries had close 
historical and cultural ties with some of the Middle East countries. Thus, the Middle East 
and other Mediterranean countries are perceived as an arena to project democracy, human 
rights, good governance, rule of law and transparency. The projection of these principles 
and values are perceived as a solution to a number of multifaceted problems that threaten 
European security and stability. For this purpose, the EU created the European Initiative 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which served as the legal basis for these 
activities, covering the period from 2000-06. This initiative was replaced by the European 
Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR) from 2007-13.  
5.3 EU-Russian Actorness in Middle Eastern Politics: Comparative 
Analysis  
What is the meaning of these contexts in a comparative way? How are they related to 
internal developments and external expectations? The above contexts show how the 
Middle East is interconnected and interrelated with EU and Russia polities, as well as what 
kind of opportunities exist for them. It is perceived in multi-layered contexts. Mainly, its 
geostrategic position and indissoluble interactions present its importance which makes it 
hard for the EU and Russia to be isolated from being involved in policy-making in this 
region. That is, this importance is perceived as an opportunity through internal lenses that 
have direct or indirect effects on internal developments and also meets external 
expectations that relate to the contexts in which the Self is constructed.   
In the context of economic and trade relations, the EU and Russia are similar in perceiving 
the importance of the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea, but with different 
perspectives according to their internal developments. Reinforcing their regional actorness 
in the Middle East in terms of economic and trade relations is perceived as a strategic 
objective in order to maintain their prosperity, stability and security.  In this regard, EU 
and Russian foreign policies are designed to ensure the sustainability of growth 
productivity, but Russia, additionally, intends to integrate into the world economy. Both 
have built their external expectations on their Self-perception as an economic power. That 
is, playing an active role in this geostrategic region is perceived as a dual opportunity: 
paving and enhancing an economic and trading environment that reinforces productivity 
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growth which is a profound base for a strong economy, prosperity and stability on the 
internal level, and regional actorness in this region serving as a driving force to further 
political and economic global actorness.  
However, for Russia, improving its economic influence in the Middle East is perceived as 
a vector to maintain its territorial unity and prevent any potential disintegration.
621
 While 
for the EU, it is based, on the one hand, on the vision that ‘a strong economy and internal 
cohesion will strengthen the Union's ability to project its influence in the world’622 and, on 
the other, it is perceived as a driving force to boost political unity among its member 
states. Russia wants to avoid a repeat of the decline of the Soviet Union caused by giving 
up its economic strengths in favour of communist ideology. The EU realises the fact that 
its attraction among its member states proceeds from its economic strengths as an engine 
of European prosperity and stability.      
In the context of energy, this importance is also viewed from different perspectives:  
Russia is the largest gas producer while the EU is the largest gas importer in the world. 
Thus, the question of energy is naturally perceived according to their internal situations. 
Based on the reality that Russia is the biggest gas provider to Europe; the EU finds in the 
potential increase of gas and oil production in the Levant an opportunity to escape from 
overdependence on Russian gas, diversify its sources of energy, prevent any destabilisation 
due to disputes on the rights of exploitation and maximise unsolicited intervention by 
regional and other global actors.    Russia, in turn, strives to keep its dominance in the gas 
market and secure its prices. Not only are gas and oil revenues the main sources of the 
state budget but a price increase has have twice saved Russia from collapse.  In other 
words, Russia considers the Middle East as a geopolitical and strategic area especially in 
terms of being an energy hub which helps Russia to maintain its interests and protect its 
assets.  
In the context of security and stability, both the EU and Russia are similar in their 
perceptions of the Middle East. That is, the region is a source of security threats and the 
area’s instability can easily spill-over directly or indirectly causing destabilisation, social 
unrest and ethnic clashes in areas such as the Caucasus and the Balkans. The readings from 
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the US experience in Iraq came to the conclusion that ‘military efforts may lead to further 
political and military destabilization’.623 Thus, the EU’s and Russia’s strategy focuses on a 
multilateral policy by different means. Russia focuses on rapprochement with the Islamic 
world while the EU emphasises the promotion of its principles and values. For Russia, 
improving its image and rapprochement with the Islamic world is perceived as a twofold 
opportunity: to contribute in drying up the sources of violence in the South Caucasus and 
secure the integrity of Russian territory from any growth in secession claims, and to 
reinforce Russia’s political, economic and trade ties with the Middle Eastern countries that 
serve its desire of actorness. In contrast, for the EU, the promotion of European normative 
values and principles is perceived as an opportunity, on the one hand, to undermine the 
root causes of insecurity and instability. These undemocratic regimes and the absence of 
good governance and rule of law have been seen as a source of regional instability and 
causes of violence. Thus, the projection of European normative principles and values is an 
opportunity to minimise these threats and increase its ability as a soft power. And, on the 
other hand, it leads to paving the road for close economic and trade relations. That is, they 
are similar in perceiving the Middle East, but different in their policies.  
In the context of history, culture and religion the Middle East is perceived differently. 
Russia finds in it an opportunity to meet internal developments and encounter national 
problems. Therefore, Russia focuses more on building cultural and educational relations 
and even religious ties with the Middle Eastern countries. In the region Russia has an 
image that needs to be refurbished and Russian-speaking communities necessitate 
continued ties. Thus, Russia uses culture and education to boost its image and build a 
connection with Russia-speaking communities in this area. On religious ties, Russia’s 
policy towards the Middle East is built on the view that the Orthodox Church and Russia 
Muftis Council have religious links to holy places with positive effects on internal and 
external levels.  The role of the Church is perceived as twofold: to utilise Orthodox 
principles and values as a social drive on the internal level, and utilise church leverage 
among Orthodox Christians around the world to enhance its soft power. In addition, Russia 
is keen to restore the role of Tsarist Russia in representing Orthodox Christianity and to 
defend its minorities in the Middle East. The role of the Mufti Council is perceived as 
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enhancing the internal social fabric, boosting Russia’s image and minimising any 
opposition and hostility towards its activities in the Islamic world.   
 
On the EU side, the Middle East is perceived as an arena to build a positive image and 
enhance its capabilities as a civilian and normative power. The heritage and cultural ties 
between the two banks of the Mediterranean are indissoluble. In addition there is a strong 
educational relationship that links the two banks. Unlike Russia, the EU has a strong 
cultural and education interchange with the Middle East. It has implemented and designed 
many programs to reinforce its soft power in the region. Thus, the EU focuses on the 
projection of European principles and values which are perceived as a solution to the many 
problems and challenges facing the region.  
 
Through these contexts, the Middle East forms a multifaceted opportunity that runs deeply 
into a geopolitical-economic perspective. Thus, policy-making of the EU and Russia 
towards the Middle East works to utilise their unique capabilities, and increase their 
influence in this region in order to possess the most employable powers which assert and 
underpin their global actorness on the world scene.  That is, global actorness is a core 
objective in both EU and Russian foreign policy-making towards this region, which is not 
a given. This actorness is to meet the main core functions of polity-existence: security, 
stability and prosperity. Thus, increased involvement in the Middle East peace process is a 
priority as long as it serves these objectives.  It proceeds from the idea that having a role in 
the peace process will guarantee an major seat in the making of Middle East politics. In 
fact, the prevailing perception of global actors is that an active role in mediating a peace 
settlement gives an opportunity to establish political and economic circumstances which 
will serve as a catalyst for facilitating deals for numerous persistent matters. Thus, the 
EU’s and Russia’s involvement is to draw the line and reserve its seat in policy-making 
that will secure and maintain their interests in the above contexts. In other words, their 
involvement in finding a settlement to the conflict is not only about peace per se, but it is 
an opportunity, where their interests in other contexts will be significantly enhanced.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I argue that the involvement of the EU and Russia in MEPP takes its 
importance primarily from the significance of the Middle East. That is, the perception of 
the Middle East as geostrategic nerve and the cross-roads of world trade informs the 
making of foreign policy by the EU and Russia.  The discussion focuses on how the 
Middle East is perceived in the context of building an international identity by the EU and 
Russia. This emphasises the Middle East as an opportunity to enhance their influence and 
assert their actorness on the world scene.   Further I explain how their involvement in 
MEPP is defined by the perception of the Middle East in wider contexts through the ways 
in which the Self-perception of the EU and Russia is cultivated. Through the arguments 
and discussion in this Chapter I find that the MEPP works as an important channel that 
paves the way and creates a favourable environment for the EU’s and Russia’s access to 
the Middle East to exercise actorness which enhances their influence in this region.   
 
For Russia, a visible and effective presence in the MEPP is a priority as it provides a way 
to access the Middle East which is seen as a vital arena. Restoring its former influence in 
this region by reinforcing its presence in the MEPP became a priority with Primakov 
which gained more importance with the advent of Putin, especially during his second term 
in office. This is to counter internal problems regarding economic weaknesses, security 
concerns, territorial stability, and social cohesion. The Russian presence in the MEPP 
focuses more on removing obstacles that would burden the Russian economy and prevent 
economic interchange with the Middle East, undermine the security threats that might 
originate from the region, maintain its energy assets through preventing other countries 
from any ventures in oil and gas prices,  boost the Russian cultural and educational 
presence and improve the Russian image.  
 
For the EU, an active role and visible presence is a strategic priority. This is to introduce 
itself as an active global player and assert itself as a representative of the European 
community and exercise its actorness in different contexts such as acting as a normative, 
soft and economic power. From the EU perspective, the importance of the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East lies at heart of European history and its geographical proximity. The 
EU aspires to assert itself as an alternative to both the US and Russia based on geostrategic 
interconnections with the region. Also, the Middle East represents a new arena after 
Central and Eastern Europe to exercise its capabilities in terms of the projection of 
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democracy, peace-making, exporting stability and security through sustainable 
development policies.  
 
On other hand, the EU focuses on major economic and trade interests in the fields of 
energy, establishing free trade areas and creating the Mediterranean market. This was 
formed within the Wider Europe Initiative, designed under the ENP through association 
agreements and implemented then by action-plans. The Wider Europe Initiative set up a 
new vision that reflects the desire for building closer relations and intensifies political, 
economic and cultural bonds with Middle Eastern countries in order to reinforce its 
regional influence and underpin its global actorness. This perception inspired the EU to be 
actively involved in the MEPP as a key channel to the region. It is this perception of the 
Middle East that is cultivated in the contexts of the Self-perception of the EU and Russia 
and informs the involvement in MEPP rather than making peace per se.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
PROMOTING THE EU’S AND RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE 
MEPP AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN 
STATEHOOD 
Focus 
The argument in this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it focuses on the development of the 
EU’s and Russia’s involvement in the Middle East peace process and how this 
involvement developed in conjunction with their Self-perception of actorness. The 
emphasis here is on the MEPP as a ‘channel’ to enhance presence and visibility in the 
region. Secondly, it contextualises the EU’s and Russia’s perceptions of establishing 
Palestinian statehood concentrating on four areas: (a) the context of international law and 
United Nation resolutions; (b) the context of cooperating for security and stability; (c) the 
context of relations with Israel; and (d) the context of peace-making and state-building.  
The emphasis is laid here on how the perception of ‘actorness’ is reflected in adopting 
positions and implementing policies. In so doing, the analysis looks at these four aspects 
that define the establishment of Palestinian statehood by the EU and Russia and examines 
the extent to which they use the MEPP as a channel to enhance their influence and 
maintain their ‘actorness’ in the region.  Thirdly, the chapter discusses a number of 
essential events in the making of Palestinian statehood, highlighting the differences 
between the EU and Russia on the grounds of Self-Other perception. By understanding the 
way the EU and Russia perceive and deal with the main issue, we can learn a great deal 
about the policy-making processes employed by the EU and Russia towards the anticipated 
Palestinian state.  
 
6.1 Peace-Making and Actorness: EU and Russian Perceptions of the 
Conflict and Peace Settlement  
The rise of the EU’s actorness as a result of European enlargement and spill-over towards 
Central and Eastern Europe, which has become a new centre of economic growth and an 
exporter of stability and security, has driven it to look for an active role in this process. 
The emphasis on the EU as a normative, soft and economic power, has increasingly 
created a tendency to seek resolutions to existing conflicts and to regulate crisis situations 
according to their geographical proximity, and is consistent with its desire for actorness. 
The EU discourse towards a peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly 
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between Palestinians and Israelis, shows its centrality and importance. For Solana, playing 
a full and active role in this conflict’s peace-making is a matter of ‘presence and visibility’ 
of the EU.
624
 This involvement is an important matter if one is to be an ‘effective global 
actor’625 and to be heard ‘on every continent’.626  The EU makes it clear that it should take 
full advantage of opportunities in the region more assertively to promote its interests and 
values.
627
  It perceives itself as an actor in mediation ‘based on its own experience as a 
peace project’ and its normative values.628  
In contrast, Russia’s role as a legal successor of the former Soviet Union has driven it to 
try to restore its position as a global actor on the international stage. The Russian discourse 
on peace-making in the conflict primarily reflects its ambitions to restore its previous 
influence in the region.  Alexander Saltanov, the former Deputy Foreign Minister and 
Putin’s special envoy to the MEPP, said that the Russian role is an elimination of ‘dis-
balance’.629 Similarly, Lavrov refers to Russia’s involvement in this process as a 
‘correction of the regional architecture towards equilibrium’.630 He emphasises that 
Russia’s noticeable presence in the Middle East ‘should be viewed’631 as serving to restore 
the former Soviet influence in the region and to stress its actorness.  To A. Kreutz, Russian 
involvement works as one of the main channels of Russias influence in the Middle East.
632
 
This approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict started with and was reinforced by the 
appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as Foreign Minister in 1996.
633
  Robert O. Freedman 
argues that reserving an advanced position in this process of peace-making is a low-cost 
area to underscore Russia’s commitment to cooperation with other global actors, especially 
the US.
634
 In his book, Russian Crossroads: Toward The New Millennium, Primakov 
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stresses that Russian co-sponsorship in the peace process, ever since the Madrid 
Conference (1991), has allowed Russia to open or renew its channels with most of the 
regional and global actors on the basis of cooperation of mutual interests.
635
Furthermore, 
A. Kreutz argues that the preservation of the mechanism that provides smooth and easy 
access to the Middle East is no less important than reaching a comprehensive peace 
agreement.
636
 
This perception of the MEPP is based on the perception of the Middle East as a whole. The 
EU and Russia recognise the importance and viability of the Middle East in asserting their 
global actorness and its direct and indirect effects on their stability, security and prosperity. 
Their involvement in finding a solution to the Middle East conflict has evolved in line with 
their internal developments and the desire to assert their influence in the region.  
 
The Development of EU Involvement in the Middle East Peace Process 
The EU’s engagement in the MEPP has developed in correlation with the development of 
its collective identity and as a response to internal problems. The Venice Declaration, the 
first official EC/EU recognition of ‘the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’,637 was 
adopted after the Euro-Arab Dialogue launched in the course of the oil embargo in the 
aftermath of the 1973 War.
638
  This position was adopted as a response to the need to work 
collectively to deal with matters that affected all of the EC member states at that time. The 
EC/EU’s actorness on the international stage started and developed with its the 
engagement in the Middle East conflict. For Steven Everts, the EU’s common position on 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which was set out in the Venice Declaration (1980),
639
 was 
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the first significant change of the posture of self-denial in foreign policy.
640
 The 
Declaration was the EU’s first step towards a more unified official position on the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict which was even then seen as one of the most intractable 
international conflicts.
641
 More interestingly, the internal development of the enlargement 
process that was embodied in the signing of the Treaty on the European Union (1992) was 
accompanied by further involvement in the peace settlement. The EU sponsored the 
Madrid Conference (1991) and had appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for 
the Middle East process ever since 1996.
642
 The EU, then, increased its involvement in the 
process gradually.    
 
The signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 introduced the post of Higher 
Representative for Common Security and Foreign Policy that entered into force in 1999. In 
accordance with these developments, the EU, during the German Presidency, issued the 
Berlin Declaration (1999) which ‘proclaimed the landmark decision to support a 
Palestinian state’.643 This Declaration was initiated in respect to the Palestinian quest to 
issue a unilateral declaration of independence at the end of an interim period according to 
the Oslo Accords.  The Declaration was a package of measures developed in cooperation 
with the USA to avert a Palestinian declaration of independence by providing substantial 
financial aid to the PA.
644
  
 
Further, the EU, on its way to 2004’s enlargement, prioritised reaching a solution for the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the context of a ‘wider Europe’ framework. Reaching a 
settlement was seen as essential for a better chance of dealing with other problems that had 
a more direct effect on Europe.
645
 The success of Solana in sharing the drawing up of the 
Mitchell Report and setting up ‘the necessary confidence-building measures’ at the Taba 
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negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis,
646
 identified the increasing influence of 
the EU political profile in policy-making in the Middle East.
647
 This brought the EU up to 
the Quartet’s membership.  Reaching a peace settlement has been central to EU 
involvement in Middle East politics.  The EU’s major interest in a peace settlement is to 
reach stability in the region and to eliminate the reasons behind conflict and violence.
648
 
Furthermore, the EU’s own experience in reconciliation and peace-making in Western 
Europe and realignments in Central and Eastern Europe, has stimulated the EU to play a 
role in peace-making in the Middle East. EU success in strengthening the European 
cooperation and solidarity process compelled the EU to focus on surrounding countries. 
Therefore, the EU discourse towards the conflict has shifted as its Self-Other perception 
has changed.  
 
The substantial European enlargement at the inception of the new millennium represented 
a new era for the EU. The merged size of their economic power encouraged the EU leaders 
to transfer it to a political weight.  The Middle East is a geostrategic area and vibrant 
domain for the EU that can exercise its actorness and develop existing economic and trade 
ties that support its Self-oriented policy towards an attractive polity for further spill-over. 
In this regard, the EU’s role in the peace-making in the Middle East conflict is perceived 
as a vital opportunity to reinforce its influence in the region.  
Russian engagement took place during the Cold War.  It acquired its importance from 
contrasting with Western materialism in general and the Soviet-American confrontation in 
particular.
649
  This Soviet perception of the conflict underscored by Primakov that Soviet 
policy took the Arab-Israeli conflict on ‘ideological tones’.650  The Soviet support for 
Palestinians started with the decline of Soviet influence in the Middle East after the 1967 
War and especially, with the death of Nasser, the Egyptian president, in 1970.  With the 
coming to power of Sadat in Egypt, Soviet influence began to decline. Thus, the Soviet 
involvement in the Palestinian question was an attempt to preserve its influence in this 
region. In this regard, Yevgeny Primakov said that the Soviet link with Fatah was 
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perceived as an option to ‘boost Moscow’s influence in the region, including the planned 
new state, no matter what form it took’.651   This support increased within the context of 
the public mood that was against western-backing of Israel in the 1973 War.  As a result, a 
Palestinian embassy opened in Moscow and the PLO, backed by the Soviet Union, attained 
observer status at the UN General Assembly in 1974.
652
 In reaction to the American-led 
Camp David Accords in 1978, the Soviets recognised the PLO as the “sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people” and President Leonid Brezhnev adopted an 
official position which declared that full liberation is the only road to establish a 
Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.
653
 Consequently, the Soviet Union was one of 
the first countries that recognised the Palestinian Declaration of Independence which was 
proclaimed in Algeria in 1988.
654
  
 
These ideological overtones in the perception of the conflict declined in the late years of 
the Soviet Union.
655
  That is, post-Soviet Russia abandoned its former ideological 
dimension in its foreign policy towards the conflict. Andrej Kreutz ascribes this retreat 
during the post-Soviet period up to 2005 to: strong American-Russian relations, the 
Russian focus on internal problems rather than strengthening its relations with the Arab 
World, and the increasing importance of its relations with Israel.
656
 This was reflected 
through minimal Russian involvement in peace-making during the Yeltsin period. Russian 
foreign policy under Andrei Kozyrev was labelled as pro-western.
657
  This policy mirrored 
the dramatic change in Russia’s strengths and self-confidence, and accepted the US and 
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Israeli positions on the peace settlement.
658
 This appeared at the Madrid Peace Conference 
(1991) when Russia accepted the exclusion of the PLO and Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem and the diaspora from representation.
659
 Moreover, the Russian Foreign Policy 
concept that Yeltsin signed in 1992 did not mention Palestinian rights or the Israeli 
occupation.
 660
  For Pogos Akopov, Russian elites and diplomats criticised this policy 
which exacerbated Russia’s internal problems. He argues that withdrawal from the Middle 
East peace process under the Kozyrev policy was led to an increase in the decline of 
Russia’s position in the world.  The Kozyrev policy perceived as a gesture of the apparent 
bankruptcy of the Euro-Atlanticist school in meeting external expectations of Russian 
elites.
661
   
 
The coming of Primakov to the Foreign Ministry in 1996 was a sign of a significant 
change in Russian foreign policy.
662
  Primakov tried to restore Russia’s position in the 
Middle East through renewing its co-sponsorship of the peace settlement. This change was 
a response to many internal problems: the state was very weak due to an unsuccessful war 
in Chechnya, and was close to bankruptcy and incapable of collecting taxes; the change in 
the political map, especially in the Russian legislative lower house (Duma) which moved 
further to Eurasianist, Neo-Euransianist and Communist schools which advocated a major 
role for Russia by  a balanced and  independent foreign policy, and the  appearance of 
interest groups (Oligarchs) and quasi-independent actors within the government, such as 
the energy companies, especially Lukoil and Gasprom.
663
  This change revealed the 
division in the  ruling class in Russia, especially the dispute with the Yeltsin line in 
conducting Russia’s foreign relations. The emergence and re-rise of state and non-state 
actors that saw further involvement in Middle Eastern politics, especially in peace-
mediating, was in favour of Russia’s short and long term interests.664   Primakov observed 
that Russia’s role was at a minimal level and he intended to increase it.665 For Oleg 
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Peresypkin, the appointment of Primakov was an attempt to revive Russian influence in 
the Middle East through playing a role in peace mediating.
666
  But he admitted that internal 
developments such as political, social and economic turmoil and the invasion of Chechnya 
limited and restrained Russia’s ability to play a role as a peace broker.667  
Primakov, during his meeting with Arafat in Ramallah in 1997, promised that ‘Russia 
would recognize a Palestinian state as soon as it was proclaimed’.668  In 1998, Arafat 
visited Moscow and met with the new Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov who assured him that 
Russia’s position on a Palestinian independent state was unchanged.669 But Russia’s 
internal situation deteriorated during 1998. The financial crisis and the second Chechnya 
war led to a further weakness in Russia’s capabilities at both internal and external levels. 
In 1999, removing Primakov and then Yeltsin from power were gestures of many shifts 
and changes in the Russian political system which affected Russian foreign policy-making.  
This influenced Russia’s position in supporting the Palestinian intention to proclaim an 
independent state. Arafat was intending to proclaim an independent state at the end of the 
interim period on May 4, 1999. For this purpose, Arafat arrived in Moscow to discover the 
Russian position on this issue and met with Ivanov who expressed Russia’s ‘strong support 
for the inalienable right of the Palestinian people’, but he urged Arafat to ‘postpone the 
proclamation of Palestinian independence’.670 Practically, most of Russia’s efforts in peace 
making went to stopping Arafat from continuing his plan to proclaim an independent 
Palestinian state on September 13, 2000.
671
 Accordingly, Russia welcomed the decision 
taken by the Executive Council of the PLO to postpone the declaration of Palestinian 
independence.
672
  
 
When Putin became Prime Minister (1999), he celebrated ‘Palestinian Solidarity Day’ in 
Moscow by playing host to the visiting Arafat’.673   For Andrej Kreutz, Putin needed to 
show his support and sympathy for the Palestinians and to present himself as a peacemaker 
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to the West and  Muslim World which was useful to overcome internal problems,  
especially his war on Chechnya.
674
 Also, to divert international attention from his war on 
Chechnya and to assure Russia international status, Moscow proposed to hold a new 
Middle Eastern summit, which however failed to materialise.
675
   Putin coming to power 
represented a new era for Russia. Putin represented a new generation of the ruling class 
and a new relationship between money and power in Russia.
676
 These kinds of relations 
directed his foreign policy choices.    The Chechen wars, the financial crisis, economic 
integration in the world economy and facing the expansion of NATO served as bases to 
build an active and effective foreign policy.
677
  The Middle East is a vital sphere for Russia 
where it can assert its actorness and possess economic and financial means that support its 
Self-oriented policy. In this regard, the Russian role in the peace settlement was perceived 
as a vital opportunity to reassert Russia’s influence in the Middle East. Accordingly, Putin, 
at the beginning of his first term of presidency, accepted Arafat’s invitation to visit 
Palestine, but he conditioned it to suitable circumstances.
678
 Therefore, this visit did not 
happened during Arafat’s lifetime.  
In essence, the EU’s and Russia’s involvement in peace-making in the Middle East is a 
quest to meet internal problems and is viewed as a mechanism for easy access to the 
region. The EU views that a strategic partnership with ‘key players in the world provide a 
useful instrument for pursuing European objectives and interests’.679 The involvement is 
about preserving this mechanism with or without reaching a peace settlement.  
 
More Process than Peace-making: EU-Russian Perception of the Conflict 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the longest-running and most continuous and 
longstanding conflicts in the contemporary world.
680
 In the Russian discourse, the conflict 
is perceived as intractable and chronic.
681
 More than that, the Russian Foreign Policy 
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Survey identifies the unsettledness of the Arab-Israeli conflict as ‘the roots of the 
problems’ in the Middle East.682  While in the EU discourse, it is viewed as intractable and 
a major challenge, but claim that finding a solution is ‘a strategic priority for Europe’.683  
 
This perception of the conflict has been emphasised by the nature of the peace process 
itself which the Oslo Accords laid down. The Oslo Accords, as Orde F. Kittrie argues, are 
an open-ended gradual negotiation process and designed from the approach of 
‘constructive ambiguity’.684 This view appears in the EU and Russian discourse on conflict 
resolution in the emphasis on ‘negotiation’ as the only way to reach a peace settlement.685   
This fact has been reaffirmed by a series of Independent Task Force reports on reforming 
the Palestinian Authority.
686
 The failure of the Camp David summit (2000) under the 
patronage of the US came to the conclusion that collective active efforts were preferred to 
reach a peace settlement. This has made room to accommodate EU and Russian efforts and 
to develop a sharper political profile and increase their presence in the process. 
  
Both the EU and Russia emphasise the finding of a solution through a collective format. 
Solana has emphasised that solving Middle Eastern problems, especially the conflict 
between the Palestinians and Israelis, should be based on collective efforts.
687
 Similarly, 
Lavrov stresses collective efforts in approaching a solution to the conflict, which Russia 
primarily preferred.
688
 This mirrors EU and Russian perceptions of the conflict. In this 
case, the Quartet as a mediator of collective action for a peace settlement is an opportunity 
for cooperation and coordination to prevent clashes between the most interested global 
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actors in this region. Solana has put the active role of the EU in the Quartet in the context 
of more presence and more visibility.
689
 EU membership in the Quartet has helped in 
asserting its international identity as a peace-maker.   For Russia, membership is a kind of 
prestige that preserves its actorness in world politics and underpins its presence in Middle 
East politics.    
6.2 The Contexts of the EU and Russia Positions on the Establishment of 
a Palestinian State 
Within the Quartet framework, the Russian discourse towards a peace settlement changed 
from Primakov to Putin. Primakov insisted on the Madrid Principle, land for peace and 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, while Putin was more pragmatic, looking for a 
settlement on ‘the basis of the coexistence of two states, Israel and Palestine, living in 
peace and security’.690 Accordingly, the establishment of a Palestinian state is no longer a 
matter of dispute and challenge between most global actors. The creation of “an 
independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living side by side with Israel and its 
neighbours” became a clear objective of the Middle East Quartet.  But, it is rather 
challenging when it comes to final status issues that are linked to the negotiation table such 
as borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and security matters. The Self-Other 
perceptions play a role in informing EU and Russian foreign policy-making on these 
issues. This is clearly obvious in interpreting and analying the EU’s and Russia’s position 
on most of the major events that have happened in the course of the peace process. The 
meaning of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy cannot be better understood without 
elaborating their positions in a number of contexts. Hence, the EU’s and Russia’s positions 
on the peace settlement have been elaborated in a series of contexts that inform and restrict 
their foreign policies. These contexts are those in which the EU and Russia have had to act 
constituting policy setting and, at the same time, limitations that inform their policy 
towards a peace settlement.  
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The Context of International Law and United Nation Resolutions 
International law and the UNGA and SC resolutions constitute the legal bases upon which 
the EU and Russia formulated their official positions regarding a peace settlement. They 
were framed particularly in the context of USCR 242 and 338 and the Geneva 
Convention.
691
  The discourse of the EU and Russia emphasise a two-state solution with an 
independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state. During the Yeltsin period Russia 
stressed UN and international law as a framework to reach a peace settlement. Primakov, 
in 1996, insisted on the ‘land for peace’ principle which is an interpretation of the UNSCR 
242 and 338 was approved by the Madrid Peace Conference (1991).
692 
 When he met 
Netanyahu in 1996, Primakov insisted on this formula “Land for peace” as a departure 
point for a peaceful settlement.
693 
 This is, according to Victoria Panova, because Russia in 
the post-Soviet era, was anxious to preserve a greater stake as a permanent member of the 
Security Council and maintain a role to play in the process of peace-making which gave it 
further privilege in the Middle East politics.
694
 Primakov insisted on this framework 
because it had been used to underpin Russia’s position as a stakeholder in the peace-
making process.  Under Putin, one of the main objectives of Russian foreign policy is 
emphasis on an active and effective role as a permanent SC member. The Russian 
discourse emphasises the role of the UN as the main centre for ‘regulating international 
relations’ and it opposes any attempt to belittle this role in world politics.695 The UN 
umbrella provides Russia with a large playground in world politics that can serve to 
enhance its influence.   
 
The cooperation between the EU and the UN has progressed significantly since the 
establishment of CFSP and increased when the EU paid more attention to the construction 
of its normative powers.
696
The UN umbrella serves the EU central objectives as a 
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normative power in the field of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good 
governance. However, the EU utilised international law and the UNSCRs regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to bridge the gap of its member states’ position on the conflict 
and came up with a unified position on its mediation role. That is, the EU uses 
international law and the UNSCRs to underpin a unified European foreign policy that 
represents the EU as a whole.  
 
Although the EU’s and Russia’s positions on establishing a Palestinian state are based on 
UNSCRs and the Geneva Convention, most final status issues are left to the negotiation 
table. That is, the discourse is based on, but in practice is not restricted to international law 
and UN resolutions. All issues in this process of peace-making are subject to negotiation 
and negotiation only.
697
 This context is used to take a position on many issues regarding 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict such as the Apartheid Separation Wall and the Hamas-led 
government.  
 
The Context of Cooperation for Security and Stability  
Internal concerns regarding security and stability is one of the main wider contexts that 
inform the EU and Russian perception of the Middle East. The question of establishing a 
Palestinian state, in this context, is perceived as a strategic objective that reinforces and 
underpins the security environment of both Russia and the EU.  For Russia, support for the 
establishment of a Palestinian state was perceived as an opportunity that helped to enhance 
the security environment that Russia faced during the second half of the nineties and the 
first decade of the new millennium. Being a key player in this question, Russia, had a hand 
in this security arrangement. Medvedev emphasised that Russian security in large part lies 
in the Middle East.
698 
 Also, Russia’s National Security Strategy referred to the conflict as 
one of the main elements that had a negative influence on security environment of 
Russia.
699
 Thus, the enforcement of security and ensuring Russian territorial integrity is 
one of the main objectives that informs Russia’s policy towards an active involvement in 
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the peace process. Chechnya and Dagestan in the South Caucasus are considered to be 
security vulnerabilities that are easily influenced by the conflict in the Middle East. Russia 
is in favour of making a peace that underpins and harmonises with its own internal security 
environment.   
 
Russia participated in the Berlin Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security which 
struggled to find ways to defuse security problems and support the PA in strengthening 
civil security forces and the rule of law in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Lavrov stated 
that security is a ‘substantial, integral element of the rise of Palestinian statehood’ and is 
an obligation of the PA under the Roadmap.
700
 He stressed that ‘ensuring the security of 
Israel’ is a major aim of Russian efforts.701 In addition, Putin stresses the idea that Israel is 
home to around one million or more former Soviet and Russian citizens.  He wants to ‘see 
them live in peace and security’.702 In this respect, Russia has participated in providing 
special training to hundreds of Palestinian security officers. Also, Russia provided two 
civilian helicopters and fifty BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers
703 
although Israel 
refused to hand them over to the PA.
704
 Russia is eager to participate in the security 
arrangement in the area which leads it to reinforce its security capabilities and enhance its 
security sphere which is very important for its internal security and stability.   
 
The EU discourse, in parallel, dedicates a large section of its peace process policy to 
security matters. The Security Strategy Paper that was presented in 2003 considers finding 
a resolution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict a ‘strategic priority for Europe’.705 
Obviously, it stresses that ‘the EU must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to 
the problem until it is solved’.706 Javier Solana said that ‘we need a Palestinian Authority 
that is more able and more determined to serve its population and the security of all’.707  
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Furthermore, the EU’s plan to build a ‘common zone of peace, security and prosperity’ 
will not be possible ‘unless a just and lasting settlement of the conflict is in place’.708  
 
Moreover, EU policy focuses on ensuring Israeli security through the search for its own. 
This is clearly the case when the EU directly links the idea of establishing a Palestinian 
State with the security of Israel.  The discourse strongly emphasises the idea that a 
democratic and viable Palestinian state is a guarantee for Israeli security. This explicitly 
clarifies the declaration of Berlin European Council in 1999, in which the EU considers 
‘the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian state [..] would be  
the best guarantee of Israel’s security’.709 That security informs the perspective that works 
towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. Hence, the EU discourse is full of these 
meanings that prioritise Israel and its security needs. In the joint paper entitled ‘State 
Building for Peace in the Middle East:  an EU Action Strategy’, Solana and Ferrero-
Waldner state that “only an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state can be a 
reliable neighbour for Israel.”    
According to this context, the EU has engaged to work on active plans that underpin this 
perspective. The discourse of security has been transferred to more actual mechanisms 
under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP has set up an action plan that 
outlines the commitments of partner countries. The EU-Palestinian Authority action sets 
out priority objectives to be achieved and attaches particular importance to strengthening 
the fight against terrorism and incitement to violence and cooperating in the fight against 
racism and xenophobia, in particular anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.
710
 Indeed,  in 2005, 
the EU set up ‘the European Union mission for the Palestinian territories’ (EUPOL 
COPPS) which implements its mandate in the context of objectives of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.
711
 Its purpose is to support the establishment of ‘modern and 
democratic police forces’ in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
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 In addition, the EU agreed to play a role in the security agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority on the Rafah Crossing Point in 2005. In return, the EU has 
established a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point 
(EU BAM Rafah). Therefore, the decision on the establishment of EU BAM Rafah has 
taken into consideration the security implications of the opening of the Rafah crossing 
point which will implement its mandate in the context of a situation which poses threats to 
the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the 
Treaty.
712
  In her opening statement at the 2008 annual meeting of the donor coordination 
group for the Palestinian people, Benita Ferrero –Waldner, Commissioner for External 
Relations, points out ‘mutual reinforcement between the Palestinian security efforts and 
increased Israeli trust’ and the Palestinian security plan can have immediate and visible 
impact’.713 
 
Within this context, EU and Russian efforts in the process of peace-making are bonded to 
security concerns, and the reinforcement of the security environment is a priority. The 
establishment of a Palestinian state is conditioned to be ‘the best guarantee of Israel’s 
security’.714 This context informed EU and Russian policy-making, to varying degrees, 
such as Arafat’s siege, the reform of Palestinian institutions, the Hamas-led government 
and the Gaza blockade.  
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The Context of EU and Russian Relations with Israel  
Employing EU and Russian perception of Israelis is very important in interpreting their 
positions of establishing a Palestinian state. Jews have been perceived in a mixed view of 
sympathy and victimhood following the WWII tragedy.  Laura Jeffery and Matei Candea 
argue that ‘victimhood establishes a space for a specific kind of politics’,715 an example of 
which is the Stockholm Declaration of 2000 which instituted Holocaust Memorial Day 
signed by most EU member states. In 2005, the European Parliament adopted a resolution 
in remembrance of the Holocaust, Anti-Semitism and Racism,
716
 holding an official annual 
ceremony for the remembrance of Holocaust victims. For the first time victimhood was 
considered as part of the EU discourse towards Israel. The speeches (delivered in the 
Knesset by Presidents of the EU Parliament, Lord Plumb of Coleshill (1989), Nicole 
Fontaine (2000),  Hans-Gert Pöttering (2007), and  Jerzy Buzek (2011),
717
 and addresses 
(by the EU member state leaders such as Federal Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel 
(2008), the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy (2008),  President of Hungary, Laszlo 
Solyom (2008), and the Prime Minister of Italy Silvio Berlusconi (2010) showed the EU 
sympathy and solidarity with Israelis.  
 
The Russian discourse is different from the western European. For Alexander Saltanov, 
Russian-Israeli relations are deep in terms of ‘the political, economic, cultural and 
humanitarian spheres’.718 Putin, in an interview with Israeli Television Channel One before 
he made the first visit of a Russian President to Israel, focused on the Soviet Union which 
was one of the founders of Israel and the sacrifice of  30 million Soviet citizens who were 
killed during WWII to defeat Nazism and save the world.
719
  In his discourse, Putin 
emphasised the role of the Red Army in the liberation of Auschwitz and the need to 
preserve ‘the memory of those who died at the hands of the Nazis, and those who fought 
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Nazism’.720  In 2012, accordingly, Vladimir Putin took part in a ceremony of unveiling a 
monument to the Red Army’s victory over Nazi Germany in the city of Netanya. 
Furthermore, Putin considers Russians and Israelis to be on the front line against fascism 
and anti-Semitism, which is ‘not a Russian invention’.721 Putin emphasised the protection 
of Judaism by Russian Law as one of the traditional Russian religions.
722
  That is, Russia 
shows sympathy to Jews, but takes the Holocaust on its side when dealing with Israelis.   
 
The EU has attempted to avoid the misunderstanding in which it will be perceived as pro-
Palestinian and anti-Israeli though the EU seems to be eager to present its neutrality and 
give an impression of credibility by taking an official position in light of international law. 
In defending the EU position on the peace settlement, Solana makes clear that ‘we are pro-
peace, pro-security, and pro-justice’.723 Certainly, the EU has vowed to fight anti-
Semitism. In the last decade, the EU has been accused, especially by American and Israeli 
think-tanks and media, of anti-Semitism rising in Europe, which in turn influences EU 
policy towards the Middle East. Javier Solana addressed this issue at the European 
Parliament by saying that ‘we will not tolerate anti-Semitism, but neither can we tolerate 
the insinuation that anti-Semitism drives our policy’.724 This could imply that the historical 
relationship between Europe and its Jews still chases EU policy-makers. On the sixty-fifth 
anniversary of the Holocaust, Catherin Ashton honoured the memory of all victims and 
said ‘this dark period in European and world history must not be forgotten, denied or 
repeated’.725 Thus, the EU discourse always emphasises the reality that the creation of 
Israel was a European effort to “atone for the sins of the Holocaust”. Thus, in the European 
mind-set, Israeli Jews are often perceived as victims.   
 
In addition to the geostrategic place of Israel in the Middle East and its role as a regional 
actor, this perception helped to boost EU-Israel relations which are marked by 
interdependence and a deep cooperation in the domains of economic, trade, security and 
science. The Association Agreement between the EU and Israel focuses on the need to 
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promote a further integration of the Israeli economy into the European economy, 
strengthening the political stability in the region, maintaining a dialogue on economic, 
scientific, cultural and technological matters that is intended to create a ‘new climate for 
their economic relations and in particular for the development of trade, investment and 
economic and technological cooperation’.726 Israel is one of the EU’s leading trade 
partners in the Mediterranean region and the 25
th
 major trading partner globally.
727
  Israel 
is part of many EU research programmes such as the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh 
Framework Programme for Research and Development, and the navigation satellite 
program, Galileo.
728
 More than ten sub-committees between the EU and Israel have been 
established to implementing and underpin EU-Israeli cooperation.
729
   
 
To Russia, relations with the Israelis are about finding opportunities. Russian-Israeli 
relations have been growing stronger under Putin’s presidency especially after Russia 
‘ceased to politicise’ the former Soviet and Russian emigrants in Israel.730 The ideological 
contradiction has declined and a new bilateral base built on mutual interests. In the context 
of Russia-Israeli relations, ideology no longer plays a role. For A. Kreutz Israel is 
perceived by the Russian ruling elite as ‘the most strategic ally in the region’.731 In 
addition, this cooperation has been prompted by the Russian speaking community in 
Israel.
732
  Primakov, during his first meeting with Netanyahu as Prime Minister in 1996, 
came to a point that ‘one could do business with Netanyahu in seeking to settle the 
conflict’.733  The importance of Israel to Russia is perceived in terms of: the Russian 
speaking community in Israel about whom Putin stated that he ‘wanted them to live in 
peace and security’,734 geopolitical and strategic calculations in which Israel is viewed as 
an important regional actor in the Mediterranean Sea, especially regarding the Levant 
Basin; and high-tech weaponry industries and security cooperation, particularly where 
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Israel has high-tech qualified industries.  In addition, Israel has become an important 
economic partner with Russia and their economic ties have been strengthened since the 
coming of Putin to power in 2000.  Thus, Russia is looking for balanced relations with 
Israel on the basis of mutual interests. 
 
Furthermore, Israel is perceived as a key channel to the west. A. Kreutz argues that 
between the Russian elites there is an approach that Russian Jews in Israel could serve as a 
‘unique bridge, linking Russia and the West in science and technology’.735 A study 
published by the Russian International Affairs Council in 2012 has argued that Israel’s 
support by the West, especially the US, is ‘on the wane’ and it is ‘becoming more isolated 
within the international arena’.736 This view is enhanced by Russia reacting to the changes 
in the map of regional actors in the Middle East in the context of “the Arab Spring” which 
affects the geostrategic environment of Israel.  The reduction in the US’s ability to ‘define 
the trends and events in the Middle East further deepens Israel’s isolation’.737   
 
Within this context, the EU and Russia are prioritising their relations with the Israelis over 
those with the Palestinians.  Additionally, the context of victimhood paves the way to an 
extraordinary environment to build a strong relationship between the EU and Israelis. That 
is, these perceptions of Israel inform EU and Russian foreign policy, though in varying 
degrees.  
 
The Context of Peace Making and State-Building 
The EU is more active and effective than Russia in this context. This can be attributed to 
Self-perception as a peacemaker and normative actor.  That is, playing a role in this 
context is congruent with its Self-perception as a normative power and meets its aspiration 
of being a soft power. Russian participation is at a minimal level and emphasises its 
position as a global actor and preserves its prestige among the major global players. It 
focuses on the political sponsorship of the project of establishing a Palestinian state 
through the UN’s institutions and organisations, and supports this project politically and 
diplomatically on the international stage. The Russian discourse emphasises that Russia 
has recognised Palestine as an independent state since 1988, enjoying full diplomatic 
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relations with Russia
738
 while the EU has only confirmed its intention to support peace-
making and state-building by mobilising the Union’s political, economic and financial 
means.
739
 In other words, the EU has supported the establishment of a Palestinian state on 
practical terms through associating state-building with institutional settings and 
strengthening de facto state powers on the ground, while Russia supports the Palestinian-
state-building in political terms through creating international political legitimacy.  
The EU discourse of state-building represents its ambition to shape the peace process from 
its viewpoint. This includes using instruments that underpin its policy. It also intends to 
perform its Self-perception as a peacemaker in building infrastructures for peace that can 
take many shapes. In this context of infrastructure-building for peace, the EU has 
supported a series of Independent Task Forces to ‘strengthen and reform Palestinian public 
institutions’ led by the former French Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, in 1999740, 2003, 
2004 and 2006.
741
 These task forces remain the most detailed and authoritative guide on 
the assessment of Palestinian institutions. This assessment is built on the good governance 
standards which are seen as ‘a necessary condition for peace processes’.742  The 
recommendations of the Independent Force Task report in 1999 along with the peace plan 
proposed by the Mitchell Commission (30 April 2001) which was supported by Russia,
743
 
constituted the bases for the ‘Road Map’ which has been endorsed by the Middle East 
Quartet.
744
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The Road Map and Palestinian Statehood  
The Road Map was the first collective framework calling for the establishment of a 
Palestinian state as an objective of most global actors in Middle Eastern politics. The EU 
and Russia, as active members of the Quartet, adopted this question as a priority and a 
strategic objective. The establishment of a Palestinian state became a political fact at the 
end of the five years interim period of Palestinian self-government as stipulated in the Oslo 
Accords that came to an end on May 4, 1999.
745
 The Berlin Declaration (1999), which 
immediately followed this period to avoid a Palestinian unilateral declaration of 
independence, along with Quartet membership represented a deep involvement of the EU 
in shaping and influencing the peace-making process.  The EU, within the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework, set out a new framework reinforcing peace-
building in ‘preparation for the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian 
State’.746  An Action Plan was adopted as a ‘working and guiding tool’ for the 
implementation of mutual commitments in the course of peace.
747
  While Russia paid more 
attention to legalising the nature of the Road Map through drafting resolution 1515 to the 
UNSC which called for the implementation of the Road Map commitments by the Israelis 
and Palestinians under the supervision of the Quartet.
748
 Within this context, EU Self-
perception as a normative and soft power informed its policies towards the establishment 
of a Palestinian state as a peace project in the Middle East. That is to say, that the 
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envisioned Palestinian state should be consistent with the principles and values that it is 
committed to promote. Russia, in turn, is very keen to be perceived as a supporter of 
Palestinian rights and supports state building and the peace process as a mechanism to 
facilitate its access to the region.  
6.3 The Road to the Establishment of a Palestinian State  
The way towards Palestinian statehood during the last decade has been defined by 
landmark events that came in the course of the above contexts.  For the EU and Russia, 
taking a position on events thrown up by the peace settlement is about seizing 
opportunities in order to enhance influence and reinforce their actorness.  
The Arab League Peace Initiative 
Putin welcomed the initiative by addressing the Arab League meeting in Beirut when what 
is known as the Arab Peace Initiative 2002 which became one of the foundations of the 
peace settlement was declared. Solana, in turn, welcomed the Initiative and called for an 
‘International Conference’ similar to the Madrid Conference in 2003.749 Russia placed the 
Initiative on the legal basis of reaching a peace settlement between Israel from one side 
and Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians on the other. Solana, likewise, stressed the 
importance of the Initiative as one of the legal bases for a lasting and just peace
750
 and 
went on to state that there can be no peace without implementing the Initiative.
751
  
 
Russia and the EU have been very keen to implement the Arab League Initiative which 
comes within UN resolutions and is compatible with the Madrid principle of “land for 
peace”. The Initiative formed an important bridge to enhance EU and Russian relations 
with the Arab World. It constituted an opportunity to facilitate further access to the region.      
Moreover, the Initiative offers a normalisation of relations between the Arab countries and 
Israel which is viewed as the main foundation for stability and security in the Middle East. 
But, EU and Russian efforts to implement the Initiative were limited by Israeli’s stance. 
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The Israeli Government refused to respond to this Initiative and Sharon, at that time, went 
so far as to imprison Arafat in his headquarters in Ramallah.
752
     
The Siege of Arafat and Institutional Reform  
Since the Berlin Declaration, the EU has been the leading actor in funding and supervising 
the process of Palestinian state-building. Based on its Self-perception as a soft normative 
power, the EU is the leading actor in the Quartet interested in reforming and strengthening 
Palestinian institutions. EU efforts to reform Palestinian institutions increased after the 
escalation of the second Intifada into an armed conflict and with the coming to power of 
Sharon as premier in February 2001.
753
 The escalation of the conflict increased the level of 
insecurity and instability in the region. The reading of this situation appeared in the Seville 
European Council conclusions (June 2002), in which the EU emphasised ‘security reform, 
early elections and political and administrative reform’.754 This reform, particularly in the 
security sector, became a priority and was seen as essential in the light of the European 
security strategy which was supposed to provide a secure environment outside EU 
borders.
755
  Accordingly, the EU, along with the other Quartet members, especially the US, 
increased its efforts to pressure Arafat to make good his commitment to these reforms.   
These efforts came in the context of Israeli accusations of Arafat of the responsibility of 
the militarisation of the Al-Aqsa intifada and of being behind the weapon-carrying  Karin 
A ship seized by Israeli forces in the Red Sea in January 2002.
756
  Consequently, Sharon 
imprisoned Arafat at his headquarters in Ramallah. This action plus the reform of the 
Palestinian Authority became central to the peace process.  Putin had stressed that Arafat is 
‘an internationally recognised leader’ and his existence is very necessary as a partner for a 
peace settlement.
757
  In 2003, Moscow was invited by the US to shun Arafat in order to 
force the Palestinians to replace him, but Russia refused.
758
  The EU, along with the US, 
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was focused on reforming the Palestinian Authority. This process of reform conformed to 
the EU’s views and criteria that were consistent with its normative values and principles. 
The capacity and efficiency of the PA is limited to the international donor community 
whose financial assistance has had a ‘major impact on the development of all branches of 
Palestinian government’.759 The EU, as the largest donor to the PA, influenced this process 
of reform. This conditionality mechanism was present in the ENP through applying the 
reforming Action Plan.
760
  
The agenda on reforming Palestinian public institutions was set out by the Task Force 
Reports. Arafat undertook significant reforms regarding the signing of the Basic Law and 
the Judiciary Law, appointing Salam Fayyad as Minister of Finance to place expenditure 
and revenue under the control of the Ministry of Finance and the creation of the position of 
Prime Minister
761
 which was one of the most significant reforms that Arafat undertook. 
The EU’s view was to shift power to the office of the prime minister in order to 
marginalise Arafat and to run day-to-day activities, especially in the security sector.
762
 
Later, Russia changed its position and shared EU and US views on Arafat and the 
reformation of the Palestinian Authority. Ivanov, in his visit to Ramallah in July 2003, was 
asked by Arafat representatives to assist in the ‘restoration of the freedom of movement of 
Yasser Arafat’. 763 He replied by insisting on the need to ‘end violence and terror’ which 
‘make the peace process irreversible’.764  
Mahmoud Abbas came to power as the first Prime Minister of the PA on 19 March 
2003.
765
 In conjunction to that (on 30 April), the Quartet presented the Road Map for 
peace.
766
 Phase I of the Road Map addressed ending terror and violence, normalising 
Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions.
767
 Accordingly, the PA was required 
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to conduct political reform including running Presidential and Parliamentary elections. 
Abbas formed the ‘inter-ministerial Reform Committee’ which produced a 100 Day 
Reform Plan, and  made serious efforts to attach security services ‘accountable to the 
Cabinet’768 in order to fulfil the security commitments of the Road Map, but he resigned 
after less than six months in office.
769
  This was considered a heavy blow to the reform 
process.
770
 This reform agenda was pursued after the death of Arafat and Abbas came to 
power as the elected President of the PA on January 2005.  
In conjunction with these reforms of Palestinian public institutions, there were attempts to 
facilitate the negotiation process on final status issues. The Geneva Initiative was one of 
these attempts that considered a draft agreement. The importance of the Initiative lies in 
proposing solutions for many of final status issues, especially those of the refugees and 
Jerusalem. 
The Geneva Initiative  
The EU and Russia gave considerable support to this Initiative in the course of seeking a 
peace settlement to the conflict.  In 2004, Solana considered the Initiative as timely and 
important, and said that it points in the right direction to facilitate peace negotiations.
771
 
For Russia, the initiative could be presumed as ‘an attempt’ to ‘overcome the present dead-
end situation in Palestinian-Israeli settlement’ and the ideas and suggestions that the 
Initiative outlined ‘do not run counter’ to the Road Map which Russia had considered as 
the ‘sole real program’ for establishing a Palestinian State.772 The shadow of the EU and 
Russia as sponsors existed when Javier Solana and Igor Ivanov met the authors of the 
Initiative before and after its appearance in public. The support is compatible with Russia’s 
and the EU’s general objective in finding a solution for the conflict in a collective formula 
through the cosponsorship of international society.   
The initiative is unofficial and outlines a compromise for most of the final status causes 
that mostly pour into the Israeli interests. And at the same time, the Initiative presented 
views that served their activeness and actorness in peace mediation and boosted their 
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image as peacemakers.  For Menachem Klein it was a ‘breakthrough’ and has become ‘the 
principle reference framework’ in the discourse on the conflict and as ‘the principle model 
of a permanent agreement’ between the Israelis and Palestinians.773 In the meantime, it was 
considered by the EU and Russia as “a valuable contribution” to the negotiation process 
and was well-suited to related UN resolutions. By and large, it supports and facilitates 
Russia’s and EU’s efforts to cosponsor a peace settlement.  
The Apartheid Separation Wall 
The Wall is one of the main elements that have political and security implications in 
relation to a prospective Palestinian state. The Wall has many consequences in different 
aspects that concern the EU and Russia. Along with humanitarian, social, health and 
economic repercussions that are extremely negative, it has deep political implications in 
terms of legitimising the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, violation of international 
law and UN-related resolutions and creates de facto realities that obstruct peace 
negotiations.
774
 Peter Lagerquist contextualises the matter of building this Wall as ‘the 
bantustanisation of the West Bank and any Palestinian state on some 50 percent of the 
territory’.775   
 
The EU’s and Russia’s discourse on the Apartheid Wall, which was built on occupied land 
based on international law and UN resolutions,
776
 follows. Russia considered it as a 
counterproductive step to peace efforts exerted by the Quartet.  On October 2003, Russia 
voted in favour of a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly to stop the 
construction of the Separation Wall.
777
 In addition, Russia expressed its regret at the US 
veto in the Security Council against the condemnation of the Separation Wall. But, 
practically, it refused the idea of imposing economic sanctions on Israel in order to force it 
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to comply with international law and UN resolutions.
778
 That is, Russia’s position on this 
matter was informed by the desire of asserting its actorness.  
 
But in the absence of any real pressure from the EU or Russia, Israel continued building 
the Wall, laying its logic on the security perspective.  Peter Lagerquist argues that because 
of the lack of any real opposition by the EU and the other sponsors of the Road Map, the 
Wall’s ‘designs accordingly became bolder’.779 That is, such matters were subject to 
relations with the Israelis and their security perspective more than UN resolutions and 
international law.  Meanwhile, the Sharon Government diverted the focus of political and 
diplomatic efforts towards the so-called “unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza Strip 
and North West Bank”.   
 
Disengagement from Gaza and the Palestinian Elections 
The Israeli redeployment from the Gaza Strip has been perceived as a step that could 
improve the peace process
780
 and was hailed by the international community, especially 
the Quartet members, as a step towards the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.
781
 
Russia considered it as a step ‘in restoring the peace process’ and it ‘must fit in the Road 
Map’.782 Putin in his letter to Abbas considered it as ‘a prologue to implement the Road 
Map’.783 Likewise, Solana considered it as an opportunity to ‘restart the implementation of 
the Road Map’.784 
In anticipation of this Israeli step, the report of the Task Force on Strengthening 
Palestinian Public Institutions (2004) stressed the completion of the Palestinian 
Presidential and parliamentary elections as necessary reforms in order to prevent scenarios 
of a rapid degeneration or drift that was facing the PA.
785
In addition, pushing ahead 
towards the conduct of elections perceived a renewing PA legitimacy, capitalised upon 
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Hamas’ popularity into parliamentary seats and were integrated into the political system 
that would ‘make vigilante violence illegal and make it possible for the new government to 
collect illegal arms’.786    And the report called upon the international community actively 
to encourage and assist the PA reform especially in the conduct of these elections, 
financial transparency and the rehabilitation of PA security services.
787
 Accordingly, in 
April 2005, James Wolfensohn, the former president of the World Bank, was appointed as 
the Quartet Especial Envoy for the Israeli disengagement plan from Gaza with the task of 
supervising the three-year development plan worth a total of US$9 billion.   
In September 2005, Israelis forces redeployed from the Gaza Strip. EU policy focused on 
security arrangements, political and democratic reforms, and financial aid that helped to 
facilitate this redeployment from the Gaza Strip. In November 2005, the EU agreed to play 
a third party role between the Israelis and Palestinians in a security arrangement on Rafah 
Crossing Point and to modernise and democratise the Palestinian security forces.
788
  
Accordingly the EU and Russia continued implementing the Road Map, in particular with 
regard to conducting the Parliamentary elections. After the death of Arafat, and under 
international community sponsorship, especially the Quartet and particularly the EU, 
Russia and the US, the Parliamentary elections were conducted on 25
th
 January 2006. 
Hamas won the Parliamentary election with an overwhelming majority close to 2/3 of the 
seats (79 of 132).
789
 Consequently, the Quartet on 30 January stated that:  
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‘All members of a future Palestinian government must be committed to 
nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and 
obligations, including the Roadmap’.790 
 Accordingly, the development plan was suspended, Wolfensohn resigned and the EU, the 
largest donor to the PA, along with the US, withheld its donated money to the development 
plan.
791
 Hamas formed a government in March 2006 and the programme did not include 
the acceptance of Quartet conditions. For the EU it was ‘unacceptable’ and not compatible 
with ‘European principles’.792 And for Russia, it does not meet the agreed Quartet 
conditions.
793
 Therefore, a boycott applied to the Hamas-led Government except states that 
are classified as neutral or anti-western such as Iran and Syria.  
Through its victory in the 2006 Parliamentary election, Hamas moved from a non-state to a 
state actor. Yezid Sayigh argues that the rise of Hamas as a state-actor ‘disbursed $9.5 
billions’ of financial aid in support of MEPP.794 This shift changed the course of peace-
making and represented an obstacle to the peace process. The Hamas-led government’s 
political programme was inconsistent with criteria that were set-up by all global actors 
involved in the peace-making process.   Thus the position taken on a Hamas-led 
government was not on its democratic legitimacy through fair and free elections, but 
focused instead upon whether it had international legitimacy through accepting Quartet 
conditions. In other words, the Hamas-led government is consistent with the European 
criteria of democracy, but incompatible with other criteria.   
 
In this respect,   the Quartet conditions are an embodiment of these criteria of actorness 
and fit in the above contexts. Hamas believes in armed resistance to the Israeli occupation 
which the EU and Russia consider as “terrorist attacks”.795 Hamas believes that Israel has 
established itself on occupied Palestinian land and does not recognise Israel as a ‘state’. 
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Hamas accepts the premise that Palestine exists from the river to the sea and does not 
accept the 1967 borders as geographical boundaries to the state of Palestine.
796
 In this 
respect, dealing with Hamas is based on how the EU and Russia perceived Hamas 
behaviour on the ground.  Both share the same position on the importance of a UN 
umbrella and the view of Hamas is that they should accept UNSCRs relating to the conflict 
especially Resolution 242 and 338. Moreover, the creation of Israel is rooted in the history 
of Europe and Russia from different perspectives. Therefore, both are committed to secure 
Israel as a state. In the case of the EU, any rapprochement with Hamas will be interpreted 
as anti-Semitism due to Nazi treatment of Jews. The matter of the Holocaust in European 
history informs EU policy in this context.  
 
However, the emergence of Hamas as a state-actor with its own peace-making views and 
interests which contradict the MEPP, is a new matter which provokes EU concerns 
regarding its actorness in the region which is the most central to its foreign policy in the 
Middle East. Solana, at an appearance before the European Parliament in the aftermath of 
the 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary elections, considered its results as a ‘critical time for 
the future of the Middle East Peace Process’.797 In addition, Hamas’ state-actorness is 
perceived as a matter that has long-term consequences for European security, stability and 
prosperity all of which are the vital to the EU.  
 
Moreover, Hamas hcame to power at through door of democracy and legitimate elections, 
a door opened as part of the political reforms of Palestinian institutions which, according 
to the European Security Strategy, were designed to ensure the security environment 
outside European borders and to prevent the collapse of the PA project according to Task 
Force assessments.  Additionally, this door opened to contain Hamas and renew the 
legitimacy of Palestinian public institutions which were expected to give the EU extra 
influence in the MEPP and enhance its actorness in the region. But, the coming of Hamas 
to power was perceived as a gesture that might reduce EU influence by blocking the 
opportunities to make any progress in the MEPP. However, the success of the Hamas-led 
government in running day to day activities and pursuing the reform process of the PA, 
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will probably lead to the promotion of a new model, with different characteristics, that 
may also undermine the EU actorness in the region.     
 
In contrast, Russia played the role of “friend of all”. It agreed to the Quartet conditions, 
provided $10 million to Abbas’s office and invited a Hamas delegation led by Khalid 
Masha’al to Moscow.798 Asserting its actorness lies in the contradictions and differences in 
Russia’s position on Hamas. The desire to play an active role in this area has been an 
incentive to adopt a different perspective in dealing with Hamas. Putin in the first-ever 
official presidential visit to Tel-Aviv and Ramallah (2005), represented the increased focus 
on Russian involvement in MEPP which coincided with the advent of Hamas to power. 
For Russia, Hamas constituted a new state-actor which did not belong to any of the global 
actors.  Russia is very keen to present an independent foreign policy in contrast to the EU 
and the US and at same time to present its commitments to its international obligation 
towards the MEPP. The Russian discourse on Hamas emphasises that it was 
democratically elected and is not classified as a terrorist organisation in Russia.
799
 That is, 
Russia does not have any restrictions on dealing with Hamas. Also, Russia had experience 
in convincing the Fatah to recognise Israel during the 70’s and 80’s. In this regard, Lavrov 
conveyed to the Hamas delegation the Quartet’s conditions and urged Hamas’ leaders to 
transform the movement into ‘a political party’ and abandon violence as a ‘means to 
achieve political aims’. 800  Russia thus plays a role that others cannot.  
However, Russia’s perception of the complexity of the conflict and its interconnection 
with world politics as well as the heavy dependency of the PA on international donors 
eases its reservations on dealing with Hamas. Hamas has limited opportunities to cross this 
minefield. In addition, Russia knows very well that the EU and the US will not accept 
Hamas in power unless it recognises Israel. More than that, Igor Belyaev ascribes Russian 
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talks to Hamas to its neutral position on the Chechnya war.
801
 That Russia’s relations with 
Hamas underpin its internal policy of being “anti-separatist and terrorist not Islamists”.  
 The EU insists on Hamas’ acceptance of the Quartet’s conditions as a prerequisite to 
Europe’s support. In June 2006, the EU at the request of the Quartet, had developed and 
put in place a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) which was designed to bypass 
Hamas through direct delivery of assistance to Palestinians.
802
 Pragmatically, Russia 
supported this European mechanism.
803
 This wide boycott movement created a financial 
and economic crisis and speeded up chaos that exacerbated armed clashes between the two 
main leaders, President Abbas and his faction, Fatah, and Prime Minister Haniyya and his 
faction, Hamas. The emerged incapability of a Hamas-led government let to a Palestinian 
National Unity Government (NUG) established after the Mecca agreement between the 
two factions.
804
 The Israeli government launched ‘a global campaign of lobbying’ against 
this NUG.
805
 The European position on political communication with Hamas has not 
changed. In this regard, Michelle Pace and Thomas Diez, argue that despite Abbas 
insistence that the new NUG had now ‘met the conditions of the Quartet’; the EU response 
to this NUG was ‘disappointed’.806 Russia took a different road by calling for the need to 
deal with the NUG.
807
   
The Palestinian Division and the Annapolis Conference   
In mid-June 2007, the NUG collapsed and the Palestinian Authority divided into Fatah 
control of the West Bank and Hamas control of the Gaza Strip. In response, the EU 
suspended the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point EUBAM
808
 and 
supported the emergency government headed by Salam Fayyad.
809
 On 27 June 2007, the 
                                                 
801
 Interview, 'Interview with Igor Belyaev, Director of Middle East Peace Process Department and Deputy 
of the Head of Asia and Africa Department in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs'. 
802
 European Commission, 'Temporary International Mechanism (Tim)', 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-
cooperation/occupied_palestinian_territory/tim/index_en.htm>, accessed 03/04/ 2014. 
803
 United Nations, 'At UN Session, Middle East Diplomatic Quartet Endorses Direct Aid to Palestinians', 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18402&Cr=Middle&Cr1=quartet#.Uyg0Gvl_vTo>, 
accessed 18/03/ 2014. 
804
 For more information about the Mecca agreement see Rouba Al-Fattal, 'Muted Response to Mecca 
Agreement”, 9 February 2007'. 
805
 Ingrid Jaradat Gassner, 'The Palestinian People at Cross-Roads', majdal,  (2007), 5. 
806
 Thomas Diez and Michelle Pace, 'Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation',  (2007).p11. 
807
 Gassner, 'The Palestinian People at Cross-Roads',  (p6. 
808
 European Union, 'The European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point', 
<http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/node/2296>, accessed 05/04/ 2014. 
809
 Solana and Ferrero-Waldner, 'State Building for Peace in the Middle East: An EU Action Strategy',  ( 
181 
 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, visited Ramallah and supported Abbas to 
‘remove any obstacles that may hinder the Palestinians from realizing their cherished 
dream of creating their own state’.810  Accordingly, the US called for an international 
peace conference at Annapolis to revive the negotiations in which Abbas and Olmert, the 
Israeli prime minister, reached a “joint understanding” to continue the bilateral negotiation 
towards a permanent two –state solution by the end of 2008.811  Solana hoped to reach this 
aim but he doubted its success and expected the failure of the US efforts.
812
 As expected, 
the Annapolis conference failed to achieve its objectives. Putin tried to seize this 
opportunity to push Russia in to the front seat and revived the idea of holding an 
international conference in Moscow. Lavrov, after the failure of the Annapolis summit in 
2007, called for organising an international conference in Moscow in 2008.
813
 Despite the 
decision in favour of holding this conference agreed at the UNSC, despite the Quartet and 
the Palestinians reiterating their support for this conference
814
, it did not take place, due to 
Israeli opposition.  
Instead, Russia focused on the reconciliation of the two main Palestinian factions become 
a dominant issue overshadowing the Palestinian landscape.   Russia tried to play a bigger 
role in inter-Palestinian relations and pushed toward reconciliation. Therefore, Mashaal 
was invited to Moscow in February 2010 and Medvedev met him in Damascus in May of 
the same year. After signing the Cairo Agreement on Palestinian unity in early May 2011 
between most of the Palestinian factions, Russia immediately invited these factions to 
Moscow hosting a meeting that took place at the Institute of Oriental Studies, of the 
Russian Academy of Science.   Russia tried to play a role in implementing the Cairo 
Agreement and to provide the practical auspices of inter-Palestinian reconciliation through 
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pushing toward the formation of ‘a unified and inclusive Palestinian government of 
independent technocrats’.815  
The Palestinian Application for Full UN Membership 2012  
On 23 September 2011, President Abbas submitted the Palestinian application for full UN 
membership to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, asking the UN to accept the state of 
Palestine as a full member. This followed a report, in April 2011, by the UN saying that 
the PA was ready to be run as an independent state.
816
 Accordingly, the Russian-
Palestinian working committee met twice in Moscow to discuss the steps being taken by 
Palestine for the UN bid in which Russia reaffirmed its strong support for the Palestinian 
rights for full UN membership.
817
 At the Security Council, Russia supported the 
Palestinian application to full UN membership and pushed for the recognition of an 
independent Palestinian State. Unfortunately, the US vetoed this bid at the UNSC. 
Consequently, the application moved to UNGA applying for the status of a non-voting 
member state. On 29 November 2012, the UNGA voted in favour of upgrading the 
Palestinian status to that of a “non-member observer state”. Russia voted in favour and 
considered it as ‘the important step towards the restoration of historical justice in relation 
to the Palestinians’.818 Despite the fact that Russia emphasised that this vote, in favour of 
the resolution, came after ‘the affirmation of the Palestinian leadership’ and that this 
upgrade in Palestinian status at the UN ‘is not directed against Israel, does not seek to 
isolate it, and that political negotiation course of the solution problem has no 
alternative’.819  At Russian instigation, this commitment is clearly stated in the UNGA 
resolution on the observer- status of Palestine.
820
   
 
Russia’s long history in supporting the Palestinian quest for UN membership had 
minimised its reservations in sponsoring the Palestinian bid. Indeed the Palestinian 
                                                 
815
 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Response by Sergey Vershinin, Director of the Middle East and 
North Africa Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, to a Media Question Regarding the Meeting of 
Palestinian Organizations in Moscow’s Suburbs', in Mfa Press Department (ed.), (Moscow, 2011a). 
816
 Aljazeera, 'UN Says Palestinians Able to Govern Own State'. 
817
 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Press Release on Meeting of Russian-Palestinian Working 
Committee on the Middle East', in Mfa Press Department (ed.), (Moscow, 2011b). 
818
 Affairs, 'Comment on the Adoption of the Resolution «Status of Palestine in the UN» by the UN General 
Assembly'. 
819
 Ibid. 
820
 United Nation General Assembly, 'General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘ Non-
Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations', in News and Media Division  Department of Public 
Information (ed.), ( New York, 2012). 
183 
 
application at the UN was an opportunity for Russia to assert its global actorness which 
meant that it could show credibility and commitment regarding this matter and, at the same 
time, take into consideration its relationship with Israel. The fact is that Russia 
relinquished its ideological motives in support of Palestinian statehood, but did not 
abandon its motives of global actorness.  Supporting Palestinian statehood is critical to 
Russia for multiple dimensions that should be taken into consideration. It is an external 
expectation of many internal forces such as parliamentary groups in the Duma and the 
Orthodox Church. For example,   parliamentary groups such as the Refah party consider 
‘the defence of the Palestinian people as one of its major goals’.821 In addition, the 
Palestinians attract the sympathy of  the Russian Orthodox Church leaders which represent  
one of the main social forces in Russia.
822
     
Moreover, the position is about Russian prestige and adopting an independent foreign 
policy vis-à-vis the Middle East. Russia maintains its global position in world politics, and 
reinforces its independence by making foreign policies as a rival to the USA. This is about 
maintaining relations with its clients, and sustaining its image as a veteran actor in the 
Middle East. Russia is keen on constructing a pole of political attraction among countries 
of the region. By taking this position on Palestinian statehood, Russia shows its strengths, 
independence and political muscle, especially in areas where it can be easily done such as 
the UN in which consequences are not high. It is not about the Palestinians per se, but 
other countries that perceive Russia as a defender of their interests at the UNSC such as, 
for instance, Iran.  
The EU member states, at the UNGA, were divided in voting on Palestinian status. 
Catherine Ashton said that the EU supports Palestine in its bid to be a full member at the 
UN as part of a solution to the conflict by negotiations.
823
 This official position taken by 
Ashton presents that the EU’s perception of Israel informs its policy-making towards a 
peace solution to the conflict. That is, the EU is keen on the negotiation process in which 
Israel has the upper hand. This means that Israeli views are highly considered in contrast to 
Palestinian rights of statehood. The EU played a role in 1999 in postponing the Palestinian 
declaration of independence by promising financial aid. In 2012, when it came to a 
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defining moment to declare an independent Palestinian state, the EU failed to adopt a 
collective position and prove its credibility.  
 
This confirms that the EU is interested in open-ended negotiations that secure its presence 
on the Middle East scene. It is always a non-stop process of negotiation and negotiation 
only. In this context, peace-making is closer to being an instrument than a principle. EU 
mediation has restricted Palestinian choices in the negotiation process which is unbalanced 
in the light of emerged results during 20 years of this ongoing process. For more than a 
decade of direct involvement in the MEPP, the EU policy deprived the Palestinians from 
going into multilateral soft approaches and restricted Palestinian choices in a ‘sole choice-
negotiation’. By using its financial aid as a vital foreign policy instrument, the EU is trying 
to keep the situation frozen and has not allowed any heat in order to prevent any threat to 
the region’s stability and security which could have a direct effect on its internal situation.  
That is, the EU is following the “more process than peace” approach, and continues 
playing the game of ‘constructive ambiguity’ in dealing with the matter of establishing an 
independent Palestinian state. 
The case of the Palestinian bid at the UNGA presents a strong correlation between internal 
developments and the making of EU foreign policy. The nature of this façade of 
supporting Palestinian statehood is clearly identified through its perception of the Israelis 
and the perception of the conflict plays a significant role. The EU failure to adopt a 
collective position on the Palestinian bid at UNGA underscores the Union’s capability 
when it comes to a high profile matter such as Palestinian statehood. Despite the fact that 
the majority of EU member states voted in favour, this failure to maintain a united stance 
reveals to what extent the perception of the Israelis in contrast to the Palestinians defines 
the making of EU foreign policy towards a peace settlement. The problem with the failure 
of the EU to vote collectively on Palestinian statehood is not that there is no collective 
position on it. It is that there is no agreement on how Palestinian statehood is to be 
established.  
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the aim of the EU’s and Russian involvement in this 
peace making process is to obtain a role in the making of Middle Eastern politics, thus 
what the EU and Russia are attempting to achieve is different in their use of instruments, 
but constant in what it designed for, in particular, the reinforcement of their presence and 
visibility on the international stage.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I argue that the Middle East peace process is a major channel to display EU 
and Russian presence and visibility, and reinforce their regional influence.  This perception 
of the MEPP is informed by the Self-perception of actorness and perception of the Middle 
East in terms of multiple contexts. This has defined instruments and guided foreign policy-
making towards Palestinian statehood during recent decades. The discussion focuses on 
how Self-perception is reflected in adopting policies and positions that are relevant to 
Palestinian statehood. It emphasises that the making of peace is limited to the umbrella of 
UNSCRs and international law, securing stability and maintaining security in the region, 
the perception of Israel and how Israeli views have been taken into account in supporting 
proposals and initiatives regarding final status issues such as the Arab Initiative and the 
Geneva Initiative.  
  
Since the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000, the EU and Russia have been 
motivated to reinforce their presence and visibility in the peace process. This active 
involvement in the MEPP is driven by the desire to become global actors in the making of 
politics in this vital region. The involvement has increased in conjunction with internal 
developments that emphasise the significant of the Middle East. The EU’s and Russia’s 
membership of the Quartet constitutes an opportunity to increase their presence and 
visibility as leading global actors in the making of Middle Eastern politics. 
 
After a period of American control of the making of Middle Eastern politics, and, in the 
aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR, Russia pushed itself to restore its influence in the 
region by active engagement in the MEPP. In Europe, which emerged through the 
enlargement process, the EU sought to translate the economic, geographical and 
demographical size into political weight through playing an active role in the MEPP. The 
increased desire of the EU and Russia to play a crucial role on the international stage has 
driven them to become more actively involved in the MEPP which provides a channel that 
furnishes smooth and easy access to Middle Eastern politics.  
 
This EU and Russian perception of actorness creates limitations to their support and efforts 
to establish a Palestinian state. These limitations are also defined by the perception of 
Palestinians in contrast to the Israelis. In this regard, the EU and Russia implemented 
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policies that reinforced their presence and visibility in the MEPP and adopted stances that 
are consistent with their principles and values and do not contradict their strategic interests 
as effective global actors in the region. Many stances and policies that have been adopted 
by the EU and Russia were on issues that are at the core of establishing Palestinian 
statehood yet are defined by these limitations. Examples of these issues include the Arab 
Initiative, the Geneva Initiative, the Apartheid Separation Wall and Sharon’s bilateral dis-
engagement from Gaza.     
On the road to establishing a Palestinian state, the EU mobilised its economic and financial 
means. It focused on reforming Palestinian public institutions which was considered a 
necessary condition for peace-making, while Russia mobilised its political weight to 
reinforce international support and put emphasis on sponsoring Palestinian statehood at 
UN institutions. The Road Map, which was adopted by the Middle East Quartet, prioritised 
security arrangements and emphasised a wide range of political and administrative 
reforms, yet failed to establish a Palestinian state.  Russia focuses on reserving a seat in 
this process and asserting its influence and eliminating the un-balance with other global 
actors in the region.  
 
The question of establishing a Palestinian state (per se) is no longer a matter of dispute and 
challenges, but these issues do matter when it comes to such  things as security 
arrangements and Hamas as a state-actor.   As far as being a normative power, the EU has 
failed to defend the principles of democracy and human rights. This is because it defends 
its actorness and  Hamas is perceived as an element that restricts its influence.  The EU 
uses democracy as a foreign policy instrument not as a principle. The EU supported the 
Parliamentary elections in 2006 which were designed to contain Hamas through 
capitalising its popularity into parliamentary seats in a council that was controlled by a 
Fatah majority and functions limited to the Oslo Accords.  It is an instrument that was 
supposed to relax some of the tensions that caused instability and to help create a secure 
environment that would accelerate EU access to the region and reinforce its presence in the 
making of the Middle Eastern politics. The matter is not Hamas as an Islamic movement; it 
is about Hamas as a political construct that is inconsistent with EU global actorness in the 
region.      
Russia took a pragmatic approach to dealing with Hamas. It plays the game “friend of all”. 
It supported the Quartet conditions that were imposed upon Hamas and participated in 
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a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) which was designed to bypass the Hamas-led 
government. At the same time, Russia opened a diplomatic channel with Hamas and 
Medvedev met Mashaal in Damascus. Russia in its relation with Hamas plays on 
contradictions and tries to exploit the margin that Hamas creates in Middle Eastern politics 
to reinforce its influence in the region. However, at the UN, the EU failed to translate its 
presence in the MEPP to actorness at the UNGA where its member states were divided in 
supporting the Palestinian bid while Russia did support it. For Russia, tt is empirical 
evidence that meets expectations of internal groups and proves credibility in defending its 
friends and clients in the region.   Finally, the EU and Russia focus to benefit from the 
support of Palestinian statehood in maintaining their image and enhancing their influence 
in the region that work to underpin their actorness on the world scene.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FINDINGS AND CONSTRUCTIVIST REFLECTIONS 
Focus 
This chapter sums up the dissertation’s key findings. The principal problematic of this 
thesis is that identity and Self-Other perception inform policy-making, specifically towards 
the Israel–Palestine conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state.  The findings are 
based on a comparative discussion which is presented in three stages: Firstly, how the 
EU’s and Russia’s Self-perception as global actors informs their foreign policy-making 
towards the Middle East. Secondly, how the EU and Russian perceptions of the Middle 
East define their involvement in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Thirdly, how 
their identity and Self–Other perceptions influence the EU’s and Russia’s positions on the 
process of establishing a Palestinian state. In principle, Palestinian statehood is a strategic 
priority for both the EU and Russian efforts at peace-making in the Middle East. 
Nevertheless, the EU and Russia avoid taking measures necessary to achieve that aim, 
because such policies would hurt their roles in the region.  
7.1 Findings of the Thesis 
A key finding that originates from this thesis is that constructivism clearly represents a 
theory with great heuristic power. In fact, it can be seen how identity and Self-Other 
perception as basic theoretical principles help to interpret and analyse the discourse of the 
EU and Russia towards a peace settlement in the Middle East. Similarly, the use of 
discourse analysis (DA) is primarily based on how DA as a method and a whole research 
field helps understand power relations, which are a dynamic that changes all the time. The 
analysis here does not give some kind of invariable ‘truth’. Rather, it is based on evidence 
taken from official documents, interviews and other texts and through my interpretation of 
them, which is a process, in which I as analyst hold some kind of dialogue with the 
collected data. My own interpretation is not the end of the process, the readers of my own 
analysis through DA become part of this process. I view this to be an advantage that 
encouraged me use this research method. 
 
Moreover, the fact that is information about the world we live in, including the 
construction of power relations, takes place within a context. That is another strength that I 
have found fascinating about DA; meanings have context, and this is what I have tried to 
stress in my analysis. Through my investigation into the assumption of identity and Self-
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Other perception on foreign policy-making, I have come to the conclusion that building or 
maintaining an international identity through increased presence and visibility is part of a 
construction process that Self-perception, in contrast to others, as well as the perception of 
‘Otherness’, has a powerful influence on making the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy, 
especially towards their involvement in the MEPP.  That is, the search for a global 
actorness on the international stage has informed EU and Russian involvement in MEPP. 
Indeed, they consider the peace process as a key channel that provides a smooth and easy 
access to many Middle Eastern countries. The significance of the Middle East to EU-
Russian strategic interests provides a geostrategic sphere in which to be actors.  
 
EU and Russian foreign policy-making towards Palestinian statehood deserves special 
attention as it highlights the role of Self-perception and perception of ‘Otherness’ in 
contrast to Middle Eastern politics. The issue of Palestinian state-building underscores that 
fact that peace-making, with all of its significance, represents a formidable opportunity to 
create a presence and then transfer it to actorness in order to fulfil strategic interests, not 
only through hard power, but also through soft means such as involvement in the MEPP. 
This is to say that peace-making is also a soft means that can create close relationships 
which are dynamic in nature and facilitate access to fields of interest. In the Middle 
Eastern conflict, the construction or reinvention of the Self of the EU and Russia plays a 
key role in influencing their policy-making. Of additional interest is the fact that the EU 
and Russia react differently towards the establishment of a Palestinian state as a function 
of the situation in the Middle East and, moreover,  the extent to which Palestinians are 
perceived in contrast to the Israelis, and vice versa .  
In applying the constructivist approach to studying foreign policy-making by the EU and 
Russia towards the MEPP, in-depth discussion has striven to understand the construction 
of the Self as a global actor, which is central to both the EU and Russian policy-making. 
Understanding the construction of the Self through interpreting and analysing the discourse 
of ‘actorness’ gives explicit indications of the process of foreign policy-making. The Self 
has a power to make foreign policy although little attention has been devoted to studying 
its influence on making politics. This study of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy-
making leads to a number of findings that should assist in refining our understanding with 
respect to peace-making in the Middle East. First, one should take into consideration 
internal and external developments that play an important role regarding which type of 
global actorness has most support on an internal level and how they inform external 
190 
 
expectations in terms of actorness. Secondly, when assessing perceptions of the Other at 
contextual levels, what are the important findings that actors prefer and how do they define 
policies and action plans.    Both findings bring us to the third, namely that after more than 
a decade of active involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the EU and Russia (as part 
of the Quartet) have failed to help realise a Palestinian state. 
7.2 The Fundamental Role of the Self as a Driving Force in Foreign 
Policy- Making  
The construction of an international identity is a prime objective in both EU and Russian 
foreign policy-making which itself is a dialectic between internal developments at various 
contextual levels and external expectations of reflecting these developments in terms of 
global actorness. Thus, constructivism provides a framework to understand this process of 
foreign policy-making as a dynamic- not as a static process, for example, as realism 
assumes. To the extent that the dynamics of internal developments play a role in the 
construction of the EU and Russian international identities, it also informs their external 
actions. That is, the construction of EU’s and Russia’s global actor image reflects the 
internal developments which play a major part. Changes in the post-Soviet Union era and 
the strategic reading of the US’ troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, presented 
external developments that informed the EU’s and Russia’s Self-perception. In the case of 
Russia, building an international identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union was a 
reaction to internal developments which informed its place and mission on the world 
scene.  
 
According to Sergei Karaganov, the main planner of Russia’s foreign policy, seeking 
further influence is to ‘lie more than ever in internal developments’.824 After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Russia had a very chaotic period in which constructing the new 
Russian international identity became a dominant matter among different streams of the 
Russian political spectrum. Constructivism provides an opportunity to understand how 
these internal interactions which revolve around Russia’s role in the world ended.  Self-
perception has a fundamental role as a determinant of actorness in two ways: the 
perception of the Russian Self in terms of geography as the  world’s largest country and 
also as a bridge between Europe and Asia.  
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Russia has had a rich experience of empire in terms of legacy and heritage- in both the 
former Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia- rich natural resources and various capabilities in 
different arenas; and the dire aftermath of the collapse of the  Soviet Union’s 
disappearance (e.g., inefficient economy and weaknesses, a technological gap, the threats 
of disintegration, fragile security and stability invoked by Chechnya and Kirgizia, losing 
influence in Central and Eastern Europe in favour of the EU and in central Asia in favour 
of the US), which had a remarkable influence on Russian identity and broadly have 
informed and defined Russia’s approaches and instruments in the making of its foreign 
policy. In addition, the reality of Russia being an Orthodox country with an ethno-fusion 
of Slavic and Turko-Muslim combination is an important element that cannot be ignored 
and plays an important role in informing Russian foreign policy.   Therefore, rebuilding a 
place and mission in the world and recovering from these weaknesses have been driving 
forces of Russian foreign policy.  
 
By analysing the discourse of the Russian leadership, especially Putin, it appears that 
resuming the practice of power at the international level occupied a substantial amount of 
thinking. Putin came to power with the slogan ‘Great Russia’ and ‘Strong Russia 
statehood’. In his perception of Russia’s place on the world stage, the collapse of the 
USSR was ‘a genuine drama’ and ‘a major geopolitical disaster of the century’.825 Thus, 
Putin focuses on re-constructing Russia’s global actorness; he has also paid more attention 
to restoring the strength, influence and position of Russia.  This is known as the Putin 
Doctrine, which prioritises the recovery of Russia’s political, economic, and geostrategic 
assets lost in the Soviet breakup.
826
  
 
In Europe, over recent decades, a number of internal developments have affected the 
collective identity of the Western European countries, in turn; a sense of international 
identity constructed as well as the desire to play a global role, has been growing and varies 
in contextual levels. Thus, constructing an international identity that reflects internal 
developments and meets external expectations has been the driving force ever since the 
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creation of the EU in 1992.   In the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Bloc, the EU 
achieved a considerable global actorness by enlarging its membership and spill-over 
towards Central and Eastern Europe. A new international identity emerged constructed in 
multifaceted contexts which were rooted in the development of the EU from war to peace 
and from disarray to being a net exporter of security, stability and prosperity.  
The new EU’s Self was built on the idea that working together is the main way towards 
promoting political and social conciliation, boosting economic prosperity and sustaining 
European cohesion. This international identity is a combination of sharing common 
normative values and principles, and a spirit of peace, cooperation and solidarity with the 
aim of achieving prosperity for all the EU’s member-states.  
By applying a constructivist approach, the analysis and interpretation of the EU discourse 
empirically shows how Self–perception defines actions at external levels. From Self-
perception as an economic power and the perception as a normative or civilian power, 
have informed the EU’s foreign policy-making towards neighbouring countries. For 
example, findings related to the EU’s search for playing a role as an actor promoting good 
governance underscores the fact that Self-perception as a normative power leads to 
creating a foreign policy characterised by a high level of projection of good governance 
and democracy. Moreover, Self-perception as an economic power is reflected in having 
become the world’s largest financial donor, which has long characterised EU policy 
towards its neighbours. The Euro-Med and Wider Europe Initiatives as well as the ENP as 
a framework, reflect EU internal developments in terms of the emerged Self-perception as 
a normative and economic power.  
Understanding the interaction of internal developments in the case of the EU and Russia, 
highlights the role they play in constructing their Self-perception. Furthermore, 
constructing the Self is dynamic and cannot be reduced to a static variable as realism 
assumes. States and actors make their policies differently towards other states or actors as 
a function of the situation and what the position of the other is.  Moreover, internal 
developments underscore the reality that constructs capabilities, playing a key role in 
enhancing their presence in related contexts. In analysing the EU and Russian discourse 
towards the MEPP, one should keep in mind that increasing their presence is at the heart of 
building capabilities and searching for a global role.  
193 
 
As discourse of capabilities is one of the key dimensions studied in this thesis, we can say 
that accumulating capabilities leads to Self-perception forms of actorness.   In addressing 
its perception of actorness, while Russia has acknowledged that its lack of capabilities 
limits Russian influence in world politics, the EU shows a clear sense of its ability to play 
an active role in international affairs.  Whereas, the EU stresses its power capabilities in 
the field of projection of normative values, and financial and stabilising powers, Russia is 
driven to rebuild its capabilities in different contexts that are perceived as significant to its 
global actorness.  
The emphasis here is on enhancing the EU capabilities globally in terms of normative and 
economic and trade power, and on recovering  from Russia’s weaknesses in the context of 
the economy, technology, military, heavy industry and energy sectors which have 
increasingly informed Russia’s foreign policy directions towards finding opportunities in a 
vital region such as the Middle East. The focus on reconstructing Russian global actorness 
as a successor of the former Soviet Union and restore its influence has become a driving 
force of Russia’s foreign policy. However, Self-perception played a fundamental role in 
leading Russia to present its succession to the Soviet Union in terms of strengths not 
ideology. Russia is trying to reinforce its message of the peaceful re-emergence of the new 
Russia.  This has led Russia to harmonise its own role in the MEPP from polarisation to 
cooperation with other global actors such as Russian membership of the Quartet.   
Here, constructivism provides an opportunity to analyse EU and Russian foreign policy as 
a dialectic between Self-perception, and internal and external developments. This provides 
a wide range of understanding and ability to predict the type of their involvement in the 
MEPP. Also, this enhances our understanding of contradictions that might appear between 
expectations and realties in the EU and the Russian role in the MEPP.  That is an active 
involvement in the MEPP is subject to its positive and negative repercussions on the EU 
and Russia’s international position and internal developments.  
 The EU involvement in the MEPP gradually increased in parallel with its development of 
the Self of actorness and as a reflection of its internal developments. After the 
establishment of the EU in 1992, EU involvement in the MEPP increased, resting on its 
potential to be an international actor. In 1996, the EU increased its presence in the MEPP 
by appointing Miguel Ángel Moratinos as the first EU special representative.  The creation 
of the post of Special Representative demonstrates the EU capability to play a role in this 
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process of peace-making.  While the post of Special Representative constitutes the 
spotlight searching to play a bigger role in the MEPP, Quartet membership put the EU on 
the map of global players. In contrast, Russia has increased its involvement in the MEPP in 
conjunction with reasserting itself as the successor to the former Soviet Union. In 1996, 
Primakov revived Russia’s position in the peace process in an attempt to refurbish Soviet 
influence in the region. 
On the other hand, the construction of international identity in the case of the EU and 
Russia rests on the functional role of situational factors in contrast to other rivals. The 
European and Russian strategic reading of American troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan 
reinforced their perception of a high potential to play a global role in Middle Eastern 
politics. Thus, this Self-perception of the EU and Russia, which was constructed in the 
light of their internal and external developments, deeply informs their perception of the 
Middle East as a field of strategic interests and reflects the nature of interconnected and 
interrelated relationships between the perception of the Self at a contextual level and the 
perception of Otherness in multilateral contexts that are a function of the situation they 
perceive.   
7.3 The role of Perception of Otherness in Informing Foreign Policy-
making  
Perception of Otherness is one of the main premises of constructivist theory which varies 
in kind, most of which inform foreign policy-making. To understand the foreign policy-
making of the EU and Russia towards the MEPP, I applied the perception of Otherness 
beyond the traditional way of defining one’s own Self, namely, not only in terms of 
differences and similarities. Perception of the Other can be perceived in the course of 
opportunities or challenges and to what extent it serves EU and Russian interests and in 
which contexts. Thus, I analysed and interpreted the EU and Russian discourse towards the 
Middle East and the peace process in a variety of contexts. This helped to explore the 
reasons and motivations behind their involvement, and to what extent this involvement is 
important. This to say, that putting the EU’s and Russia’s perception of the Middle East in 
a variety of contexts helps to understand contextual factors that influence their policy-
making as well as shedding light on temporal and spatial contexts in which the EU and 
Russia assemble their foreign policy, which surely shapes the nature and characteristics of 
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their involvement in peace-making, and how and what it should be. This to say, that 
making foreign policy varies and differs in accordance with differences in context.        
 
As was made clear in Chapter Five, the Middle East is perceived by the EU and Russia in 
multi-faceted contexts. Most of the Chapter Five findings demonstrate that security, 
stability, energy, military and technology cooperation, economic and trade relations, and 
historical, cultural and religious ties are essential contexts in EU and Russian relations 
with the Middle Eastern states, which deeply inform their involvement in the peace 
process. Thus, there is not only one context that informs their foreign policy-making.  In 
the vein of the EU searching for a place and mission in world politics, the Middle East 
gains more importance and becomes a geostrategic sphere in which the EU has to foster its 
visibility and influence. The perception of the Middle East is mixed between opportunities 
and challenges to its actorness.  This perception, in contrast, shows the Self-perception 
characteristics that are explained in Chapter Four.    
 
The EU’s Self-perception as a net exporter of security and stability in Europe very clearly 
informs its perception of the Middle East. The European Security Strategy redefines the 
region as an area of insecurity and instability where threats of so-called “terrorism” 
originate. This context starkly defines EU policy towards the region; therefore, a 
projection of democracy and good governance, and of security training and cooperation, 
and the prevention of WMD proliferation are notable features of EU policy towards many 
countries in the region.  Furthermore, Self-perception as a normative power is reflected in 
perceiving the region as an area of autocratic governance, humiliation of human dignity, 
absence of human rights, transiency and the rule of law predominate. Thus, the perception 
of normative power informs EU policy in focusing on the promotion of democracy and 
good governance. The association agreement which the EU signed  with a number of  
countries in the region within the framework of the ENP necessitated an action plan which 
implied an agenda of  political, social and economic reforms according to good 
governance standards.   
 
The geographical proximity and geostrategic position as a highway and vibrant centre of 
world trade as well as a major source of energy, makes the region one of vital importance, 
which, in turn, influences the EU’s perception of the Middle East. This importance, in 
contrast to Self-perception as an economic power, deeply informs the Wider Europe 
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Initiative in which regional trade and integration within the region is a recognised 
objective. Thus, opening up new market opportunities in the Middle East has been 
motivated by this Self-Other perception.  In this regard, EU policy focuses on the creation 
of a large Mediterranean market which includes free trade areas, privileged trade 
agreements and easy access to energy rescuers that has had positive effects on the EU’s 
internal stability, security and prosperity. Considering the competitive position of 
European industries and large economies of scale, EU policy intends to increase the scope 
of its market over the whole of the Middle East. To this end, the concluded association 
agreements work on the liberalisation of trade movement and set up new formulas of 
economic cooperation with most of the region’s countries which first introduced the EU as 
a global player.     
 
On the other hand, the EU’s Self-perception as an importer of energy and the reality that 
the Middle East is the geographical centre of gravity of the world’s fossil fuels, makes the 
Mediterranean Sea a highway for the global energy trade that informs its policy towards 
the region.  Additionally, the discoveries of hydrocarbons in the South and East of the 
Mediterranean promote EU focus on this region. Europe’s role in Middle Eastern politics 
developed in the context of the energy crisis that emerged in the course of the 1973 Oil 
Crisis. Energy is one of the main issues that concerns EU independence. In recent years, 
the dependence on Russian oil and gas has constituted a major weakness in EU foreign 
policy-making. The EU’s desire to diversify its energy sources to minimise its dependence 
on Russia compelled Europe to become more active in Middle Eastern politics. It is worth 
mentioning that the more active role the EU plays in the Middle East,  the more the EU 
expands to secure additional energy sources.  
 
On the other side, Russia has major interests in the Middle East, interests which are 
intertwined with its internal developments, particularly those which have substantial 
effects on their economy and trade, security and prosperity. This interrelation and 
interconnection has increased gradually over the course of Russia’s attempt to reconstruct 
its place in world politics. Primakov re-introduced the importance of the peace process as 
the main channel to assert Russian influence and interests in the region.  Lavrov refers to 
this region as a strategic area in which Russia has ‘growing trade and economic ties’.827 To 
                                                 
827 Lavrov, 'Interview with Al-Watan Al-Arabi Weekly Newspaper '.  
197 
 
save and reinforce Russia’s influence, Lavrov stresses a new formula of partnership with 
numerous countries of the region in diverse fields
828
 to broaden Russia’s cooperation with 
the Middle East.  In this regard, the MEPP becomes a key track for Russia to cooperate 
with the region in the fields of oil and gas, High-Tech, military industries, security and 
cultural aspects as a means to tackle internal problems and enhance Russia’s global 
actorness.  
 
To activate the process of further opening up to  the Middle East, Putin, during his first 
eight years in office, visited the Middle East ten times. According to Lavrov, Russia ‘had 
never had such a high level and intensity of contacts before’.829 In consistent terms with 
this process, in 2009, Medvedev toured the Middle East and visited Ramallah, despite the 
cancellation of his planned visit to Israel.
830
 Medvedev considered this visit ‘the first’ that 
a leader of a major state made.
831
 He paid significant attention to creating good relations 
with all parties in the region in order to launch what he called the ‘mega projects’.832  He 
underlined presidential diplomacy to maintain Russian influence, boost its economic ties 
and strategic partnerships.
 833
 In his speech at the Arab League in Cairo, he highlighted that 
any progress which would improve Russian influence and interest in the region must take 
into consideration the Arab League’s position and its member-states’ views on many 
issues, especially a peaceful settlement for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
834
  
 
Therefore, the emphasis on Russia’s position in the peace process takes place in the course 
of striving to enhance its influence and actorness in the region. That is, Russian 
engagement in the MEPP facilitates the Russian economy to further integrate in the world 
economy by boosting Russian access to the Middle East economies. In other words, it 
helps remove the obstacles that burden the Russian economy and obstruct growth. Putin’s 
policy can be described as a stretch of the Russian role in the peace process. Russia looks 
forwards to preserving a mechanism that provides easy access to the region, which is seen 
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as vital for its economic modernisation and integration in the world economy, and political 
and social stability. In this regard, Russia emphasises economic and technological 
interrelations, building military bases, and increasing its share of the Middle East 
weaponry market. Indeed, Russia is the world’s second largest arms supplier to the Middle 
East. In the 2007 presidential tour of the Gulf, Putin attempted to increase cooperation in 
high-tech weaponry with the Gulf States.
835
 On the other hand, Russia increased its 
military cooperation with Israel, and, as a result, the countries signed their first military 
agreement in 2010. 
 
Furthermore, Russia perceives the Middle East as a key rival in the field of energy.  Russia 
wants to maintain its oil and gas assets and secure its share of the market. This is important 
for the Russians because their economic capability largely rests upon the status of ‘energy 
power’. Since 2000, surging oil and gas prices have influenced Russia’s position as a 
global actor. Gaining a regional presence in the Middle Eastern oil and gas market gives 
Moscow a large economic club to hit Europeans with, as happened during the gas crises in 
the winters of 2005–06 and 2008–09. Moreover, the Levant Basin is very rich in natural 
gas and oil. Thus, Russia increased its geostrategic presence in the Mediterranean, 
especially in Syria. Considering the potential increase in the oil and gas supply, Russia is 
very keen to be a regional actor in order to share the benefits or at least save its assets and 
revenues of oil and gas from depreciation.  Also, Russia has an interest in increasing its 
share in the oil and gas industries. In 2004, Russia entered the Saudi fuel market with a 
strong interest in building pipeline networks (linking the oil and gas field with the 
Mediterranean) and Cypriot Energy. Russia has also signed operator agreements and 
memoranda in the energy sector with Israel and Lebanon.  
 
Moreover, Russian involvement in the MEPP aims to keep the security dialogue with 
many countries and non-state actors in the region actively open.
836
 The geographical, 
historical and religious interconnections between Islamic states in the Federation and the 
Middle East are much of concern to and inform Russian policy towards the region.   The 
Russian experience of internal political instability, insecurity and social turmoil in the 
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post-Soviet era has fostered Russia’s perspective of reconstructing Soviet influence in the 
region through new formulae.     
 
Moreover, historical, cultural and religious bonds with the Middle East, especially the holy 
places in the Levant, impose an important context of Russian perception of this region. 
After the collapse of communism as a social drive of the Soviet Union, Russia searched for 
ways of reviving the Russian social contract and reinforcing the values of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. The trend is to utilise Orthodox values as a social drive.  This 
perception of the Middle East has been enhanced with the increase of the Church’s 
leverage in Russian public life. The increased focus on restoring the Tsarist properties in 
Jerusalem shows the growing importance of Orthodox symbolism in Russian political life 
and among the ruling class.  Russia has increased its support for Russian NGOs, such as 
the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS), that sponsor Russian activities in the 
Levant. These activities are run by high profile Russian politicians such as the head of 
IOPS, Sergei Stepashin,  the former Russian Prime Minister and his deputy Mikhail 
Bogdanov, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and Russia’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister. Plus, Russian focus on the Middle East has been increasing in the light 
of the existence of one of the largest Russian-speaking communities in the world, the 
Russian-speaking community in Israel.    
 
In this vein, the Self-perception of the EU and Russia is reflected in their perception of the 
Middle East. This understanding of the reflection between the Self and Other is a powerful 
mechanism for meaning-making, particularly as the EU and Russia are highly involved in 
peace-making in the Middle East. It is no surprise that the constructivist approach calls for 
the contextualising perception of the Other, which reflects the construction of an 
international identity which is the outcome of internal developments of the EU and Russia.  
Contextualising the perception of the Middle East deserves attention with respect to 
interconnections and interrelations with the EU and Russia, where the EU’s and Russia’s 
perceptions of the Middle East significantly influence the way they make their foreign 
policies. Accordingly, from its entirety it assumes an importance which informs the EU 
and Russian foreign policy-making towards Palestinian statehood.  
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7.4 The Self-Other Perception and the Establishment of a Palestinian 
State  
The establishment of a Palestinian state is at the centre of EU and Russian foreign policy 
as a step towards peace in the Middle East. I have found that identity and Self-Other 
perception limit EU and Russian efforts to realise this goal. They hold that any action in 
this regard should be consistent with Israeli concerns, making it a top priority in the EU–
Russian diplomacy. This is a matter rooted in European history and which takes a high 
priority in public opinion towards the Middle East. This ascribes to the perception of Jews 
as victims. Also Israel constitutes an advance geostrategic base that would not contradict 
European interests.  
   
In this regard, the EU and Russia took a stance on, and responded to, most of the events 
towards solving the conflict in order to construct a global actorness self-image. Namely, 
the perception of actorness constituted the cornerstone in informing EU policy-making in 
the case of Israel-Palestine.  Despite the fear that the EU and Russia responded positively, 
rhetorically, regarding the proposed Arab League Peace Initiative and the Geneva 
Initiative for which they provided a regional and Palestinian mandate to both efforts, since 
it proposed to normalise relations between Israel and the Arab and Islamic countries and 
pave the way to reach a solution on the final status issues, especially refugees and 
Jerusalem, the EU and Russia did not take any real action to pressure Israel and push 
forward towards a final peace settlement.      
 
However, EU policy towards Palestinian state-building focuses on building strong 
Palestinian security services and the reformation of Palestinian public institutions. This is 
consistent with the EU’s Self-perception as a normative power and net exporter of 
security. In contrast, Russia focuses on security training and cooperation. Both actors 
stress the need to enhance the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) ability to fulfil its commitments 
regarding Israel, such as security and continuing the negotiation process. When Israel 
imposed a siege on Arafat at his headquarter in Ramallah, the EU and Russia accepted the 
Israeli position as an internal Israeli security matter. Moreover, the EU pressured the PA to 
make political and administrative reforms especially in the security sector. The EU also 
adopted the Israeli perspective on peace-negotiations by focusing on security as an 
outcome, rather than as negotiations to finding solutions to the final status issues.  Despite 
the illegality of the Separation Wall, the EU and Russia dealt with it as a de facto reality 
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that maintains the security of Israel.  Also, the EU and Russia shared putting pressure on 
the PA to conduct presidential and parliamentary elections in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, which was to renew PA legitimacy to carry out the Road Map objectives in which 
security commitments were the high priority.  
Contrary to the desired aim, Hamas won the Parliamentary elections. Hamas, whose 
ideology and political thought are inconsistent with the establishment of the PA in 
maintaining Israeli security and continuing with an open-ended peace process, has played a 
role in informing the EU response towards the 2006 elections. Moreover they feared that 
Hamas would constitute a model which might spread to neighbouring countries. The 
emergence of Hamas as a state-actor in Palestinian politics causes a challenge to the EU, 
but less of a challenge for Russia. The EU position on Hamas is defined by its perception 
of the Hamas model as a challenge to European actorness in the region as well as its 
principles of non-violence resistance against Israel and perception of Israel to which 
Hamas constitutes a key threat.   
 
Having Hamas at the top of the Palestinian political system contravenes EU actorness and 
delimits its influence in the region. The rise of Hamas as a state-actor was perceived as a 
power that limited EU influence according to its nature as a resistance movement against 
the Israelis, which is incompatible with the European strategy in the region. Russia, to 
some extent, shares the European view on Hamas, but with less concern due to Hamas’s 
position on the Chechnya war and its strategy of non-intervention. Additionally, Russia 
has very good relations with Hamas’s former allies, Syria and Iran. This perception of 
Hamas by both the EU and Russia led to a boycott of the Hamas-led Government in 2006 
and the Palestinian Unity Government which was established after the Mecca Agreement 
in 2007. Most interestingly, Russia agreed to the Quartet conditions on the Hamas-led 
Government, and at the same time opened a diplomatic channel with Hamas. This shows 
Russian willingness to deal with all parties in the Middle East for the sake of its interests 
and influence in the region.  
 
Moreover, when the moment of reality came and the establishment of a Palestinian state 
based on international law and UNSCRs needed real acts, the EU was divided. As a result 
the EU succumbed to Israeli demands. While Russia supported the Palestinian bid at the 
UNSC/GA, its support was conditional upon the PA abstaining from using Palestinian 
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membership in the UN against Israel. The EU’s role as a peace-maker actor towards the 
establishment of a Palestinian state is affected by a number of important challenges, as the 
EU is seen as a diverse entity which is subject to internal pressures, and its perception of 
the Palestinians in contrast to the Israelis. The rise of a new non-state actor such as Hamas 
has complicated the process of peace-making on the ground. On the other hand, the victory 
of Hamas represents a key weakness of the PA functions and poses a new division in the 
Palestinian leadership that could obstruct peace-negotiations.  
 
The contexts within which the EU and Russia perceive their Self, highlights the 
significance of the Middle East, which in turn, informs their involvement in the 
establishment of a Palestinian state.  That is, their involvement in the MEPP takes its 
importance from the strategic importance of the Middle East itself.   For the EU, the 
Middle East is a ‘test case’ in light of its growing ambitions, thus creating a presence and 
fostering influence in order to construct a sense of global actorness. The involvement is an 
opportunity that the EU seeks the Europeanisation of its periphery space through creating 
privileged forms of close relationships with the Middle Eastern countries. Through playing 
a role in the MEPP, the EU gets good access to translate its active role into a massive 
presence on economic, security and normative terms. This is the response to expectations 
and aspirations of European member-states and citizens under the umbrella of the EU. For 
Russia, the Middle East is a vital vector with respect to its ambition to reinvent its global 
actorness. That is, reviving their influence in the Middle East is a recognised objective in 
order to make Russia one of the most influential centres of the modern world. Thus, the 
involvement in the MEPP boosts its image in the area, which further expands Russia’s 
presence to reinforce its position on the international scene. To sum up, it is clear that the 
EU and Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process is Self-centric, 
focused on enhancing influence and reinforcing actorness. 
 
By using constructivism, the thesis finds that Russia differs in its perception of the Middle 
East from the EU. This difference derives from the difference in constructing their 
international identity and the extent that the Middle East represents significance in terms of 
opportunities and challenges. As discussed throughout the thesis, the perception of the 
Middle East has multifaceted distinctive elements whose effects are deeply felt on the 
involvement of the EU’s and Russia’s efforts towards Palestinian statehood. Since the 
establishment of post-Soviet Russia, the strategic importance of the Middle East has 
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always been at the centre of Russian foreign policy. Internal developments towards 
reinventing Russia’s global actorness and perception of the Middle East pushed forwards 
into playing an active role in its engagement in the MEPP.  In contrast, following the 
establishment of the EU, the geostrategic significance and intertwined relations with the 
Middle East have always been at the heart of EU policy towards its neighbours. Perception 
of the Middle East is the way to increase the EU’s visibility and presence globally deeply 
informs its involvement in the MEPP. So, constructivism suggests that constructing an 
international identity as a global actor and perception of the Middle East as vital 
opportunities and potential challenges inform and define foreign policy-making by the EU 
and Russia towards their engagement in the MEPP. This to say that, constructivism 
highlights the role of the Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making. 
 
7.5 Constructivism, Realism and Liberalism: A Critical Discussion of 
Foreign Policy-making 
This thesis has advanced constructivism as a reasonable expectation to help in providing a 
better understanding and analysis of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards 
Palestinian statehood. By stressing the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign 
policy-making, the study provides viable options and means of ‘assessing’ future trends of 
the EU’s and Russia’s policy towards Palestinian statehood. In this thesis, I have tried to 
demonstrate that normative and material contexts play a key role in constructing the 
identity of actors (in both directions) and inform foreign policy-making.  This is because 
these contexts provide a system of meanings that define actors interpreting their 
capabilities within their environment.  The interpretation of the EU’s and Russia’s 
capabilities pushes them towards building and reinventing a sense of global actorness. This 
Self-perception (which is a construct) of actors constitutes interests and actions especially 
in their neighborhood and periphery. Accordingly, the EU’s and Russia’s quest to play a 
global role drives them to an active engagement in making Middle Eastern politics, 
especially its core issue, Palestinian statehood.   
 
Realism and liberalism treat the construction of Self-interest and actors’ preferences as 
externally-determined givens. The Self exists in the three theories that address foreign 
policy-making but in different ways. While constructivism asserts that the Self is 
constructed through normative and material structures, realism and liberalism assume that 
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it existed prior to social interactions.  This study underscores that there is a difference 
between the Self-interest that realism offering, and Self-perception that constructivism 
premises in playing a role in EU-Russian foreign policy-making. Self-interest in realism 
builds on ‘human nature’ in which man’s innate lust for power plays the major role in 
making politics among nations. Morgenthau wrote that ‘man is born to seek power’.837  In 
this study I do not claim that this role does not exist. Naturally it exists, but in the case of 
states it is a ‘construct’ that takes a shape according to the contexts in which it is 
cultivated.  Constructivism does not deal with making foreign policy as a given, it goes 
behind the scenes to understand the components of the process of its making. This process 
is open to many changes that influence the construction of Self-perception which in turn, is 
central to making foreign policy.   That is, constructivism deals with the making of foreign 
policy as a reflection of internal developments which are changeable and not fixed. In the 
case of the EU and Russia, internal developments, as discussed above, play a key role in 
informing their foreign policy towards the MEPP. The involvement in the MEPP provides 
the EU and Russia the opportunity to achieve or maintain the best possible outcomes that 
serve their global actorness. Realism and liberalism dismiss the role of these internal 
interactions in informing the making of foreign policy. 
 
Realism places an emphasis on states which seek to maximise power accumulation and 
defend their national interests. Power, according to Morgenthau, is the desired end for 
states to achieve. In this thesis, power (as a material in both forms economic and military) 
is no longer the key objective and has little place in informing the EU’s and Russia’s 
stance towards Palestinian statehood. While Russia is very keen to refurbish its image as a 
peace maker and to be perceived as a defender of Christian Orthodox values, the EU, in 
contrast, is very eager to present itself as a normative and soft power and maintain its 
actorness as a promoter of democracy and good governance, as well as a net exporter of 
security, stability and prosperity. The engagement of the EU and Russia in peace-making 
is a sense of gaining power, but in terms of multilateral capabilities, not only in material 
ones.  That is, power is considered as a construct and is a reflection of their capabilities in 
multifaceted contexts.  
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Furthermore, maintaining a sphere of influence by the EU and Russia in the Middle East 
might be viewed as similar to a realist approach based on regional domination. From a 
realist perspective, the EU and Russia are global players which compete with each other 
and struggle with other global powers in the region. In this perspective, maintaining a 
sphere of influence that rests on human nature informs actions towards peace-making. 
Whilst from a constructivist perspective, involvement in peace-making is an attempt to 
construct actorness through building a sphere-of-influence in the Middle East.  This is an 
external expectation for both the EU and Russia, but it is not only to accumulate material 
power as realists assume. The Wider Europe Initiative seeks to enlarge the European 
sphere outside Europe’s borders. ENP was designed to build bridges with neighbouring 
countries as a framework to increase European influence in the Middle East. Alongside 
Euro-Med, these official documents might be viewed as a realist approach to boost EU 
influence in the Middle East. But, the EU discourse in these documents is dominated by 
normative rhetoric that emphasises normative and civilian actorness. Most of the 
concluded Association Agreements within the framework of the ENP with EU 
neighbouring countries emphasises the projection of democracy, good governance, 
transparency, and human rights.  Russia, in contrast, is very keen to restore its influence in 
the region, but bases its approach on cooperation not confrontation. Also, Russia accepted 
Quartet membership and plays an active role in this forum.   
 
Peace-making is the common channel that both the EU and Russia use, but the mechanism 
and policies of constructing their spheres of influence are different.  In this difference, I 
find that Self-Other perception plays a role. This role is manifest in their quest for 
acceptance as equal global actors by other global and regional players in the region. That 
is, the role is limited and subjected to power of capabilities which are not only military. 
The role in the peace process is perceived as a proof of both the EU’s and Russia’s rising 
significance for their constituencies and the presumption of increased influence in Middle 
Eastern politics. Also, for the EU, it is a proof of accepting the EU’s values as guiding 
principles that facilitate peace-making in the Middle East. Thus, this role is about 
accepting the EU and Russia as soft rather than hard powers in the making of the Middle 
East politics.   
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However, Waltz argues that the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for 
security.
838
 In this study, I have found that security is one of the key concerns, but not the 
ultimate one that informs EU and Russian foreign policy towards the MEPP.  Security in 
this region is more than vital to Russia’s territorial integrity and internal security in the 
light of twisted interrelations and criss-cross interactions.  Perceiving the Middle East as a 
threat is not the ultimate motive that drives Russia to engage in the MEPP. Similarly, the 
EU is very sensitive to security concerns which do play a role in pushing the EU into 
active involvement in the MEPP. For instance, the EU’s normative zeal is a substantial 
apparatus in its endeavor to be recognised as a net exporter not only of security, but also of 
stability, prosperity, democracy and good governance in Europe and beyond her borders. 
More than that, EU attitudes towards security matters in the Middle East are heavily 
influenced by its normative Self-perception. 
Even the EU attempts to cast its perception of security issues with the Middle Eastern 
countries as a normative matter that is rooted in both social and political systems. A 
number of documents, such as the European Security Strategy and the Wider Europe 
Initiative explicitly advocate security matters from a normative prospective.  The EU 
approach in dealing with security matters which are a result of the Middle Eastern conflict 
is an explicit linkage to this normative perception of security which is in contrast to the 
neorealist approach. That is, the EU’s and Russia’s desire to take part in the MEPP, is 
worthy to deal with security matters but also to restructure their multifaceted relations.  
 
Moreover, both liberal and neoliberal perspectives in foreign policy-making assume 
increased interdependence and sustainable development between countries which leads to 
enhanced cooperation and peace. That is, states seek to achieve the desired end of welfare 
which is considered a primary concern of states. The EU’s and Russia’s relations with the 
Middle East are characterised by multifaceted levels between societies and governments.  
These intertwined relations are embodied in trade and economic partnerships, as well as 
the energy sector. The EU is eager to be perceived in the Middle East as a more convenient 
partner than Russia, China or the USA. Russia competes to integrate its economy with the 
most significant economies of the Middle Eastern countries. The EU also has a strong 
economic relationship with Israel and the Palestinians are heavily dependent on 
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international aid, especially from the EU. Israel is one of the EU’s leading trade partners 
and forms part of many EU research programmes. Relations between Russia and Israel 
have also reached unprecedented levels of growth, in multifaceted contexts.  
 
This interdependence did not bring the peace and sustainable development which 
liberalism had assumed it would. Equally it did not decrease the level of conflict. Thus, I 
can say that interdependence as a construct in most of the vital domains can play a key role 
in designing and arranging relationships between actors. This means that interdependence 
is a platform to increase cooperation and mutual benefits, but not the prime motive that 
informs the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. In contrast, the 
findings have shown that the EU’s and Russia’s perception of Israel plays a major 
determinant in establishing a Palestinian state. The EU constructs interdependence in areas 
that serve its actorness. Also, this EU policy of increasing interdependence predominates 
as a result of its economic and normative policies towards peace-making. Likewise, 
prosperity is one of the main features that the EU is eager to stress, and to be perceived as 
an exporter of it, but it is not the prime objective informing EU foreign policy.  The Wider 
Europe Initiative defines a number of instruments which aim to increase interdependence 
between the EU and the Middle Eastern countries. The EU has used normative discourse 
for sustainable development in the Middle East and peace-making in which financial aid 
has been conditional upon the projection of its normative principles.  
7.6 Reflections on the Collected Data 
Most of the data that I have analysed presents a kind of reflection of internal developments 
rather than rationality in foreign policy-making. Primary sources that I collected on the 
EU’s and Russia’s discourse in making their foreign polices speak as much about Self-
constructed forms of actorness which are subject to analysis and interpretation in this 
thesis. Documents on the EU and Russia that I have used have provided background and 
contexts that allow onr to track changes and the development of constructing their 
international identity. On the EU side, primary and secondary sources on the formation of 
the EU’s expectation of being a global normative and economic actor reflect its internal 
developments rather than a rational choice of foreign policy-makers. Internal 
developments that occurred in the aftermath of WWII, and the context of enlargement 
towards Central and Eastern Europe underscore the quest to play an international role as a 
normative and economic power. European internal developments in the search for a global 
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role and the extent to which this role will support EU global actorness represents a key 
determinant of foreign policy-making. On the Russian side, events and interactions in the 
post-Soviet era underscore how Self-perception has been constructed and what the main 
determinants are for conducting Russian foreign policy. These primary sources tell the 
onlooker a considerable amount about the reconstruction of Russia’s international identity 
and the extent to which recovering from weakness and rebuilding capabilities dominate 
Russia foreign policy-making.   
 
For triangulation purposes, I have used a variety of primary and secondary sources which 
contributed greatly in enhancing the discussion of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy 
towards the MEPP. I collected my data from different sources such as speeches, press 
statements, newspapers, magazines, official documents, interviews, and press releases. My 
aim has been to try as much as possible to validate my research by verifying the same 
information, through the use of different sources of data (spoken and written). This 
triangulation of data is assumed in the social sciences to strengthen the credibility and 
validity of research findings. Most of the primary sources I have used are responses to 
problems, challenges and opportunities, whether in internal or external contexts. The EU 
discourse reflects internal developments over more than sixty years especially after its 
establishment in 1992, and external expectations and aspirations express these interactions. 
Thus, collected data on EU foreign policy display interactions based mainly on internal 
and partly on external contexts and how these developments heavily influenced the 
construction of the EU’s international identity which, in turn, informs the making of its 
foreign policy.  
 
Similarly, the Russian discourse reflects interactions and developments that happened in 
the post-Soviet era. These interactions and developments deeply influenced problems and 
challenges that faced Russia in this period and which played a key role in reinventing 
Russia’s international identity. Thus, the data that I collected introduced critical thinking 
and allowed a better understanding of the meaning of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy 
towards Palestinian statehood. By using this sort of data, it is easy to generate 
constructivist interpretations about foreign policy-making and the formation of external 
expectations by the EU and Russia. The major emphasis that I have paid is on interpreting 
the text within a context. It is worth underlining that it is not the text (speech, official 
document,  interview, etc.) per se that matters, but rather what it means in terms of doing 
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(actions) that takes place afterwards that assert a kind of actorness. The discussion has 
shown that interpretation of Text is attained when all three elements of the mechanism 
balance (saying, doing, being).  
7.7 Future Studies 
In academia, researchers, by using the theory of constructivism, can find their niche   in 
studying political phenomena in the foreign policy realm. In this thesis, identity-based 
factors that have been interpreted and analysed present the strength of constructivism in 
theorising foreign policy-making by global actors. In line with this research, future 
researchers could examine foreign policy–making towards final status issues such as 
borders, refugees, settlements, Jerusalem, Jewishness of Israel, etc.   Emphasising how 
Self-Other perception informs foreign policy-making towards these issues provides deep 
understanding to finding a solution through the perception of these issues themselves. 
However, constructivism can also offer a better understanding of the transformation of its 
position towards the Arab Spring, especially towards Libya, Syria, and Egypt. On the other 
hand, the findings of this study invite Palestinian researchers and advocates of Palestinian 
rights to take on the challenge of working to change the perception of the MEPP as an 
open ended process and a channel to establish a Palestinian state, not a channel to enhance 
their interests. 
 
Significance of this kind of study  
This study has provided evidence that identity and Self-Other perception have the potential 
to enhance the study of foreign policy-making by global players towards the Middle East. 
Moreover, I believe that a further potential for ‘cross-fertilisation’ between the realm of 
foreign policy and other social science areas of study certainly exists. The findings of this 
thesis should contribute to the constructivist theory of foreign policy-making by global 
players to improve our understanding of the relationship among constructed identity in a 
multifaceted contexts of Self-perception and the perception of Otherness, whether in 
positive or negative ways.  I hope that the findings of this research will be able to inform 
practice and influence foreign policy decision-makers. These findings challenge the realist 
assumption that nation-states or their policy-makers are the most important actors in 
understanding international relations and there is a sharp distinction between domestic and 
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international politics.
839
  Realism focuses on power as an inherent goal for politics among 
states.
840
 However, the constructivist approach can work as a meta-theory to explain the 
formation of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy. It can be applied to different 
assumptions within realist and liberal approaches. It would be naïve to argue that EU’s and 
Russia’s foreign policy are  only informed by power or security. Even if it were possible in 
terms of some political phenomena to argue from liberal or realist perspectives, the 
dynamic of Self-Other perception will be present and arguable.  
 
In sum, contemporary constructivist research in investigating the phenomena of 
relationships between global actors and the Middle East issues is vibrant. Constructivism 
allows us not only to better understand the role of identity and Self-Other perception in the 
MEPP, but also to guide analysis and interpretations of other socio-political phenomena 
involving power relations in this region.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
The investigation into the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy-making towards the creation 
of a Palestinian state takes its importance from the failure of diplomatic efforts to realise 
the right of the Palestinian people to a viable and independent state. During the first decade 
of the 21
st
 century, establishing a Palestinian state, which is the central puzzle of this 
thesis, has been at the core of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards the MEPP. To 
investigate this puzzle, this study  was built primarily on the assumption that identity and 
Self-Other perception play a key role in informing both actors’ policies towards a 
Palestinian state. By interpreting the EU’s and Russia’s discourse in the course of making 
foreign policy, I came to the conclusion that the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy-making 
is Self-centric and revolves around reinforcing their influence in the Middle East, 
underpinning their actorness in the world, and improving their image as peace-makers 
rather than actually making peace. By supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state,   
the EU succeeded in realising presence and visibility in the region, but failed to defend its 
principles in promoting democracy, which is at the centre of its normative power, and 
failed to translate this presence to actorness, especially its failure to support the Palestinian 
bid at the UNGA.  Russia meanwhile succeeded in refurbishing the old Soviet influence in 
the region, and partly succeeded in displaying credibility through its support for 
Palestinian statehood at both the UNSC and the UNGA.    
In this thesis I argue that these unsuccessful and ineffective diplomatic efforts to establish 
a Palestinian state can be better understood by taking into consideration the influence of 
identity and Self-Other perception in the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy-making.  In my 
discussion I focus, in a comparison, on how Self-perception as a global actor, and 
perception of Otherness, in the Middle East in general and the conflict between Israelis and 
Palestinians in particular, has influenced the quest for Palestinian statehood. I argue that 
the constructivist approach in studying foreign policy-making provides a better 
understanding of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. This 
argument challenges the conventional assumptions that foreign policy-making towards 
Palestinian statehood are informed by power, security and interdependence. In this process 
of investigation and exploration I have used discourse analysis as a methodological 
analytical tool to interpret the EU’s and Russia’s discourse towards the Middle East peace 
process in general, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular. This method of 
analysis provides a better interpretation by contextualising the EU and Russian foreign 
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policies. It utilises the golden base of interpretation that there is no meaning without 
context.  This has explored how the process of saying (informing) gives a meaning and 
presence of its polity through a series of policies (actions) in order to assert its actorness 
(identity). In order to investigate the process of achieving global actorness as a prime 
motive behind the EU’s and Russia’s involvement in the MEPP, I have used the model of 
Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler.   
 
The linkage between internal developments and external expectations helps us to a better 
understanding of foreign policy-making. The collapse of the USSR and the breakup of its 
bloc in Europe and Central Asia constitutes the broad context in which the EU’s and 
Russia’s Self-perception were constructed and reinvented. The EU and Russia are striving 
to construct and reinvent their international identities in a series of differences such as 
principles and values, economic and military capabilities, and soft powers. Building an 
international identity in these contexts is central to the EU and Russia in order to assert 
their global actorness in the world arena. In both cases, this international identity is an 
external expectation to meet internal developments. In the case of the EU, it meets the 
spill-over of the European community that is designed to secure and maintain the famous 
trio: European stability, security and prosperity, which are an external expectation to 
represent the size and economic weight of the Union. Therefore, the EU stresses its 
civilian nature and emphasises its global actorness in terms of normative values, peace-
making, soft power and economic capabilities. The EU’s attempts to construct this 
international identity is a reflection of its Self-perception in terms of history, culture and 
economic weight.  
 
In the case of Russia, the decline in its international position has caused an identity crisis 
between constructing a new international identity by dependence on the heritage and 
legacy of the former Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia, or becoming a follower of Western 
policies. The collapse left post-Soviet Russia with many internal problems such as internal 
security and stability, a technological gap, a weak economy, guaranteed free trade 
movements for its goods and services, and protecting Russian assets, especially gas and 
oil, in the world market. Thus, global actorness was perceived as the guarantor to heal its 
internal disarray and turmoil.  Russian foreign policy is very sensitive to any efforts that 
might affect its internal security, territorial integrity and economic integration in the world 
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economy. Therefore, Russia focuses on reinventing its international position in different 
contexts such as energy, economics, the military, and culture.  
  
Self-perception is reflected in the formulation of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy 
towards the Middle East in general and the peace settlement in particular. Playing a role in 
the MEPP is an important ideal for the EU and Russia that tends to reaffirm their actorness 
in the region. It takes its importance from the perception of the Middle East which can 
enhance their capabilities and underpin their actorness on the international stage.  The 
Middle East is a geostrategic nerve centre of world politics and is perceived as a vital 
sphere in different contexts. It has been perceived as a region of multilayered interests and 
challenges: a region of interrelated economic relations, especially in trade and energy, a 
region of intersecting historical relations in terms of religion and civilisation, a region of 
insecurity where threats of so-called “terrorism” originate, as well as a region of instability 
with rather undemocratic and authoritarian regimes. These interrelations and 
interconnections have increased the EU’s and Russia’s focus on this region. This strategic 
importance of the Middle East, its geographical proximity, its interconnected bonds, and 
interrelated relations are incentives which pushed the EU and Russia to search for an 
active role in its policy-making.  This makes it difficult for the EU and Russia to ignore the 
MEPP. Such a region, at the crossroads between three continents, with a huge amount of 
natural resources and energy supplies, as well as the homeland of the three Abrahamic 
religions, is a vital sphere to create presence and exercise actorness.      
  
The MEPP is an important and key channel to approach the Middle East. That reinforcing 
influence in the Middle Eastern countries is a chief motive that informs the EU’s and 
Russia’s involvement in the peace-making process in indelible.  That is, active 
involvement in the MEPP provides easy access to take a role in the policy-making of this 
vibrant region.  
 
The making of their MEPP foreign policy is largely performed under the effect and 
influence of Self-perception. The EU finds itself caught between promoting its principles 
and values to assert itself as a normative power, and guarding its economic interests and 
acting as an economic power; between being normative and soft and defending its member 
states’ national interests; and between being a peace-maker and a normative principles 
promoter, and grantor and guard of its member states security, stability and prosperity.  
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Meanwhile Russia finds itself seeking to assert its successor to the former Soviet Union, 
protector of former Soviet clients, balancing policy towards all parties, and 
counterbalancing other global actors in the Middle East which continue to drive Russian 
foreign policy towards the Middle East.  
Therefore, the EU and Russia strongly struggle to play a role in this process.   The idea is 
to seize this channel into the Middle East to increase their influence and to assert Self-
determination as actors. The main change on the European and Russian side is to seize the 
potential decline of American hegemony in this region.  To Russia, the core objective of its 
foreign policy-making is ‘making the federation work’; that is, to maintain its geographical 
size and strengthen its economic and political muscle.  Restoring Russia’s actorness in 
world politics was the assumption that no other choice would lead Russia to overcome its 
economic, territorial integrity and security problems. Further, that, being a global actor 
will make the Russian Federation operate well, which will improve Russia’s ability to 
boost economic growth, reinforce its internal and external security environment, especially 
the stand-off against NATO, and to delegitimise movements that call for independence or 
separation in the North Caucasus. Therefore, the rehabilitation of Soviet influence in the 
Middle East has been a strategic objective. Putin’s slogan “Great Russia” (2000)  needs 
material resources, political leverage and public drive to make it real. The Middle East as a 
vector is to improve Russia’s bargaining opportunities in these domains. Longer term, 
Russia seeks to play a major role in the making of this region’s politics that pour into its 
interests.  The restoration of Soviet influence in the Middle East helped Russia to recover 
its inefficient economy, bridge the technological gap by increasing its share in the Middle 
East market and face challenges of fragile security and stability by neutralising religious 
factors and financial support coming from the region.  
 
To the EU, being a global actor in the region and in the world, makes the Union function 
better; that is, it helps the EU to burnish its identity by adding a new layer to its 
institutional construct thus strengthening and confirming its collective identity. This shows 
its member states how authoritative and influential the Union has become.  By playing an 
active role and constructing good relations with most of the ME countries, the EU tends to 
assert its political legitimacy at an internal level, and enhance its influence on the world 
scene. This underpins European solidarity and integration so that member-states may look 
at themselves as a part of an influential and powerful global actor. Additionally, the ME as 
a foreign policy field is used as a parcel of external policies that aims to widen and 
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consolidate the Europeanisation process in Europe. Beyond these aims it is also used to 
extend the European project outside its borders in terms of influence and a wider European 
landscape in geographical proximity. 
 
 In addition, making the Union function better helps to undermine the ideas of nationalist 
groups and parties. It helps in strengthening inter-state bonds and lessens the idea of 
nation-states that lay behind destructive European wars for centuries. As well, the 
actorness in peace mediation is important through which European citizens fathom their 
position in world politics and receive the meaning of being together and working 
collectively on the world stage.  To a large degree, actorness in different contexts gives a 
meaning to internal constituencies and shapes state policy responses and underpins policy-
makers in gathering a mandate for their policies.  The existing high level of cooperation 
between the EU and US in many areas, as their policies can be regarded as compatible, at 
the present, the EU introduces itself as an equal strategic partner or even an  alternative  in 
the making of Middle East politics.  The internal developments in terms of enlargement 
have increased the level of external presumption in which the member-states expect to play 
an active role to meet their ambitions. 
 
This perception of the Self as well as the perception of the Middle East has largely 
informed foreign policy-making towards establishing the Palestinian state. This is reflected 
by the EU’s and Russia’s focus on reinforcing their influence more than making peace. 
Through the analysis of  EU and Russian discourse security informs the establishment of 
the Palestinian state.  Both actors consider the conflict a breeding ground for extremism. 
The EU and Russia share the same perception that the long a waited Palestinian state must 
be consistent with the Israeli perspective of security. This appeared in the EU’s and 
Russia’s reaction towards the Apartheid Separation Wall and the siege of Arafat. This 
policy by both actors cannot be separated from their perception of the Middle East in 
general and their perception of Israel in particular. Their perception of interrelations with 
Israel, in different contexts, forms a major limitation to the process of establishing a 
Palestinian state.  This security-based perception will continue to inform the EU’s and 
Russia’s foreign policy towards peace-making between the Palestinians and Israelis.        
 
The EU has increased its presence in the Middle East as a state-builder and an exporter of 
democracy and good governance that have helped to increase its leverage in the region. It 
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uses its financial capabilities to implement related polices. These financial aids are 
conditions to the EU-Palestinian Association Agreement which sets up action plans that 
represent the EU perspective on making peace between Palestinians and Israelis. This 
normative-based perception of peace-making has driven the EU to force the PA to conduct 
institutional reforms.  The policy emphasised promoting democracy and institutional 
reforms to pave the way to Palestinian statehood through preventing scenarios of collapse 
and escalating into disarray, and undermining the roots of so-called “Palestinian violence” 
by containing the political and social forces in the political system. This policy brought 
Hamas to power from the gates of democracy. In this regard, the EU was caught between 
accepting the result of the democratic process and accepting Hamas although it was 
classified, by the EU, as a “terrorist organization”. The perception of Hamas, in terms of 
its political construct in contrast to the perception of Israel and in the light of enhancing 
EU influence in the region, drove the EU to boycott the Hamas-led government. This 
means that EU policy towards Palestinian statehood was driven by the desire to reinforce 
its presence in the Middle East. The EU succeeded in enhancing its presence in peace-
making, but failed to translate this presence into actorness. This contradiction between the 
perception of the Self and the perception of the Israelis in contrast to the Palestinians 
clearly appeared at the UNGA. The EU failed to vote collectively at the UNGA in favour 
of upgrading Palestinian status.   
 
By playing a role in the MEPP, Russia succeeded in boosting its presence in Middle 
Eastern politics and partly restored Soviet influence in this region. Unlike the EU, Russian 
involvement in the process of state-building focuses on little financial aid, but bigger 
political support. Russia’s emphasis on preserving a seat in this process is about more that 
making peace. This is because Russia’s main desire is to refurbish Soviet leverage in the 
area and enhance its position in making the region’s politics. Russian policy is more 
pragmatic in dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that is perceived as a chronic and 
intractable conflict in the world. Accordingly, Russia is playing the game “friends of all” 
in its peace mediation, for example, unlike the EU, Russia supported the Quartet 
conditions and, at the same time, keeps a diplomatic channel open with Hamas. Russia is 
attempting to exploit the contradictions in the relations between Hamas and other global 
actors. It is trying to use the space that Hamas makes in Middle Eastern politics to enhance 
its influence in the region.  Mainly, Russia is interested in the region, not in having a 
relationship with Hamas. Russian historical support for the Palestinians is one of the main 
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drives that lead it to support and vote at the UNSC and the UNGA in favour of Palestinian 
statehood. The Russian position at the UNGA is consistent with its commitment towards 
supporting its clients and friends in the Middle East. In spite of the fact that Russia’s 
importance in establishing PA’s institutions is slight, it succeeded in showing strong 
political support for the idea of Palestinian statehood. Regardless of that, Russia took into 
consideration its relations with Israel when they chose to limit Palestinian status to non-
member observer status at the UNGA so as not to be used against Israel.     
Finally, the Self-perception of EU and Russian foreign policy as a global player highly 
informed their foreign policy-making towards a Palestinian state. This is reflected in 
defining the foreign policy instruments that both actors designate to enhance their 
influence in the Middle East. Establishing the Palestinian state, as part of the MEPP, takes 
its importance from the significance of the Middle East. Its strategic importance in terms 
of economy, energy and trade, and historical, cultural and religious bonds, especially the 
Levant, largely drive the EU and Russia to become involve actively in the peace process.   
EU and Russian support for the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian 
state is, to large extent, informed by the Self-Other perception of both actors. This has 
created limitations that define the road map towards Palestinian statehood and make the 
EU and Russia to prefer process more than peace-making in the region. 
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